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BEHAVIOR OF THE TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
Much of what we think we know about the behavior of the tort
litigation system is untrue, unknown, or unknowable. This Article
explicates that proposition and its implications and suggests
approaches for narrowing the immense gap that now exists between
the system as we imagine it and the system as it is.
Students2 of legal policy face an intellectual challenge compara-
ble to that encountered by paleontologists and archaeologists. On
the evidence of a few bones, a whole dinosaur must be extrapolated.
From a fragment of spandrel, the design of an entire arch and its
ornamentation must be deduced. Similarly, our current understand-
ing of the tort litigation system is constructed of inferences built
upon evidence that is surprisingly incomplete and inadequate.
Paleontologists and archaeologists have an advantage over
students of the litigation system. They know how fragmentary their
evidence often is and how brittle are the resulting inferences.
Accordingly, they proceed with suitable caution. The same cannot
be said of those concerned with the litigation system. On the other
hand, our counterparts in the antiquities suffer a disadvantage: they
can do little to improve upon the few fragments of evidence that
come into their possession. By contrast, improved understanding
of the behavior of the litigation system need not remain forever
beyond reach.
The purpose of this Article is to help us extend that reach. This
Article will review the existing empirical evidence on the behavior
of the tort litigation system and demonstrate the inadequacy of that
evidence for drawing trustworthy conclusions about the way the
system actually performs or for redesigning the system in ways that
will cause it to work predictably better. The larger purpose is to
suggest the kinds of information needed to gain real comprehension
of and control over the litigation system.
2 Scholars, policy-makers, and policy-influencers.
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I. PREPARING FOR THE DIG
A. Implications and Importance
A reasonably veridical picture of the actual (rather than the
assumed or asserted) behavior of the tort litigation system is a
necessary but missing ingredient for addressing a wide range of
questions, from theory to policy to strategy.
The substantive rules of tort law exist to serve certain social
purposes. The most prominent among these are compensating
innocent victims for injury and deterring behavior that presents
risks that exceed their social value.3 In order to devise rules that
will accomplish these goals, rulemakers operate from some model,
some image, of the problems the rules are designed to ameliorate
and the means by which they will do so. Debate over fundamental
alternatives-market, tort, administrative compensation, no-fault,
socialized regulatory systems, etc.-depends heavily on comparisons
of the effects these different compensation and deterrence systems
are expected to have on the problems to be solved. Systems and
rules are evaluated by comparing their intended effects to their
actual effects.4 Reformers typically make reference to precisely this
gap between goals and performance.
Proposed reforms in substantive law must be evaluated against
images of a predicted future without that change and a future with
the contemplated changes. The utility of such planning depends
upon the accuracy of our models of the system and the world upon
which it is to act. Once in place, the intended effects of reforms
must be evaluated against their actual effects to see if they have
been effectual, ineffectual, 5 or perhaps made matters worse.6
3 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABREsI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 26 (1970) (taking it as "axiomatic that the principal function of accident law
is to reduce the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding accidents");
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th
ed. 1984) (stating that tort law's "primary purpose is to compensate [the victim] for
the damage suffered, at the expense of the wrongdoer"); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 176 (1986) (stating that "[m]aintaining the credibility of
the tort system requires that if a defendant is found liable, he must pay damages at
least as great as [the victim's losses]"). In circumstances where the harm was inflicted
deliberately or recklessly, punishment resembling criminal sanctions becomes an
additional objective of tort law. See KEETON ET AL., supra, § 2, at 9.
4 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1235-37 (1931) (noting that one of "the common points of
departure" of legal realists is "[a]n insistence on evaluation of any part of law in terms
of its effects").
5 See, e.g.,Julie Homey & Cassia Spohn, Rape Law Reform and Instrumental Change
BEHAVIOR OF THE TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM
Even lawmaking that appears brilliant within its closed circle of
assumptions can lose some of its shine when the time comes to
deploy it in the real world.
7
The effects of substantive rules are intertwined not only with the
effects of legal procedure8 but also with the effects of the social,
economic, and technological environment-the legal system's milieu
externe. Unless the picture is sufficiently detailed and thoughtfully
analyzed, it would be impossible to distinguish the effects of
changes in the law from changes in the law's social, economic, or
technological surround. 9 As a result, most discussions of the
in Six Urban Jurisdictions, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 117, 117 (1991) (reporting that rape
law reform in six cities failed to produce the expected effects: "predicted results were
found in only one of the six jurisdictions, and there the results were limited").
6 Legislating blind has the potential to exacerbate old problems or create new
ones. See, e.g., PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 82 (1985) (stating that "[of] the post-1975 tort reforms [two of
them] significantly reduced claim severity, but none of the others had a discernible
impact"); Stephen Shmanske & Tina Stevens, The Performance of Medical Malpractice
Review Panels, 11 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 525, 535 (1986) (concluding that the
medical malpractice review panel system does not work as intended to lower costs,
but rather "seems to lead to more formal disputes which take longer to resolve at
greater cost"). See generally LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS: CONUNDRUMS
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 49 (1987) (discussing the improbability of even a meticulous
drafter's foreseeing all, or nearly all, of the contingencies and consequences of
proposed legislation). Further examples of legislation having unintended effects will
become evident as this Article unfolds.
7 See TERESA A. SULLIvAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 336 (1989) ("To advocate law reforms without a
shred of evidence about how the system currently works, who is likely to be affected,
and how those effects may reverberate throughout the system is breathtakingly
negligent.").
8 The effects of the rules of civil procedure have not been particularly well-
studied, despite their general applicability and high visibility in the legal system. See
Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field
Experiments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67, 67. On the 50th
anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Walker reviewed all of the
empirical studies done to test whether the Rules were having their intended effects.
He found only a handful of such studies. In order to turn the scholarship and
rulemaking of legal procedure into something more than a high stakes guessing game,
Walker proposes a methodology of ongoing field experiments. See id.
9 An example may sharpen the point: Strict liability for injuries resulting from
products is cited as the cause of increases in product liability litigation, plaintiffs'
verdicts, size of awards, punitive damage awards, and resulting effects on industry.
But suppose that during the same period the sheer number of products increased, the
range of people who used them increased, the wealth of corporations increased,
management methods changed, the marketplace changed, and so on. Products need
not have become more dangerous in order for there to be more injuries and
commensurate claims. For example, clothing ranks as more dangerous (40th most
hazardous product group) than chain saws (the 125th most hazardous). See BUREAU
1992] 1151
1152 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1147
effects of legal rules and changes in legal rules are unavoidably
speculative.
Similarly, assei ted harmful discontinuities in the behavior of the
tort litigation system can be evaluated and dealt with effectively only
if the necessary evidence and analysis are developed.1 0 The data
available concerning various aspects of a litigation crisis are
inadequate to assess rationally the validity of the asserted con-
cerns. I I Yet belief in a litigation crisis exists widely. Motivated by
OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, CONSUMER PRODUCT
HAZARD INDEX 7, 10 (1976). Thus, we first need to be sure that we are talking about
changes in litigation that actually occurred and not those assumed to have occurred.
For example, have punitive damage awards in these cases really grown more frequent
or severe? See infra notes 389-434 and accompanying text. And if they have, can we
untangle the multiple possible causes to determine which are really responsible? In
principle, the answer is yes but the data now available are insufficient to answer this
question.
10 The principal manifestation of the crisis was precipitous increases in insurance
premiums. That, at least, is the principal complaint voiced and the principal piece
of evidence offered by most commentators. See, e.g., James R. Posner, Trends in
Medical Malpractice Insurance, 1970-1985, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs., Spring 1986, at
37, 38, 47 (noting that "[s]udden, sharp increases in the cost of medical malpractice
insurance" are "[c]ommonly cited in the press as evidence of crisis"). As an
illustration of the point, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL LIABIIxrY AND MALPRACTICE (1987). This report devotes
16 of its 17 data tables, and commensurate discussion, to malpractice premiums,
profitability problems of the malpractice insurance industry, and physicians' office
expenses. The principal cause of the crisis was said to be tort litigation: changes in
the laws themselves or growing use of tort litigation by increasingly litigious citizens
(afraid to accept the risks of life and wanting businesses and professionals to
indemnify them from all harm) filing ever more lawsuits, aided by increasingly greedy
lawyers and generous jurors who make ever more unpredictable decisions, which
nevertheless add up to more plaintiff victories, larger awards, and more punitive
damages. See HUGH R.JONES, INSURING OUR FUTURE: REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON LIABILITY INSURANCE 11-13 (1986) [hereinafter GOVER-
NOR'S COMMISSION] (reporting fears that major New York institutions, from airports
to zoos, may have to close or scale back operations, an instance of the widespread
disruption to our national life caused by the unavailability of liability insurance, and
blaming increasingly litigious citizens aided by greedy lawyers and generous juries).
" See, e.g., Stephen Zuckerman et al., Information on Malpractice: A Review of
Empirical Research on Major Policy Issues, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 85,
85 (reviewing the literature on medical malpractice litigation and noting that "[e]ven
a casual follower of malpractice policy debates can see that the amount of published
and unpublished information is voluminous; however, very little of that information
consists of systematic empirical studies"). The New York Governor's Commission
noted:
[A]Ithough the existence of a crisis is broadly acknowledged, the forces
driving that crisis have remained shrouded in obscurity, confused by
controversy, and clouded by a paucity of data and analysis.... Absent a
comprehensive, fact-based perspective on why we are where we are, it has
been impossible to establish the broad framework of consensus on the
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fear of the perceived crisis's perceived consequences and guided by
its perceived causes, in the latter 1980s, nearly every state modified
its laws governing recovery for damages in tort.12 The felt need
to tame the crisis continues to place demands on the agendas of
courts and legislatures. 13 Under such circumstances, lawmakers
are forced to choose among failing to make needed reforms, making
changes on little more than widely shared assumptions, or making
compromises between widely divergent assertions. Legislating in
the dark is unlikely to produce constructive solutions.
14
Similarly, without accurate understanding of how the system
actually behaves, practitioners must rely instead on the comfort of
shared assumptions and guess what tactics and strategies will
advance the causes of their clients. Errors in understanding the
behavior of the litigation system lead to errors in case management
at every stage of litigation, from case selection, to negotiation of
settlements, to trial.15
nature of the problem which is the predicate to a dispassionate and
constructive resolution.
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 10, at 1-2.
12 This orgy of guesswork included caps on awards for compensatory or punitive
damages or both, regulation of attorneys and their fees, mandatory alternative dispute
resolution, limitations on or immunities for various kinds of potential injurers, the
collateral source rule, joint and several liability, periodic payments, and statutes of
limitations. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 1988 NCSL STATE
LEGISLATURE SUMMARY: LiABITY INSURANCE 5, 19, 25, 28 (1988); NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, RESOLVING THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS:
STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES IN 1986 (1986).
13 See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1043 (1991)
(upholding common law method for calculating punitive damages, but requiring that
"general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court.., enter
into the constitutional calculation"); S. 2027, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1990) (a "Bill
to require certain procedural changes in the United States district courts in order to
promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of civil actions"); S. 1400,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (proposing the Product Liability Reform Act);
Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 134
(1990) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) ("[G]rave[] concern[] [exists] about the so-called
litigation explosion and its effect on the working of our judicial system .... [T]he
volume of court cases has increased dramatically at all levels, State and Federal
courts."). Vice President Quayle caused a stir when in a speech to the American Bar
Association, he made a sweeping attack on the civil justice system, referring to it as
"a self-inflicted competitive disadvantage" and as "a system.., in danger of spinning
out of control" before unveiling 50 justice system reforms recommended by the
President's Council on Competitiveness. Vice President Danforth Quayle, Agenda for
CivilJustice Reform in America, Address Before the American Bar Association (Aug.
13, 1991), in N.J. L.J., Aug. 29, 1991, at 15, 25.
14 See supra text accompanying notes 5-7.
15 See e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Tral by Juiy or Judge:
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Without accurate pictures of the factual underpinnings, debates
about tort reform cannot proceed usefully. With inaccurate
pictures, their conclusions are likely to be in error. Part II, the
nucleus of this Article, contains many examples and considerable
analysis of the shortcomings in our understanding of the tort
litigation system.
B. Varieties of Non-Evidence and Not-Quite Evidence
About the Litigation System
1. Absence of Evidence
Data on the litigation system's behavior are meager.1 6 Even
the most complete data on federal and state court activity fall far
short of answering the most pressing and fundamental questions
about the performance of the litigation system. The Administrative
Office of the United States Courts (AO) has data on every federal
civil case. But these data have been gathered merely as tools of
caseload management. As a result, we can find out how the size of
the federal judicial caseload changed between any two given years,
but we cannot learn how the ratio of plaintiff to defendant success
changed or how awards changed. Moreover, some important
categories of data were not entered into the AO's database until the
late 1970s. 17 Thus, one cannot find out how the proportion of
plaintiff wins or the size of awards changed over time. One cannot,
for example, compare awards from 1976 to 1986, the year the most
recent "liability crisis" was declared. And we continue to have only
Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (presenting data
strongly suggesting that in the federal courts, contrary to predictions, plaintiffs win
about half of the time before judges and less than a third of the time before juries,
but noting that interpretation of the data is exceedingly difficult because case
characteristics are probably confounded with the decision-maker). For a discussion
of the implications for settlement negotiations and trial strategy, see infra notes 213-
67 and accompanying text, and MichaelJ. Saks, Flying Blind in the Courtroom: Trying
Cases Without Knowing What Works or Why, 101 YALE LJ. 1177 (1992) (addressing the
general problem of formulating litigation strategy without an understanding of how
juries decide cases).
16 See, e.g., Zuckerman et al., supra note 11, at 88 (conducting an extensive review
of data in the medical malpractice area and observing that "It]he amount of primary
data [on premiums, claims, and awards] that is regularly updated and publicly
accessible is surprisingly limited").
17 Data on which party was favored by the judgment were not recorded until after
1978. Similarly, most data on awards were not recorded until after the 1970s. See
FEDERALJUDICIAL CM., FEDERAL COURT CASES: INTEGRATED DATA BASE, 1970-1987,
at 2 (3d ed. 1989).
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the crudest data on the case mix, a shortcoming that makes many
inferences from the data largely meaningless.18 In any event, the
federal cases constitute only about 2% of the nation's litigation.
19
Far less is known about the approximately 98% of tort cases that
are litigated at the state level. For years, the National Center for
State Courts (NCSC) has been working to bring about more uniform
data collection and reporting among the states, but the process is a
slow one. As states adopt comparable data definitions and
collection practices, their data are included in the NCSC's consoli-
dated report of litigation in the state courts. The most recent
NCSC report was able to include tort data from only' twenty
states.20 Moreover, those data have all the shortcomings of the
federal data, plus some of their own. For example, case types are
defined less consistently across state systems than within the federal
system and are categorized in less fine-grained ways than the federal
data.
The lack of data on the civil justice system provides a striking
contrast to the criminal justice system. Beginning in the early
twentieth century in the United States, systematic, diverse, and
extensive data have been collected about crime and the criminal
justice system's responses to it.21 Data collection on the civil
justice system has barely reached its infancy. Thus, we are incapable
of providing comparable descriptions of the type and number of
actionable injuries and the civil justice system's responses to them.
A lack of evidence, which might seem like an insuperable
barrier, has barely slowed many policy-makers, scholars, and other
commentators. Their discussions about the behavior of the tort
liability system often have proceeded without even assembling the
18 We know how many cases have been placed in nominal categories, such as torts,
contracts, or product liability-although we do not usually appreciate the fluidity of
the categories or the fluidity of the categorizations. See infra note 167 and
accompanying text. What is usually thoroughly ignored is the nature of the cases,
strength of evidence, extent of injuries, etc. A tort case is not a tort case is not a tort
case. This problem is developed in many places and ways later in this Article.
19 See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
2 0 See NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS:
ANNUAL REPORT 1988, at 35 (1990) [hereinafter NCSC 1988 REPORT].
21 Data exist, starting in 1929 with the Uniform Crime Reports for the U.S., see 1929-
1991 FBI UNIF. CRIME REP.: CRIME U.S. (title varies slightly over years), and now
includingall or most levels of the system, from surveys ofinitial victimization through
actual sentences served, at the state as well as federal level. In Britain, systematic data
collection on the criminal system began in 1856. See Albert D. Biderman & Albert
J. Reiss, Jr., On Exploring the "Dark Figure" of Crime, 374 ANNALS 1, 3 (1967).
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fragments that do exist, much less pausing to figure out how they
fit together. The result is a picture of the litigation system built of
little more than imagination.
22
It will be helpful to expose some of what often has passed for
"evidence" about the litigation system. After clearing away some of
this haze, we will be better able to focus on the more complicated
business of assessing the hard evidence that exists and the inferenc-
es that it can support.
2. Conclusory Assertions
Much discussion of the tort litigation system consists of
conclusory assertions, unsupported by evidence. The following are
several examples of this species, netted from a vast sea of similar
creatures.
United States Senator Mitch McConnell purported to sum up
the liability crisis for his Senate colleagues by claiming:
22 A 1986 survey of South Carolina lawyers, legislators, and physicians compared
what they believed about that state's tort verdicts to what had been found by a
systematic study of the actual cases. See Donald R. Songer, Tort Reform in South
Carolina: The Effect of Empirical Research on Elite Perceptions ConcerningJuiy Verdicts,
39 S.C. L. REv. 585 (1988). Controlling for inflation, South Carolina tort awards had
gone from a 1976 median of $2068 to a 1985 median of $2671, with almost no
fluctuation in between. See F. Patrick Hubbard, "Patterns" in CivilJuiy Verdicts in the
State Circuit Courts of South Carolina: 1976-1985, 38 S.C. L. REv. 699, 724 tbl. 7
(1987). In the first half of the preceding decade, the annual median award for
medical malpractice verdicts was $0 for three years and over $100,000 two years (the
highest was $350,000 in 1979). See id. at 730. The medians in the five years
preceding the survey (1981-1985) and the "crisis" itself had fallen and stabilized,
ranging from a low of $14,750 to a high of $75,000. See id. Controlling for inflation,
they ranged from $8702 to $41,100. See id.
Notwithstanding the actual behavior of awards, 22% of attorneys believed that
awards had more than doubled in size in the preceding decade; another 38% believed
that some increase had occurred. See Songer, supra, at 596-99. Barely more than one
lawyer in ten correctly estimated the median tort award's size; more than one-third
estimated it to be at least three times, and some more than twenty times, as large as
it really was. See id. Ninety-seven percent overestimated the size of product liability
awards, more than half by a factor of at least five. See id. Most of these lawyers did,
however, underestimate the size of the median medical malpractice award. See id.
It may be little consolation to learn that South Carolina's state legislators
overestimated tort awards by a wider margin (yet they were much closer to the mark
on defective products cases while underestimating malpractice awards by an even
greater extent than lawyers). See id.
Physicians were the farthest from the mark. Only 1.8% correctly estimated the
median tort award; more than half overestimated it by a factor of at least five. See id.
Over 60% of physicians believed the 1985 median malpractice award to be over
$100,000 when in reality it was $66,000. See id.
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Hardly a day goes by that we do not hear or read of the
dramatic increase in the number of lawsuits filed, of the latest
multimillion verdict, or of another small business, child care
center, or municipal corporation that has had its insurance
canceled out from under it....
'. . [Why?] Because, quite simply, everyone is suing everyone,
and most are getting big money.... [Americans have developed
a] mad romance ... with the civil litigation process.
23
The Insurance Information Institute informs us in one of its
publications: "While our judicial system is basically a good one, it
has been handicapped by unnecessary lawsuits, ... exorbitant
awards, and unpredictable results.... [T]he number of personal
injury, product liability, or property damage suits.., has created a
crisis.... The civil justice system is being used to right every
imaginable wrong."
24
Another example comes from the. press: "Across the country,
people are suing one another with abandon; courts are clogged with
litigation; lawyers are burdening the populace with legal bills....
This massive, mushrooming litigation has caused horrendous
ruptures and dislocations at a flabbergasting cost to the nation."
25
Perhaps we can forgive the literature of industries and profes-
sions traumatized by insurance premiums and grasping for simple
answers in a field they little understand. Nevertheless: "In
approaching the medical malpractice issue the committee was
keenly aware that the U.S. civil litigation system generally has
undergone explosive growth in certain kinds of tort liability in
recent years. This growth has attracted wide attention because of
dramatic, often breathtaking, jury awards and settlements."
26
23 132 CONG. REC. S948-49 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1986) (statement made while
introducing S. 2038, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Promotion Act). Some of
this, of course, is pure hyperbole: "Everyone is suing everyone." But it implies a
basis of some facts, some data. In his speech to the Senate, Senator McConnell cited
growth in total federal civil filings (highly misleading, as we shall see later, see infra
notes 153-211 and accompanying text). See 132 CONG. REC. S948 (daily ed. Feb. 4,
1986). Yet repeated inquiries to Senator McConnell's office produced nothing of
more substance.
24 INSURANCE INFO. INST., THE LAwsurr CRISIS 1-2 (1986).
25 JackAnderson, U.S. Has Become a Nation of Lawsuits, WASH. POST,Jan. 25, 1985,
at B8. For more examples, see Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion,
46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986), and Stephen Daniels &Joanne Martin,Jury Verdicts and the
'Crisis" in Civil Justice, 11 JUST. SYs.J. 321 (1986).
26 1 COMMITTEE TO STUDY MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIAB. & THE DELIVERY OF
OBSTETRICAL CARE, INST. OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE
DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 3 (1989) [hereinafter COMMITTEE TO STUDY MEDICAL
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Parallel examples come from the world of legal policy-making
itself. Consider a recent report by the Justice Department.27 The
report begins with a discussion of "The Crisis in Insurance Availabil-
ity and Affordability" and concludes with a set of recommendations
for change in tort law. The bulk of the report discusses the
contribution of the tort system to the crisis, largely by focusing on
doctrinal and theoretical aspects of the system that the report's
authors assume connect the behavior of the tort litigation system to
the insurance crisis, a connection for which they provide no
evidence.
28
The literature of law reviews also provides many examples of
works that do not pause long to establish factual predicates before
moving on to explaining causes or prescribing cures. Indeed, legal
scholars have a special fascination with doctrine and theory, which
may prompt them to hurry past the factual predicates on which all
the rest often depends.
29
Examples abound, but the preceding sampler should convey the
flavor of the problem. Some of these conclusory assertions stand
alone, without anything remotely resembling evidence to support
them. Others are accompanied by an anecdote or two. Others
point to increased insurance premiums and regard them as
completing the case against the litigation system. But at the end of
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY].
2 7 U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE
CAUSES, EXTENT, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (1986) [hereinafter TORT POLICY REPORT].
28 See id. at 45-52. What little data the report does present are mostly from a
source (Jury Verdict Research) upon which serious students of the litigation system
do not rely. See id. at 35-41. Jury Verdict Research (JVR) itself disclaims the capacity
of its data to provide the evidence sometimes attributed to it: "JVR has neither
asserted nor published any conclusions that the average size of jury verdicts has
recently skyrocketed .... The apparent reason for this erroneous impression [of our
data] is that a number of highly publicized news articles quoting our statistics have
grossly misstated them." Product Liability Reform Ac4 1986: Hearings on S. 2760 Before
the Senate Comm. on theJudiciaty, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 226-27 (1986) [hereinafter
PLRA Hearings] (statement of JVR). The major problems with JVR's data are
discussed later in this Article. See infra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
29 Sherlock Holmes offered relevant advice in Silver Blaze:
[W]e are suffering from a plethora of surmise, conjecture, and hypothesis.
The difficulty is to detach the framework of fact-of absolute, undeniable
fact-from the embellishments of theorists and reporters. Then, having
established ourselves upon this sound basis, it is our duty to see what
inferences may be drawn.
II SIR ARTHUR C. DOYLE, THE ANNOTATED SHERLOCK HOLMES (William S. Baring-
Gould ed., 1967).
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the day, these assertions are hollow conclusions, offered without
evidence to sustain them.
3. Anecdotal Evidence
The use of anecdotal evidence has been unusually popular in
discussions about the nature of the litigation system.3° Perhaps
the use of anecdotes is not entirely inappropriate or unfair, given
the central role cases play in law as the device for sampling social
facts, the unit of accretion of judicial authority, and the principal
tool for educating new lawyers. For these reasons cases have a
special power over lawyers, more so than over any other field.31
To use "cases" to attack the legal system may be poetic justice.
Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence is heavily discounted in most
fields, and for a perfectly good reason: such evidence permits only
the loosest and weakest of inferences about matters a field is trying
to understand. Anecdotes do not permit one to determine either
the frequency of occurrence of something or its causes and effects.
They do no better in enlightening us about the behavior of the tort
litigation system.
If we wish to find out whether tort cases have increased in
frequency, favorability to plaintiffs, or unpredictability, how can we
learn about these things through the telling of a handful of stories
(or a hundred stories) about cases in which plaintiffs "won and won
big?" Yet much of the "evidence" about the litigation system has
proceeded from just such anecdotes.3 2 These anecdotes may work
So One example is the case of the burglar who fell through the skylight.
According to this anecdote, the burglar sued and won damages of $206,000 plus
$1,500 per month for life. Another case involved a plaintiff in a medical malpractice
action who claimed that she lost her powers of extrasensory perception due to
negligent treatment with a CAT scan. She won the case and was awarded $1 million
in damages. A third example involved "[a]n overweight man with a history of
coronary disease [who] suffered a heart attack trying to start a Sears lawnmower. He
sued Sears, charging that too much force was required to yank the mower's pull rope.
Ajury in Pennsylvania awarded him $1.2 million, plus damages of $550,000 for delays
in settling the claim."
31 Most fields that use case studies (for example medicine, business, and
psychology) recognize their considerable limitations as a means for gaining knowledge
about the phenomena of interest to their field, and the case accordingly occupies a
modest position in their respective epistemologies. See, e.g., DONALD T. CAMPELL &
JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH
6-7 (1963) (stating that case studies "have such a total absence of control as to be of
almost no scientific value"). In no other field is a case the means by which anything
remotely as important as "authority" is created and transmitted.
s2 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 25, at 325. Daniels and Martin review a variety
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as a persuasive device, in that a few examples of apparent greed,
abuse, or system irrationality can arouse people emotionally. But
if we want to know how the system is really performing, and we are
not merely trying to provoke people to despise it or fear losing it,
then we must do more than fling anecdotes back and forth.
Although the validity of the anecdotes themselves is the least
important issue, their validity deserves mention. Some litigation
system anecdotes are simply fabricated.3 3 Others are systematical-
ly distorted portrayals of the actual cases they claim to report.
3 4
More important than what we learn about these stories, perhaps, is
what we learn about ourselves and our remarkable credulity.
s5
of these anecdotes and suggest that their rhetorical functions are to suggest to the
public that: (a) many if not most claims are frivolous; (b) plaintiffs are undeserving,
often causing their own injuries; (c) juries are overly sympathetic, especially against
corporate defendants; (d) defendants are not at fault, or at least are not the direct
cause of the injury; and therefore (e) the civil justice system has run amok. See id.
33 See Steven Brill &James Lyons, The Not-So-Simple Crisis, AM. LAW., May 1986,
at 1, 12-14.
" Consider the three anecdotes presented supra note 30. The "burglar" who fell
through the skylight was a teenager who climbed onto the roof of his former high
school to get a floodlight. See Bodeine v. Enterprise High Sch., 73225, Shasta County
Superior Court (1982), reported in Fred Strasser, Tort Tales: Old Stories Never Die,
NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 39. The fall rendered him a quadriplegic. See id. A
similar accident at a neighboring school killed a student eight months earlier. See id.
School officials already had contracted to have the skylights boarded over so as to
"solve a... safety problem." Id. The payments were the result of a settlement; the
case did not go to trial. See id. In the CAT scan/ESP case, the woman did claim
economic loss due to her inability to perform her job as a psychic. But her claimed
permanent injuries were due to a severe allergic reaction to a pre-scan druginjection.
Thejudge instructed thejury not to consider the claim for loss of ESP and associated
economic damages. The judge also set aside the million dollar award as either
excessive or inconsistent with his instructions, and a new trial was ordered. See
Haimes v. Hart, 81-4408, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, reported in Strasser,
supra, at 39. In the third case, the man who suffered the heart attack was a 32-year-
old doctor with no history of heart disease, and the lawnmower was shown to be
defective. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 25, at 325. Daniels and Martin also note
that only the Time magazine version of the case gave accurate details. See id.; George
J. Church, Sory, Your Policy Is Canceled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 20, 20.
-3 Such anecdotes have been dubbed "urban legends." Brunvand has defined
urban legends as "highly captivating and plausible, but mainly fictional, oral narratives
that are widely told as true stories. We folklorists call them urban legends, although
modern legends might be a more accurate term." JAN H. BRUNVAND, THE CHOKING
DOBERMAN AND OTHER "NEW" URBAN LEGENDS at ix (1984). Brunvand has
documented dozens of urban legends, including some legendary tort suits. Many of
these legends are told from coast to coast, adapted to locale, accepted as true by the
tellers and most of the listeners, yet none of them can be verified as real events by
someone with personal knowledge of the account. See id. at ix-x.
Although Brunvand explains that these stories tend to spread naturally among
the population, perhaps they are given an occasional nudge. A memorandum to the
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Even when true, anecdotes enjoy a persuasive power that far
exceeds their evidentiary value.
Anecdotes have a power to mislead us into thinking we know
things that anecdotes simply cannot teach us. For example, people
tend to equate the magnitude of a category with the ease of retrieval
of instances from that category.s6 Because we easily remember
captivating little stories, when called on to estimate how frequent
various legal events and outcomes are, we mistakenly associate the
ease of anecdote recall with the numerousness of the type of case.
Anecdotes about undeserving plaintiffs are intriguing or outrageous
and have been repeated often in the media. Consequently, people
readily believe that the category of undeserving plaintiffs dominates
the system.
But surely each anecdote, even a fabricated one, stands for a
class of cases that does exist. Surely there are cases without merit.
The trouble with legislation by anecdote is not just that some of
them are false or misleading. Even if true and accurate, anecdotes
contribute little to developing a meaningful picture of the situation
about which we are concerned. It makes a difference if for every
ten anecdotes in which an undeserving plaintiff bankrupts an
innocent defendant, one, ten, one hundred, or one thousand equal
and opposite injustices are done to innocent plaintiffs. The
proportion of cases that results in one or the other error, and the
ratio of one kind of error to the other, ought to be of greater
interest to serious policy-makers than a handful of anecdotes on
either side of the issue. Reforms are intended to change that ratio
and the tens of thousands of anecdotes the ratio summarizes.
Maryland Association of Defense Trial Counsel recommends the use of anecdotes to
promote favored legislation. See Memorandum from the Maryland Association of
Defense Trial Counsel to All Members (Feb. 1, 1991) (on file with author).
36 This is one aspect of a psychological phenomenon known as the availability
heuristic. In one experiment, participants were given a list of names of men and
women. Although the list contained equal numbers of names of men and women, the
male names were ordinary while the female names included celebrities. When asked
how many men versus women were on the list, people estimated that the women
outnumbered the men. The explanation for the error is that, because of their
celebrity, the women's names were easier to recall, and it is from recalled instances
that we intuitively estimate frequencies. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A Heuristic forJudging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
207, 220-21 (1973); see also Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information
Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 123, 137-40
(1981) (applying the availability heuristic to legal contexts).
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The answers to most questions about the behavior of the
litigation system are inherently statistical. Anecdotes simply do not
provide the information one needs to assess the system.
4. Factoids and Factlets
Other kinds of information that have dominated recent
discussion about the liability system and its reform consist of what
we might call factoids and factlets. Factoids are statements that
sound like facts, that seem as though they are conveying some
information, but that on examination turn out to be either false or
meaningless.3 7 Factlets are bits or pieces of real information
about the problem, pieces one may hope can be sewn together into
a serviceable quilt, but which by themselves leave much more
unknown than known. Both fail to give their audience a meaningful
grasp of the circumstances at issue, although they appear to do so.
Our purpose here is not to develop a fine distinction between these
two categories, but to illustrate several additional sorts of "evi-
dence"-seemingly more than baseless conclusion or mere anecdote,
but on examination no more informative.
Among the clearest examples of factoids are the use of public
opinion poll results to reach answers to questions about the
behavior of the litigation system. For example, a nationwide Harris
poll released in mid-1986 stated:
[A] big 69-24 percent majority nationwide is convinced that it is
too easy "for people to sue for damages when they think they have
been injured or some wrong has been done to them."... Implicit
is a public demand that the procedure for filing claims ought to be
overhauled to provide disincentives against many who would sue
for damages.
[A] big 63 percent majority is also convinced that the size of
most of the cash settlements of such cases have been "excessive."
Only 12 percent have the impression that the amounts usually
awarded in such liability cases are "about right," and only 13
percent believe they have been "not enough." Clearly, by any
measure, the vast majority is convinced that the system of
37 See NORMAN MAILER, MARILYN 18 (1973) (coining the word "factoids" and
describing them as "facts which have no existence before appearing in a magazine or
newspaper, creations which are not so much lies as a product to manipulate emotion
in the Silent Majority").
BEHAVIOR OF THE TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM
rectifying wrongs done to individuals in liability cases is totally out
of control.
[A] 77-15 percent majority of the American people also lays
blame for the liability crisis at the doorstep of "people who figure
they can make a lot of money from such suits."
38
A finding that the public believes by a 69-24% majority that "the
size of most cash settlements has been excessive," cannot rationally
support a conclusion that "cash settlements" are in fact exces-
sive.A9 One might think otherwise, judging from the eagerness
with which some proponents of reform cite such "data."4 ° But
saying that the public believes proposition X is true is not the same
as saying that X is in fact true.
4 1
38 Louis Harris, Excessive Cash Settlements and Lawyers Faulted for Rise in Liability
Suits, HARIS SURVEY (Tribune Media Servs., Inc., Orlando, Fla.), June 9, 1986, at 1.
s9 Indeed, compare the public belief to the empirical studies of awards discussed
later in this Article. See infra notes 378-88 and accompanying text.4 0 See, e.g., INSURANCE INFO. INST., WORKING TOWARD A FAIRER CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 52-53 (1987) (arguing that public opinion polls show that society is calling for
greater control of the costs of the tort liability system).
41 Indeed, the "public belief" may itself be chimerical. How can we explain the
paradox that the people who declare awards to be excessive (sampled as opinion poll
respondents) are the same people (sampled as civil jurors) who make those awards?
The answer may be found in an analogy to studies of public attitudes toward
criminal sentencing. These studies find that when asked whether they think sentences
are generally too lenient, about right, or too harsh, a large majority of the public
offer the view that they are too lenient. When asked what their own sentencing
preference would be, or to evaluate an actual sentence in a case, the same people
conclude that the judicially imposed sentences are about right or too harsh. See
ANTHONY N. DOOB & JULIAN V. ROBERTS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC'S VIEW OF
SENTENCING 10-11 (1983); Shari Seidman Diamond, Revising Images of Public
Punitiveness: Sentencing by Lay and Professional English Magistrates, 15 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 191, 193 (1990); Anthony N. Doob &Julian V. Roberts, Public Punitiveness
and Public Knowledge of the Facts: Some Canadian Surveys, in PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO
SENTENCING: SURVEYS FROM FWE COUNTRIES 111, 111-13 (Nigel Walker & Mike
Hough eds., 1988);Julian V. Roberts & Anthony N. Doob, News Media Influences on
Public Views of Sentencing, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 451,460 (1990); LorettaJ. Stalans
& Shari Seidman Diamond, Formation and Change in Lay Evaluations of Criminal
Sentencing. Misperception and Discontent, 14 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 199, 199-202 (1990).
For example, 67% of those surveyed in an Illinois study believed that persons
convicted of residential burglary were sentenced too lightly. See Stalans & Diamond,
supra, at 206. When asked what their own sentence for residential burglary would be,
only 11% or 26% (depending upon the form of the question) suggested a sentence
that exceeded the minimum that convicted burglars spend in prison in Illinois. See id.
Paradoxically, we may wonder whether the public believes that sentences are too
lenient (as they assert) or whether they believe that sentences are too harsh (as they
demonstrate). From such findings we might expect that if Harris's survey respon-
dents were presented with information about a representative set of actual cases, they
might agree that theirjuror counterparts made a reasonable assessment of damages,
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While factoids seem to be facts but are not, factlets present a
different problem. They are true in a literal sense, but they lead
directly to conclusions that are not justified by the data.
Figures I-A and I-B are alternative ways of presenting the same
information. Both depict data on change over time of federal
product liability litigation as well as injuries to consumers and
workers. But while Figure I-A presents these data as percentages of
change from a fixed starting point, Figure I-B presents the same
data as simple frequencies.
FIGURE I-A & I-B
42
PREMIUMS, CLAIMS, & ACCIDENTS (A) As GROWTH RATES FROM A
FIXED STARTING POINT & (B) As SIMPLE COUNTS
Percent of Base
1000
Federal Liability Claims
Disabling Injury
800-
............------- Consumer Injury
600-
400,
200
1970 .... 19"75 .... 19480 .... 1985 Year
or perhaps opine that the damages were insufficient.
42 Figure I-A is adapted from George L. Priest, The Liability Crisis: A Diagnosis,
YALE L. REP., Fall 1987, at 2, 3. Figure I-B is adapted from MichaelJ. Saks, Letters to
the Editor, YALE L. REP., Fall 1988, at 14, 15.
BEHAVIOR OF THE TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM
Number (in 000,000's)
2.0 le N.
1.5,
Federal Liability Claims
Disabling Injury
1.0, .......... Consumer Injury
.5
0 9"0........................ 0 ...... "..."...
1970k 1!75 . 1980.1945 Year
Each graph tells us something different about the same data.
The first answers the tacit question, "Are the rates of growth of
product liability filings and injuries parallel or is one growing faster
than the other?" Most people look at Figure I-A and are alarmed at
the degree to which lawsuits seem to be outpacing injuries. On
reflection, however, what do we really know when we learn about
the parallelism (or lack of it) between growth rates of injuries and
filings? Figure I-A is consistent with the following scenario: Each
year every American worker is killed and an equal number of new
workers is hired to replace them. Such a scenario makes the
marginal growth rate of injuries zero, creating an even flatter line
than the ones in Figure I-A. Imagine further that in 1974 exactly
two families initiated product liability suits for the loss of their two
respective breadwinners, and that in 1985 seventeen filed suit.
Thus, filings in 1985 would be 850% as many as there were in 1974,
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just as Figure I-A depicts. 43 The same graph would now sound the
opposite alarm: too many injuries and too little litigation.
The problem is that expressing these data as rates of growth
answers a question other than the one most people implicitly ask
about the behavior of the tort system, namely, "How does the
number of lawsuits compare with the number of injuries?"
44 If
indeed that is the question people ask most about injuries and
lawsuits, Figure I-B presents the same data in a way that provides a
more straightforward answer. It shows the number of suits to be a
thin shadow trailing behind a fat number of injuries. 45 Both
graphs are "true," in the sense that they both depict the data with
equal accuracy. But the utility of each depends upon the question
one wants answered. As an answer to the central question being
asked, Figure I-A may misdirect more than it informs.
4 6
43 Elsewhere in this Article, I calculate growth rates as the marginal increase
(difference between the old amount and the new) expressed as a percentage of the
original amount. See infra note 154 and accompanying text. That is the customary
approach. This one time I follow Priest's lead in calculating growth rates as the latter
amount as a percentage of the original amount. Priest's idiosyncratic way of doing these
calculations transforms zero change into a "100% increase"-if there were 50 cases at
time-1 and 50 cases at time-2, time-2 is 100% of time-1. By the more conventional
approach, the increase is 0%: there are 0% more cases at time-2 than at time-i.
In my hypothetical example, the customary marginal growth rate would come to
750% (17 in 1985 represents a marginal increase of 15 over 2 in 1974, and that
marginal increase is 7.5 times greater than 2). But using Priest's method, the growth
rate would be 850% (17 divided by 2 yields 8.5). Using the "real" data, the customary
marginal growth rate would come to 758% (13,554 in 1985 represents a marginal
increase of 11,975 over 1579 in 1974, and that marginal increase is 7.58 times greater
than 1579). See infra Appendix B. Using Priest's method, the marginal growth rate
reaches the elevated rate of 858% (13,554 divided by 1579 yields 8.58).
4 See infra note 46 (discussing the results of an experiment concerning
perceptions of tort litigation).
45 Now, Priest's data could be interpreted to reflect a slight closing of the gap
between what the system was supposed to be doing and what little it manages to do.
At this juncture, it may be important to say that both of these graphs are
nonsensical in that they imply a comparison between two things that with these data
cannot meaningfully be compared. Even if the rate of these injuries (totals for
selected injury types) is down, the rate of actionable injuries (a subgroup of those
other injuries) may be up. Most worker and consumer injuries, if they wind up in
court at all, wind up in state courts, and contribute little to the level of federal
product liability suits. These are the kinds of comparisons that give apples and
oranges bad reputations.
When a similar portrayal of Priest's data appeared a few years later in Fortune
Magazine, the principal change was that the vertical axis had been relabeled from
"Percent of Base" to the more cryptic "Index." See George L. Priest, How to Control
Liability Costs, FORTUNE, Apr. 24, 1989, at 323, 323.
46 In order to test what impressions about the performance of the tort litigation
system the two graphs create in the minds of those who view them, I conducted the
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The Department ofJustice's Tort Policy Working Group (Policy
Working Group) noted the same increase in federal product liability
cases between 1974-1985 (calculated this time to be up 758%).47
This calculation stems from the data we have just seen pictured in
Figures I-A and I-B. The Policy Working Group took the apparent
increase to be both real and representative of the experience
throughout the nation: "There is no reason to believe that the
states [sic] courts have not witnessed a similar dramatic increase in
the number of product liability claims." 48 More complete evidence
suggests that the federal situation does not mirror that of the
states49 and that the state situations vary markedly among and
within themselves.50 Thus, real data51 were applied beyond their
proper sphere, because their users could think of "no reason to
believe" state court filings might follow a pattern different from that
of the federal courts.
5 2
The balance of this Article concentrates on data that have more
substance than the kinds we have reviewed up to this point.53 This
following informal experiment. I asked teachers of two undergraduate business law
courses to give one of the graphs to half of their students and the other graph to the
other half. The students were asked to examine their graph and then to write on the
back of it a brief explanation of what it told them. I then asked two law school
secretaries to read each of the statements without looking at the graphs and decide
whether the writer seemed to be saying that she or he was seeing evidence of a
litigation explosion or the absence of one. Of those who saw Figure I-A, 94% thought
they saw in it evidence of a serious litigation explosion (21 out of 23 in one class and
30 out of 31 in the other class). See Study Conducted at the University of Iowa
(Spring 1988) (data on file with author). Only 13% of the students who saw Figure
I-B thought they saw an explosion (5 out of 25 in one class and 2 out of 27 in the
other class). See id. This is quite a powerful difference in the impact of two different
ways of presenting the same information; the 94% to 13% difference is statistically
significant at p<.0001, using Fisher's Exact Probability Test.
47 This number represents the percentage increase from 1579 (in 1974) to 13,554
(in 1985) calculated the conventional way. See supra note 43 (discussing the
conventional method).
48 TORT POLIcY REPORT, supra note 27, at 45.
41 See infra notes 188-207 and accompanying text.
50 See infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
51 Real data, however, have certain limitations. Rates of increase in federal
product liability filings are highly unstable and vary markedly depending upon the
time frame used to calculate them. See infra notes 165-86 and accompanying text.
12 The error is facilitated by the lack of good, complete, and accessible state court
data.
53 Numerous publications on the subject of the tort litigation system consist of
nothing more than a mdlange of loose conclusions, anecdotes, factoids, and factlets.
Those who think they already know the truth are unlikely to invest much effort in the
search for answers. For two wonderful examples of such writing and logic, see
William H. MosbergJr., The Liability Insurance Crisis, 19 NEUROSURGERY 857 (1986),
116719921
1168 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1147
change of focus is not intended to imply that disposing of uninfor-
mative and misleading data is not an important part of the process
of informing ourselves about the behavior of the tort litigation
system. Indeed, some additional discarding of empirical flotsam
and jetsam will occur along the way. The preceding examples,
however, should suffice to make the general point, and now we can
move on to the more subtle and difficult problems that are the
central focus of this Article.
C. Overview
This Article reviews the available empirical evidence concerning
the behavior of the tort litigation system, including studies pertain-
ing to whether there has been explosive growth in the volume and
value of litigation. The evidence and interpretations are organized
within a general model of the flow of disputes into and through the
system. This approach will examine the system as a system: to see
the effects of decisions at one stage on later and earlier stages, and
to see the effects on the system of changes both in the system and
in the system's external environment.
In this review of the evidence and reflection on its meaning, we
will learn (a) that the basic data offer little support for widely held
beliefs about the behavior of the system or about the decision-
makers within it and (b) that the basic data are inadequate to
provide answers to important questions about the system. More-
over, this analysis will begin (c) to develop the notion of a more
systems-oriented approach to understanding the behavior of the
litigation system that takes into account how the litigation system's
output changes not only as a consequence of changes in substantive
and procedural rules of law, but also as a reflection of the environ-
ment in which it exists and (d) to provide a research agenda for
strengthening the knowledge base that supports our understanding
of the litigation system.
and WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAwsurr (1991).
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II. EVIDENCE ABOUT THE BEHAVIOR OF THE TORT
LITIGATION SYSTEM AS A SYSTEM
The core of this Article tries to put together what is known
about the behavior of the tort litigation system into a coherent
model and then use that model to illuminate what is not known.
The model used to organize this knowledge (and the gaps in
knowledge) is a simple descriptive framework: the flow of cases into
and through the litigation process. The very simplicity of the model
will place the gaps in knowledge into high relief.
Such an examination might begin by thinking about the simplest
of frameworks for assessing how well the tort liability system deals
with claims by plaintiffs against defendants. Figure II presents a 2
x 2 matrix into which can be placed data that relate compensation
to the actuality of compensable injury.54 To the extent that the
tort system is a compensation system that requires an injurer to
compensate the injured under specified circumstances, 55 the
system might be expected to deliver compensation when there has
been a compensable injury and to deny compensation when there
has not been a compensable injury.
56
54 Obviously, a major problem to be solved is measuring the latter variable. It has
been solved in a variety of ways, and the reader can judge which of these are more
or less adequate. Recall, however, that in giving anecdotes of supposedly unmerited
awards and in quoting figures on the allegedly increased number of plaintiffvictories
and magnitude of plaintiff awards, critics simply assume that some of the outcomes
were in error in some way. Why else, they imply, would the data have changed over
time? For a discussion of answers, see infra notes 435-67 and accompanying text.
" The circumstances leading to compensation generally are present when the
injurer acts "negligently," or fails to exercise a standard of care associated with the
activity that led to the injury. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 282-283
(1977). In product liability cases the injurer may be held "strictly liable'-negligence
is not a requirement, only causation is. See id. §§ 519-524A.
56 The compensation function is the easiest standard by which to evaluate the tort
system. Its other major purpose-deterrence-is much harder to evaluate, and the
scholarship relevant to that issue is overwhelmingly theoretical. The data of the
present Article and the debate over the litigation system are focused largely on the
compensation issue.
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FIGURE II
BASIC 2 X 2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ACTIONABLE INJURY AND
THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S RESPONSE
Compensation Given?
YES NO
YES
Actionable
Injury?
NO
The reader might speculate on what Figure II ought to look like
compared with what it does in fact look like. When the cells are
filled with data, what will the gap look like between the system's
object and its performance? Will the system do a reasonable job of
providing compensation to those who have a right to be compensat-
ed and denying it to those not entitled to it? Or will the system err
by compensating some of those who ought not to be compensat-
ed?57 Or err by failing to compensate some of those who ought
to have been compensated?
58
The basic 2 x 2 model helps to describe how the system
ultimately responds to the cases submitted to it. It needs to be
made more complicated in at least two ways, however.
First, the model needs to account for the impact of the socio-
techno-economic environment of the legal system. Because the
litigation system is an "open" system-that is, one that interacts with
its environment-we need also to take into account changes in that
environment. 59 If the environment is changing rapidly and the
system is unchanged except that it is processing changed input from
7 Such a scenario is an example of a false positive.
58 Such a scenario is an example of a false negative.
59 See DANIEL KATZ & ROBERT L. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZA-
TIONS 141-42 (2d ed. 1978).
True False
Positive Negative
False True
Positive Negative
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its environment, then measures purporting to reflect the system's
changes may be doing nothing more than reflecting changes in the
system's environment. One cannot understand the behavior of an
open system without understanding the environment that envelops
it.
To illustrate, suppose tort filings have increased precipitously.
Many explanations for the increase are possible. Some come from
"within" the litigation system (e.g., changes in the substantive or
procedural law). Alternatively, explanations involving the system's
milieu externe also are possible. An abrupt increase in injuries would
give rise to an increase in filings, which in turn would reverberate
through the rest of the system. The increase in injuries could result
from new technology (e.g., the industrial revolution in the last
century or the advent of automobiles early in this century),60 or
organizational and structural changes (e.g., increased access to
health care and an enlarged consumer economy would give rise to
more actionable injuries).
In short, changes in the surroundings of the legal system that
deliver different kinds or numbers of cases to the system's doorstep
will produce changes in the numbers of filings and perhaps in trials
and awards-without any changes occurring in the litigation system
itself. Without measuring and correlating those external changes,
the changes they produce in the legal system in response to those
societal inputs are likely to be mistakenly attributed to changes in
the litigation system or in the law. Thus, one cannot evaluate the
impact of law without adjusting for all of the "extraneous" influenc-
es originating in the system's environment.
The second complication to the simple model above is unpack-
ing the path from initial injuries to final dispositions. After an
actionable injury occurs, a victim must decide whether or not to
complain; lawyers must decide whether or not to accept and file the
cases offered to them; a process of negotiation resolves most cases
short of trial; an important minority of cases will be resolved by
trial; and various post-verdict remedies61 are available. A parallel
60 We have grown accustomed to the approximately 50,000 deaths and 1.75
million injuries produced annually by automobiles, as well as the litigation those
accidents generate. See infra Appendix A. Virtually all commentators regard these
as "normal" or at least level (and, therefore, nothing to worry about).
61 Judgments notwithstanding the verdict, additur or remittitur adjustments to the
award, orders for new trials, and appeals to higher courts (or negotiations in which
parties settle in exchange for an agreement not to appeal a verdict) are examples of
such post-verdict remedies. How many cases end up as something different from
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course is traversed by plaintiffs who have suffered injuries which are
not compensable, 62 and these claims must also be processed by the
system, and either correctly granted no compensation or mistakenly
granted compensation at one or another stage. Therefore, each one
of these intermediate steps can be a complicated affair, with
complicated decisions being made by numerous people interacting
with each other. Each step is worthy of serious attention.
6 3
To begin to understand the litigation system better, we need to
look at what happens to cases as they are processed through each of
these decision stages. Does each decision node reach the "right"
result or are there systematic errors that favor plaintiffs or defen-
dants, or favor plaintiffs at some stages and defendants at others?
How can changes over time in the numbers of cases appearing at
each stage be explained? Does the answer lie in changes in the
decision process itself, in the decision-makers, in the rules they are
required to apply, or in changes in the socio-techno-economic
surroundings within which the litigation system operates?
their trial verdict is itself an interesting question.
62 Such injuries are not compensable because they fail to satisfy one or more of
the law's liability rules. For example, injuries may not have been the result of
negligence or not caused by the defendant. In some cases, a plaintiff may not have
suffered an injury cognizable by the law.
63 1 have defined the tort litigation system as extending from the pool of injuries
through to the final disposition of a litigated case. One could define the system
differently, perhaps by locating its starting point where a victim of injury first
demands compensation and the alleged injurer refuses (the dispute has thus been
born), when the injury victim first seeks to hire a lawyer (thus bringing the influence
of the law and one of its agents to the dispute), or when the lawyer files a case
(thereby placing the matter within the jurisdiction of a court).
We should be clear that a change in definition defines a great deal of behavior
in or out of "the system" and alters, most likely substantially, some of the inferences
to be drawn about "the system." I have chosen a relatively expansive definition
because it matches the implicit definition of virtually all commentators, legal and
beyond, of virtually all disciplines and persuasions. Commentators from the common
law and legal realism traditions to those of law and economics and law and society
make reference to the behavior of potential injurers as a function of tort rules.
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FIGURE III
STAGES OF THE LITIGATION SYSTEM
Tortious Injury
Present Absent
Base of actionable injuries
Decisions to claim
Prospective cases presented to lawyers
Lawsuits filed
Settlements negotiated
Trials commenced
for Plaintiff
Trial Verdict
for Defendant
Awards
Changes from additur/remittitur review
Appeals
Compensation paid
A. Base Rate of Actionable Injuries
The first thing to determine is how many actionable injuries
occur.64 Such injuries are what the system seeks to compensate
and deter. Any assessment of whether the propensity to sue is
increasing, decreasing, or remaining the same can be made only in
relation to the waxing or waning of the pool of injuries from which
suits properly arise. 65 Any inference about whether the average
" The number of actionable injuries really means the ratio of actionable injuries,
on the one hand, to non-actionable injuries plus non-injuries involved in some
activity. This will become evident shortly, in our discussion of malpractice. We must,
after all, think in terms of the base rate in order to make sense of the movement of
cases through the system and the decisions made about those cases.
65 Of course, not all injuries are compensable; but actionable injuries are
I ___ I ___
___ I ___
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size of awards or settlements has gone up, down, or remained level,
in real terms, depends upon knowing what the pool of injuries looks
like. If the pool of injuries has increased and the inherent serious-
ness of the injuries or the cost of repairing them has increased, one
should not be surprised to find a commensurate increase in cases or
awards. 66 If the pool has shrunk either in size or cost of injuries,
even a seemingly level number of filings or payments should in real
terms be regarded as an increase.
Despite the indispensability of this ingredient to making sense
of the behavior of the system, direct consideration of injury base
rates is absent from virtually all commentary and analysis of the tort
litigation system. Studies and commentaries that deal, for example,
only with filings are assuming that the base rate of actionable
injuries has remained constant and unchanged. Some effort to take
base rates into account is reflected by those studies that have tried
to adjust caseloads for population increases. At best, however, that
adjustment is a crude one. It assumes that the number and
seriousness of injuries per unit population remains constant over
time.
It is this base of actionable injuries for which tort law exists, to
which it responds, and upon which it is intended to have some
effect. 67 But tort law has a far more special relationship with the
injury base. Tort law defines the base of actionable injuries. In the
nineteenth century, the pool of injuries rose with the industrial
revolution. 68  Tort law's response was to reduce the pool of
actionable injuries by introducing restrictions. 69 In the latter half
of the twentieth century, the tort rules affecting liability for
products and, to a lesser extent, medical accidents, were modified
to make more of their associated injuries actionable. 70  By alter-
necessarily a subset of total injuries. Furthermore, the number of injuries is known
imperfectly. With the exception of a few studies to be discussed, see infra notes 85-91
and accompanying text, the proportion of those that are actionable is barely known
at all. In the absence of such knowledge, it is impossible to defend any assertion
about what is happening in the tort system.
66 Moreover, it would be irrational to blame the victims of the injuries or the
liability system for such increases.67 Tort law seeks to reduce the number of those accidents, or minimize their costs,
or maximize the gross social product, and so on. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTs 1 (8th ed. 1988).68 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 261-64 (2d ed.
1985).
69 These restrictions include the advent of the fellow servant doctrine, contributo-
ry negligence, assumption of risk, etc. See id. at 262-64.7 0
See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, § 96 (tracing the development of the
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nately constricting and expanding the base of actionable injuries,
the number of filed cases is expected alternately to decline and
grow. Indeed, after assuming a litigation explosion, many commen-
tators point to changes in the law as its "explanation."
7 1
An obvious first step in an analysis of the impact of tort law is
to study the relevant injury base to see how many injuries are or are
not brought into the subclass of those for which a defendant is
supposed to be judged liable. How do changes in the law map
themselves onto that injury pool they are intended to retreat from
or embrace? Although legal discussions of tort law invariably make
vague references to those pools of medical, products, or auto
injuries, no rigorous mapping ever occurs. To do so would permit
something akin to a legal impact statement-hclping to determine
if doctrinal changes are accomplishing their purposes and helping
to explain the gaps between expectations and actual behavior of the
system.
72
One reason the assessment of the expected and actual effects of
law changes do not occur at the level of the injury base is that
knowledge of that base is lacking.73 To be useful in understanding
the role of law, the count of injuries must be more precise in at
least two respects. Those counts must be made within categories
that match the legal categories of injury-for example, auto,
negligence-based law of products liability). Concerning medical malpractice, a variety
of doctrines that once provided special immunity to physicians gradually eroded. See
id. § 32, at 187-89, § 40, at 259, § 133 (discussing charitable immunity, locality rule,
respondeat superior, application of res ipsa loquitur, and informed consent).
71 See, e.g., TORT POLIcY REPORT, supra note 27, at 30-35. The real puzzle is to
explain why, in the face of such a reasonable expectation of a doctrinally expanded
pool of actionable injuries, the actual growth is so modest. See infra notes 79-84 and
accompanying text (discussing filings).
72 It may be, for example, thatjudges, legislators, or drafters of model codes have
guessed incorrectly about the contours of the injury base, and as a result the changes
in law have touched only the margins of the pool, failing to affect it in the ways
intended, imagined, or feared.
7' Another reason is that the culture of law does not include rigorous concern for
the phenomena to which the law is directed. The contrast is striking between the
care with which doctrinal considerations are addressed and the casualness of the
treatment of the real world with which those doctrines are concerned. This is a
shortcoming in the scholarship and practice of law that a parade of prominent
lawyers-from Holmes, to Pound, to Llewellyn, to Bok, to Shuck-has been able to
complain of, but which few have been able to do much about. See Oliver W. Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-62 (1897); Roscoe Pound, The Need
of a SociologicalJurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607,607-09 (1907); Llewellyn, supra note
4, at 1223; Bok, supra note 1, at 581; Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do
More Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 325-33 (1989).
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products, workplace, medical, or dramshop. In addition, they must
be made within geographic units that at least approximately match
the geographic units that matter for legal doctrine (state by state)
and for the sociology of the law (for examples, local legal culture
74
or different degrees of urbanization within and between doctrinal
regimes).
Although we have a good deal of data on accidents, this
information is not collected or organized to fit the legally relevant
maps. Far worse, although entirely understandable, separating
accidental injuries into those which are tortious and those whose
costs must remain with the injury victim is something that is rarely
even attempted.7 5
One illustration of how the base rate is essential to making sense
of litigation data is provided by considering national accidental
death and injury data. 76 The number of motor vehicle deaths and
injuries peaked around 1970, 77 declined thereafter, and continued
to decline, though much less sharply, through the first half of the
1980s. The death and permanent injury rate per unit population
also declined during that period largely because the population of
people increased faster than the number of auto accidents.
78
In light of this trend, consider the conclusion that filings in the
auto negligence area in the first half of the 1980s were level when
74 Local legal culture refers to systematically different interpretations and
applications of law within the samejurisdiction. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, Federal
Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2038 (1989) (referring to the local legal culture as
"the customary practices and expectations of both trial lawyers and judges").
75 To count emergency room visits or workplace injuries or to conduct household
surveys of disabling injuries is one thing. To sort them into those for which the
circumstances would allow a finding of liability and those where they would not is an
immensely bigger challenge.
76 National level data on deaths and injuries associated with motor vehicles and
the workplace, as well as the total national count of accidents, are presented infra in
Appendix A. That table is based on data published annually by the National Safety
Council. Other collectors of accident data include both government and private
agencies-National Center for Health Statistics, National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, insurance companies, and trade associations.
77 See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 1989, at 14-15 (1989)
[hereinafter ACCIDENT FACTS] (noting that the 1970 level approached the all time
highs of the 1930s).
7 The trend reversed in the latter half of the 1980s, with deaths and permanent
injuries rising slowly. See id. Furthermore, the death and injury rate per unit
population has not been level, it has been rising, because the population of accidents
has been growing faster than the population of people. See id.
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adjusted for increases in population. 79  If the death and injury
rates were down, yet the filing rate was level, then in real terms auto
crash filings were actually up.
This illustrates that it is not enough to look only at the number
of filings and to control for population. When the focus of interest
is whether a disproportion exists in the filing rate, it is the base rate
of accidents or injuries for which all other controls are proxies.
Unless we know that the proxies are accurate (that is, that the
number of actionable injuries is proportional to population), then
they will not correct the data as we wish them to. As this illustra-
tion shows, the growth of population and injuries is not equal;
sometimes one grows faster than the other.
80
But aggregate auto or workplace accident data compared with
national level lawsuit filing data may be misleading in any event.
That is because aggregations can hide as well as illuminate some
relationships. To take an extreme illustration, imagine that in half
the states auto accidents are rising while litigation is falling, and in
the other half auto accidents are falling while litigation is increas-
ing.8' These perverse patterns would cry out for inquiry, yet
aggregations of auto accident data and auto accident litigation data
at the national level would mask these patterns because the declines
in some states would offset the rises in other states.
8 2
7 9 S ee e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER, TRENDS IN CALIFORNIA TORT LIABILITY
LITIGATION 12 (1987) (explaining that "[t]he rate of increase in automobile accident
filings is roughly equal to the rate of population increase, but the rate of increase in
other types of lawsuits has outstripped population growth by a considerable amount").
80 Most victims of motor-vehicle accidents are the young and the old. See
ACCIDENT FACTS, supra note 77, at 6 (showing that those drivers between the ages of
15 and 24 years of age and those 75 years of age and older exhibit the highest death
rates). From this it may be inferred that the most accident-prone drivers are the
youngest and the oldest drivers. To the extent that the youngest and oldest drivers
also constitute the fastest growing age segments of the population, we can anticipate
increases in the overall auto mortality rate in the future.
The reasons for those trends are not of much importance for this Article; they
merely are the pool from which lawsuits may arise. They provide our starting point.
A study of the effects of tort law, of course, would be interested in the reciprocal
impact of the number of accidents on the amount of litigation and the amount of
litigation on the number of accidents-in short, the contribution of tort law, if any,
to keeping accident levels down, or at least at an optimal level (if between 46,000 and
49,000 deaths per year and three times that many permanent injuries can ever be
regarded as "optimal").
81 This scenario is not altogether far fetched. We know that auto accident fatality
rates are far from uniform across states. Whether we control for miles driven,
number of vehicles, or population, western and sunbelt states have more auto
fatalities than midwestern or northeastern states. See id. at 64.
82 A very similar methodological critique was made about data on the deterrent
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The number of workplace deaths and injuries are down in both
absolute terms and as a population-adjusted rate.8 3 How much of
this decline can be attributed to the deterrent effects of the tort
system, how much to government regulation, how much to the
regime of worker's compensation, and how much to changes in
managerial or technological culture and practices is interesting and
important to know. Something is causing it. Knowledge of what
causes desirable changes would be a valuable guide to doing even
better through future law reforms. Without such knowledge,
reforms are shots in the dark. 4
The most interesting and legally useful studies of base rates have
been done in relation to medical malpractice. In these studies,
medical experts8 5 evaluate a large sample of hospital records to
identify iatrogenic injuries8 6 and determine which were negligently
produced. 7 The earliest of these was conducted in 1972 by the
effect of the death penalty. See Greggv. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 235 (1976) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("The aggregation of data from all States ... obscures the relationship
between murder and execution rates.... [A] decrease in the execution risk in one
State combined with an increase in the murder rate in another State would...
suggest a deterrent effect that quite obviously would not exist .. .
See ACCIDENT FACTS, supra note 77, at 14-15.
84 See supra notes 5-7, 42-46 and accompanying text. We should now be able to
see more dearly the extent and import of the limited overlap between worker injuries
and federal product liability filings, and what an apples-to-oranges comparison they
constitute. Few worker injuries are product related: 33% result from lifting,
throwing, carrying, and pushing or pulling objects, 17% from being struck by falling
or flying objects, 19% from falls, and 8% from being struck by or thrown against
objects. See ACCIDENT FACTS, supra note 77, at 39. On the other side of the coin,
many product injuries occur outside of the workplace.
85 People with medical training are one obvious choice of evaluators of the case
files. We might note that to the extent that these evaluators in general are inclined
to err systematically in these judgments, that error is likely to be in the direction of
failing to attribute an injury to practitioner negligence. Thus, these estimates are
likely to undercount. The authors of the Harvard Medical Practice Study note that
only 1.3% of the judgments were in what the physician judges felt was the close call
range. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW
YORK, THE REPORT OF THE HARvARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY TO THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 3 (1990) [hereinafter HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY]. Of course,
their count will also understate the incidence to the extent that the records
deliberately or inadvertently fail to capture instances of negligent care leading to
injury, such as with injuries that do not present themselves until some time after the
patient leaves the hospital.
86 Iatrogenic is defined as "[d]enoting an unfavorable response to medical or
surgical treatment, induced by the treatment itself." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY
759 (25th ed. 1990).
" They also gather other useful data, such as the type of medical procedure giving
rise to the injury, see HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 85, at 6-61, the
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then U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It found
a rate of negligent injury of 218 per 10,000 patients. 88 Perhaps
the best known study was conducted jointly by the California
Hospital Association and the California Medical Association and
published in 1977.89 This study found that 79 per 10,000 patients
had suffered negligent injuries.90 The most recent such study,
conducted in 1990 by researchers based at the Harvard School of
Public Health, found that 100 of 10,000 New York hospital
discharges suffered from negligent iatrogenic injuries.
91
If nothing else, studies of the base rate of actionable injuries
help to establish that base rates really exist.92  Beyond that,
demographics of the injury victim, see id. at 6-23 to 6-34, and whether the cases were
followed by a claim for compensation, see id. at 7-1 to 7-43. This information will be
of use later in this Article.
88 See LEON S. POCINCKI ET AL., THE INCIDENCE OF IATROGENIC INJURIES 50, 55
(1973) (report prepared under contract with the Secretary's Commission on Medical
Malpractice, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare). This translates to
about one actionable injury for every 46 patients. The report also states: "[I]t has
been found that 7.5% of the records show evidence ofiatrogenic injury. Severalfactors
indicate that this number significantly underestimates the true rate." Id. at 63.
89 CALIFORNIA MEDICAL Ass'N & CAL. HosP. ASS'N, REPORT ON THE MEDICAL
INSURANCE FEASIBILITY STUDY (Don H. Mills ed., 1977) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION].
90 See id. at 103-06. This translates into about one for every 127 patients. These
results flow from the following findings: Out of 3,011,000 hospitalizations in 1974,
there were 140,000 "potentially compensable events." Of these, 23,800 were
determined to have been the result of medical errors or other actionable negligence.
See id.
91 See HARvARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 85, at 3. The study reaches
the above conclusion utilizing the following calculations:
Weighting these figures [the negligent injuries found among the 30,121
cases sampled and analyzed] according to the sample plan, we estimated the
incidence of adverse events for hospitalizations in New York [State] in 1984
to be 3.7%, or a total of 98,609. Of these, 27.6%, 27,179 cases, or 1% of all
hospital discharges, were due to negligence.
The majority of adverse events (57%) resulted in minimal and transient
disability, but 14% of patients died at least in part as a result of their
adverse event, and in another 9% the resultant disability lasted longer than
6 months.... [A]bout 2,500 cases of permanent total disability resulted
from medical injury in New York Hospitals in 1984.
Id. at 3-4.
92 Knowledge of these studies seems to evaporate somewhere between the medical
journals and the public and legislatve debates. For example, a book by surgeon
Albert Ferguson discusses the "causes of suits." See ALBERT B. FERGUSON, THE
LIABILITY CRISIS AND How TO SOLVE IT 103-08 (1987). Ferguson mentions poor
communication, careless remarks, the patient's needs due to economic loss resulting
from injury, greed, and patients and lawyers looking for a "fall guy" as possible
19921 1179
1180 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1147
complications grow. One might be tempted to infer from these
studies that negligent medical injuries dropped sharply during the
1970s but by the mid-1980s had turned upward again. But the
differences may instead reflect differences in region, the nature of
the medical records, or the definitions and procedures of those
doing the studies. In the long term, we need to have consistent
definitions and procedures and to gather data from the same places
at regular intervals if we are to make sense of trends in the injury-
producing behavior, not to mention the relation of the law's
response to those injuries.
Injury base rate data are more useful for understanding the
litigation system than studies focused on products (which may show,
for example, that they are designed to be safer and are in fact less
likely to cause injuries) or on the nature of services (which may
show, for example, that medical knowledge is greater and medical
technology and the management of care are more safe and
effective). It does not necessarily follow that safer products and
more effective and cautiously provided services will lead to fewer
injuries, which in turn ought to lead to fewer claims for compensa-
tion. Increased safety of each product over time may be more than
offset by increases in the number of units of the product in the
environment. 93  Moreover, increases in the power of newer
technology may offset other changes designed to increase safety.
reasons for lawsuits. See id. But Ferguson cannot bring himself to mention the
incidence of negligent iatrogenic injury.
In fact, considerable research documents the incidence of injuries that could lead
to medical malpractice suits. For example, a study of 220 obstetric malpractice claims
filed with St. Paul Mutual Insurance Company observed that "these cases contain
common easily identified obstetric risk factors, most of which occurred in labor or
delivery." Thomas M.Julian et al., Investigation of Obstetric Malpractice Closed Claims:
Profile of Event, 2 AM.J. PERINATOLOGY 320, 320 (1985). Of 1001 risks identified by
the reviewing panel, only 32% had been managed correctly even though 54% had
been recognized by the defendants. See id. at 321. Sixty-six percent of the risk
factors were directly involved in the claims brought. See id.
Another body of research inquires into the proportion ofsurgical treatments that
were given unnecessarily. For example, one study found that only 56% of patients
who received coronary artery bypass surgery needed it. See Constance M. Winslow
et al., The Appropriateness of Performing Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery, 260 JAMA 505,
505 (1988). Presumably the other 44% of these patients had a valid cause of action,
but were unlikely to learn of it. (The category of unnecessary treatments may differ
from garden variety malpractice in that it may include cases of fraud and deliberate
torts. This category may be a far more serious problem that attracts virtually no
attention outside of medical research circles.)
" Recall the data on the harm done by clothing versus the harm done by
chainsaws. See supra note 9.
BEHAVIOR OF THE TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM
Similarly, improvements in medical care might be responsible
for an increasing incidence of negligent injuries. For example, all
else remaining equal, increasing access to health care would
increase the total number of people who would suffer negligent
iatrogenic injuries.94  If medical care has been reorganized to
become more efficient so that a single doctor can see many more
patients in a day than a doctor could a generation ago, even if all
else remained equal, the contemporary doctor should expect to
cause more negligent injuries, in proportion to the increase in
patients treated.95 As the population ages, the need for and rate
of encounters with medical care increase and, with this increase in
encounters, the rate of actionable injury would be expected to
increase. 96 The effect of a "graying population" is compounded
by the fact that older patients are more likely to suffer negligent
iatrogenic injury.
97
94 Consider the decade preceding the announcement of the litigation crisis: The
number of persons enrolled in medicare rose from 25 million to 31.1 million between
1975 and 1985, an increase of 24%. See SOURCEBOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA
32 tbl. 4.1 (1989). Those with private major medical coverage went from 134 million
in 1975 to 163 million in 1985, a 21% increase. See SOURCEBOOK OF HEALTH
INSURANCE DATA 5 tbl. 1.3 (1988). The number of physicians per 100,000 population
went up 27%, from 187 in 1975 to 237 in 1985. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 101 tbl. 154
(110th ed. 1990) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. A proportionate increase in
the number of medical malpractice injuries and consequent lawsuits should not be a
surprise. Danzon found that increases in the number of physicians (especially the
proportion who were surgeons) and increases in the number of surgical procedures
per capita led to a higher frequency and severity of malpractice litigation. See
DANZON, supra note 6, at 72.
" Doctors sometimes compare the contemporary experience with malpractice
against that of doctors 20 or 30 or more years ago, as if nothing has changed in the
delivery of medical care except tort law. While some of the special protections tort
law once accorded health care have been removed (for example, the locality rule and
charitable immunity), there may also be other causes of increases in malpractice and
malpractice claims over time that are equally or more understandable; one does not
have to posit a growing incompetence of physicians or sinister changes in the law in
order to theorize about changes in the incidence of malpractice claims.
96 In the period from 1975 to 1985, the population over age 65 grew from 22.696
million to 28.540 million, a 26% increase. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 94,
at 13 tbl. 13.9 7 See CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 51-52. The monotonic
increase with age is patent. In the California Medical Association study, those aged
0-19 years suffered 22.03 iatrogenic injuries per 1000 hospital admissions; those aged
20-39 suffered 42.44; those aged 40-59 suffered 55.31; those over 60 suffered 68.85.
See id. at 44 tbl. 4, 52 tbl. 52. The Harvard Medical Practice Study found the same
monotonic relationship, even after controlling statistically for the riskiness of the
required treatment. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 85, at 6-24
to 6-26.
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More subtly, we might realize that as more treatments become
available for more conditions, and patients are exposed to more
procedures, they simultaneously receive both the potential benefits
of treatment as well as the associated risks of harm. 9 8 Even more
subtly, the growth of knowledge about treatment moves more and
more cases into the zone of potentially negligent injury. The
growth of knowledge about how to do something right by definition
means more opportunities for doing something "wrong."99 Harms
that previously were not "negligent" potentially become so to-
day.100 If this analysis is correct, then the more advances in
medicine the more potential malpractice there will be, by a process
of redefinition of what is unavoidable or untreatable versus what is
actionable error. In a way that only seems paradoxical, more
medical malpractice might signal improvements in health care and
access to it.
10 1
98 Advances in procedures and technology may increase the risk of iatrogenic
injury. See LouIs E. LANDER, DEFECTIVE MEDICINE: RIsK, ANGER, AND THE
MALPRACTICE CRISIs 34-56 (1978). Where increased risk exposure is not warranted
by increased benefits, a procedure fails the Learned Hand test for negligence. See
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
99 See Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable Precautions,
and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 293, 293 (1988) (explaining
that "[a]dvances in technology can easily cause corresponding increases in the number
of negligence claims"). Grady argues that:
The very effectiveness of new medical technology increases potential
liability, because it creates the possibility that someone will negligently
deprive the patient of what is now a substantial benefit. Moreover, in
modern times, actual liability can also be more frequent. While older
medical procedures probably required less physician advertence, the modem
patient may be connected to a heart monitor, a brain scanner, a blood-gas
analyzer, and a respiration eavesdropper, giving [the physician] twenty-seven
interacting dials and a tremendous need for advertence. Negligence-
trespass on the case-increases because these machines round up the
mustang risks of disease and domesticate them. Once technology tames
disease, there can be relentless legal problems if [the physician] momentarily
forgets what he is doing.
Id. at 294-95.
100 Obstetrics is one example. With the advent of techniques for testing,
monitoring, and treating illness in utero, obstetricians who a generation ago could
only wait to see if health problems existed, today can commit errors well before
delivery by failing to detect the condition, choosing the wrong treatment for it, or
applying the correct treatment in a mistaken and harmful way. A study of closed
obstetric malpractice claims in the files of the leading medical malpractice insurer, St.
Paul Mutual Insurance Company, concluded that two thirds of the cases clearly
involved conditions that the attending physician ought to have been able to manage
properly. See Julian et al., supra note 92, at 323.
101 This may explain the tension between doctors, who correctly believe that they
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In order to assess the correlation between actionable injuries
and malpractice claims for those injuries, we need to acquire data
on the base rate of injuries and responses to those injuries by those
who suffer them and by the law.
B. The Decision to Claim
One of the most remarkable features of the tort system is how
few plaintiffs there are. A great many potential plaintiffs are never
heard from by the injurers or their insurers. The first and most
dramatic step in this process of nonsuits is the failure of so many of
the injury victims to take measures to obtain compensation from
those who injured them.
10 2
By comparing the cases determined to be instances of negligent
injury with insurance company records, the study of California
medical malpractice found that at most only 10% of negligently
injured patients sought compensation for their injuries.'03 Even
for those who suffered major, permanent injuries (the group with
the highest probability of seeking compensation) only one in six
filed.10 4 The earlier Health, Education, and Welfare study found
that only 6% of those negligently injured filed claims.105  The
Harvard Medical Practice Study found that in New York State "eight
times as many patients suffer an injury from medical negligence as
there are malpractice claims. Because only about half the claimants
are doing a better job, and plaintiffs' lawyers (and judges and juries) who, also
correctly, see more cases of negligent iatrogenic injury. On these numbers it is
possible to claim either that medical malpractice is rampant (data indicating hundreds
of thousands of cases throughout the land) or that medical malpractice is infrequent
(data suggesting only about 1% of patients suffer negligent iatrogenic injuries). It
may also suggest the need to rethink tort liability in a way that takes into account this
seemingly paradoxical source of the liability.
102 The empirical basis of this will be developed shortly. Meanwhile, compare the
view of an insurance executive: "An entitlement psychology has become deeply
rooted in American Society. This encourages adversarial proceedings and a feeling
that every wrong, no matter how it is defined, should be put right by someone."
William F. Jones, Reforming the CivilJustice System, RISK MGMT., May 1986, at 50, 51-
52.
103 See CALIORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 101; see also Patricia
M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 57, 68 (noting that this ratio has doubled to one
in five since the mid-1970s); Zuckerman et al., supra note 11, at 95 (noting that
Danzon's study of California hospitals found that only 10% of injured patients filed
malpractice suits).
104 See CALIFORNIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 101.
105 See POcINCKI ET AL., supra note 88, at 50.
1992] 1183
1184 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1147
receive compensation, there are about sixteen times as many
patients who suffer an injury from negligence as there are persons
who receive compensation through the tort system."
10 6
Such findings are not unusual. A major study of a wide range
of types of civil litigation (not just torts) found that of every one
thousand grievances (events for which an injury was noticed), 718
became claims (the victim brought the problem to the alleged
harmdoer's attention), 449 became disputes (the complainant and
the alleged harmdoer failed to reach an agreement on the matter),
103 were brought to the attention of a lawyer, and 50 became filed
cases. 10 7 Thus, only 10% of grievances came to the attention of
lawyers, and only 5% became filed cases.
Except for post-divorce disputes, torts become litigation more
frequently than other kinds of problems. l08 As a percentage of
disputes that become litigation, 18.7% of tortious injuries are
litigated, compared to about 11% of all other types of disputes.
0 9
Much of this difference may be accounted for by auto accidents,
which are frequent,"I0 and routinely viewed as a matter for resolu-
tion by insurers and lawyers.
111
The Rand Corporation's study of people's responses to disabling
injury found that of every one hundred injured, eighty-one decided
to take no action at all. 1 2 Of the nineteen who considered
making some sort of claim for compensation, two dealt directly with
the injurer, four with the insurer, and seven consulted a lawyer (of
whom four engaged the lawyer but only two filed suit); six did
106 HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 85, at 7-1.
107 See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing
the Adversary Culture, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 525, 544 (1980-81); see also 1 DAVID M.
TRUBEK ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT S-18 to S-20
(1983) [hereinafter CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT] (discussing the "dispute
pyramid"); William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:
Naming, Blaming Claiming..., 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 631 (1980-81) (studying the
process by which injurious experiences become perceived, grievances, and ultimately
disputes); David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinaty Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV.
72, 86-87 (1983) (discussing the frequency of litigation with a "dispute pyramid").
108 See TRUBEK ET AL., supra note 107, at 87.
109 See id.
110 Auto accidents cause 18% of all injuries. See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL.,
COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 31 (1991)
[hereinafter COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES].
111 For example, from 1980-1984, 55% of tort trials in Cook County, Illinois were
auto accident cases. See MARK A. PETERSON, CIVILJURIES IN THE 1980s: TRENDS IN
JURY TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 13 (1987).
112 See COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES, supra note 110, at 122.
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nothing."1 Thus, 87% are not heard from by the injurer or
insurer, and only 2% become filed lawsuits.
1 14
Taken together, all of these studies suggest that, at the outset of
the litigation process, .a large number of potential plaintiffs with
valid claims never initiate a claim and thereby become instant false
negatives. Defendants are protected from the majority of those they
injure by the simple fact that victims tend not to complain. Note,
however, that when the number of claims brought is proportionately
so small, even a modest increase in claims is perceived by both
defendants and the courts as a huge increase. For example, if the
proportion of negligently injured patients who filed claims rose
from 4% to 8%, this would double the number of claims, costs of
litigation, and compensation paid by defendants and their insurers.
Under such a scenario, the litigation glass may still be 92% empty,
but it is twice as full as it had been.
If they are not suing those who injured them, what are they
doing? A study that examined how patients dealt with medical care
they deemed to be seriously unsatisfactory found that 26% did
nothing, 46% changed doctors, 25% complained to their doctor
directly, and 9% contacted lawyers although none of them ultimately
filed suits. 115  Even those who complain rarely file a claim for
113 See id.
114 These figures vary considerably when disaggregated by type of injury. For auto
accidents, 65-85% of the injured claim, though only 26-31% sue. See id. at 116. In
medical malpractice, about 10% elect to claim. See id. Interestingly, auto accidents,
the area with the highest claiming rate, has aroused the least controversy or concern.
115 See Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues Their Doctors? How Patients
Handle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 105, 108 (1990). These data come
from a sample of 1706 people contacted by random telephone sampling from two
different cities, of whom 198 felt they had experienced unsatisfactory medical care
and of whom 175 agreed to be interviewed. None of these had filed suit. In order
to find patients who had sued (so as to compare the two groups), May and Stengel
had to draw a separate sample from among those who had filed complaints with the
state's patient compensation panel. See id. at 106. Moreover, Danzon found that
when hospital patients sue, 85% of these suits "involve a new abnormal condition
rather than an imperfect resolution of the original condition for which health care
was sought." DANZON, supra note 6, at 26.
Compare these data on patient behavior to speculations such as that offered by
Dr.James H. Sammons, executive vice-president of the American Medical Association,
who suggests that any patient who is not made perfect is inclined to sue: "There's a
mindset in this country now that every single thingshould turn out 100 percent right
every single time." Joel Brinkley, Physicians Have an Image Problem-It's Too Good, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 1985, at E6.
Obstetricians have been heard to complain that anyone who has an imperfect
baby wants to sue. We can begin to appreciate the exaggerated nature of these
assertions by considering that in 1983, if one obstetrician in six faced a claim, this
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damages. A study of the Ohio Board of Medical Licensure and
Discipline, for example, found that only 1% of complainants
proceeded to file lawsuits.
11 6
Most commentary, however, focuses on the injury victims who
sue and asks what it could be that leads them to do so.117 Over-
looked is the far larger group of injury victims who have legally
cognizable claims but nevertheless choose to bear the costs
themselves rather than seek to shift them to those who caused the
injury. The more challenging question might be: What explains
why so many people who have suffered -actionable injuries do not
seek compensation?
One study of medical malpractice counted the incidence of state
claims per one thousand persons and found higher rates of claiming
where there was more surgery, higher personal incomes, lower
lawyer earnings, and state laws that both extended the statute of
limitations (by way of injury discovery rules) and required a high
leads to no more than 5000 cases. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice on
Trial: Quality of Care Is the Important Standard, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986,
at 321, 333 n.52. Infant mortality in 1983 was about 40,000. See id. In a far larger
number of live births (perhaps as many as three times the infant mortality rate)
significant malformations will be detectable within the first two weeks of life. See id.
Thus, there were at least 32 times as many extremely disappointed new parents as
there were obstetric malpractice suits.
The notion that patients' unrealistic expectations lead to disappointment and
disappointment to lawsuits is not new. One of a series of articles on medical
malpractice litigation, published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
in 1941, warned that "[t]here has been a vast increase in these cases since 1900" and
concluded that the increase was due in part to "[i]ncreasing expectations directed
toward physicians as medical standards advance and the public becomes informed of
what is medically possible." Hubert W. Smith, Legal Responsibility for Medical
Malpractice, 116JAMA 2670, 2673 (1941).
116 See TimothyJost et al., Consumers, Complaints, and Professional Discipline
(1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
117 See, e.g., Brinkley, supra note 115, at E6 (noting that malpractice suits have
escalated because "Americans think that any injury can be repaired and any disease
cured"); John H. Lavin, Which Patients Are Most Likely to Sue?, MED. EcON., Jan. 9,
1984, at 107B (discussing nine criteria developed by a major malpractice insurance
company for determining which patients are more likely to file a lawsuit);James B.
Stewart, SeekingJustice: People Prone to Sue Have Many Reasons, and Money is But One,
WALL ST.J., May 20, 1986, at 1. Stewart notes:
Sociologists and economists offer a wide range of theories to explain why
Americans sue. They often cite individualism, which lawsuits are a way of
expressing; rising narcissism, which increases the inclination to blame
someone else; and urbanization (It's easier to sue strangers in a big city than
friends in a small town). Expanding theories of liability, the abundance of
lawyers and the prospect of large jury verdicts also get frequent mention.
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standard of informed consent.1 18 Another study found the stron-
gest correlation between malpractice claims and urbanization.
19
Interestingly, the number of lawyers, the age of the population, and
recent reforms of legal rules were found to make no difference in
the number of claims filed.
1 20
TABLE 1121
RATIO OF MALPRACTICE CLAIMS TO NEGLIGENT
INJURIES, BY SEVERITY
Severity Total Claims Paid Claims
1 0.057 0.023
2 0.076 0.081
3 0.082 0.028
4 0.150 0.052
5 0.170 0.065
6 0.130 0.050
7 0.110 0.037
8 0.058 0.020
Total 0.100 0.039
As Table I reveals, the degree of injury appears to make quite
a difference. Moderately to seriously injured malpractice victims
were between two and three times more likely to file malpractice
suits than families of those who died from negligent injuries.
1 22
Part of a landmark British study of injury and illness included
inquiry into the explanation for people's responses to those
disabling conditions. 125 That research found that the average
1 18 See Roger Feldman, The Determinants of Medical Malpractice Incidents: Theoy of
Contingency Fees and Empirical Evidence, 7 ATLANTIC ECON.J. 59, 62 (1979).
'19 See DANZON, supra note 6, at 74-75.
120 See id. at 74-75, 82-83.
121 The data for Table I come from DANZON, supra note 6, at 23 tbl. 2.4. Severity
index: 1 = Minor Temporary Disability: not exceeding 30 days and not requiring
surgery; 2 = Minor Temporary Disability: not exceeding 30 days but requiring
surgery; 3 = Major Temporary Disability: lasting more than 30 days but no longer
than 2 years; 4 = Minor Permanent Partial Disability: most functionally nondisabling
disabilities; 5 = Major Permanent Partial Disability: substantial damage, but not
sufficient to cause complete loss of ability to perform most ordinary functions; 6 =
Major Permanent Total Disability: substantial damage, usually sufficient to alter
patient's life-style into a dependent position; 7 = Grave Permanent Total Disability:
complete dependence or short-term fatal prognosis; 8 = Death. See id. at 21 tbl. 2.1.
12 See CALIFORNIA MEDICAL AssOCIATION, supra note 89, at 100.
123 See Sally Lloyd-Bostock, Fault and Liability for Accidents: The Accident Victim's
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Briton does not attribute responsibility in the way the law does.'
24
In the attributional perceptions of the layperson, fewer incidents are
perceived as appropriate occasions for assigning responsibility to
the injurer than would be cognized by tort law. The American
replication of that research found that for most work-related
injuries, it never occurs to most people to blame their injury on the
manufacturer who could have made the product safer for reasonably
foreseeable uses. 125 Those injured assumed they should have
used the product with more care.1 26 Medical malpractice injuries
present the greatest ambiguity. While most other sources of injury
result from something that clearly is not in the normal course of
events, medical interventions performed with due care can result in
further injury, and patients are well aware of this. 127 Medical
malpractice injuries present victims with difficulty in figuring out
whether the injury was due to medical malpractice (or was instead
an unavoidable or predictable risk of treatment).
128
Another reason for the relatively low rates of claims is igno-
rance-many injury victims do not realize they have a claim or do
not know the procedure for hiring a lawyer and filing a claim.
129
Perspective, in DONALD HARRIS ET AL., COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND
INJURY 139 (1984).
124 See id. at 160 (noting "several important ways in which responses of victims are
in conflict with the general rationale of the tort system").
125 See COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES, supra note 110, at 156-57.
126 Interestingly, much of the rhetoric of the liability crisis suggests that the
contrary is true. Perhaps that is because defendants and insurers see or talk only to
those who enter the system. The majority, who do not claim, are invisible to those
who look only at the system several steps further along in the process. A follow-up
study to the Rand study mentioned above, see COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL
INJURIES, supra note 110, will try to find out if the process of asking people whether
they considered claiming led to an increase in claims filed. See Deborah R. Hensler,
A Panel Study Analysis of Claiming Behavior (Feb. 10, 1988) (research proposal
submitted to and funded by the National Science Foundation).
127 Recall that three-fourths of iatrogenic injuries are considered to be the result
of something other than negligence. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra
note 85, at 6-48. Thus, negligently injured patients ought to be, and are, the victims
of tortious injury most hesitant to sue. In addition, medical malpractice claims filed
ought to include the highest ratio of false positives to true positives. See infra notes
148-51 and accompanying text.
128 See Marlynn L. May, Aggrieved Patients' Journeys to Justice: Self-Help
Networks Among Suers and Non-Suers (June 26-29, 1991) (unpublished paper
presented at the joint meeting of the Law and Society Association and the Research
Committee on the Sociology of Law of the International Sociological Association, on
file with author).
129 See, e.g., Bruce Campbell & Susette M. Talarico, Access to Legal Services:
Examining Common Assumptions, 66 JUDICATURE 313 (1983) (providing a general
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Presumably this lack of knowledge has been reduced somewhat by
the relaxation of restraints on legal advertising and the wider
marketing of legal services.
Another reason for these low filing rates may be that victims
conduct an intuitive cost-benefit analysis of filing a lawsuit,
including not only the dollar costs involved but the costs in time
and stress associated with a suit. These costs may include stigma
associated with the act of asserting a complaint, keeping the
memory of the injury or loss alive, or continued confrontation with
the injurer, a distressing prospect for most victims.
130
A system that requires victims to initiate claims and puts them
through a complex process before compensation can be paid will
have far fewer claims filed than a system that reduces these barriers.
Consequently, defendant groups who would like to experiment with
no-fault or other types of administrative systems fear that a major
cost of administrative expediency will be an increase in claims
filed.1 31 They worry that the number of currently litigated cases
constitutes only the tip of the injury iceberg and that in exchange
for whatever they are trying to avoid, they almost certainly will see
many more cases than they have experienced in the past. For some
areas of litigation, a quintupling of cases would not be unexpect-
ed.13
2
discussion of the lack of access to or underutilization of legal services); Jerome E.
Carlin et al., Civilfustice and the Poor: Issues for Sociological Research, 1 LAw & Soc'y
REV. 9, 58-59 (1966) (finding a "slight tendency" for pro bono services to be utilized
by those with higher incomes and more education than those with lower income and
education levels); Elliot E. Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Sevice for the
Middle Classes, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 973 (1963) (explaining why the expanding
middle class is not receiving in proportionate measures the legal services they need).
130 Something is required to overcome the costs of claiming. Sometimes it is the
presence of substantial injuries and the resulting costs to the victim. See Miller &
Sarat, supra note 107, at 540-41. Sometimes it is that the injurer has added insult to
the injury by not responding to the problem seriously. See, e.g., RANDALL P.
BEZANSON ET AL., LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYrH AND REALITY 83 (1987) (noting
that, in the context of allegedy libelous activity by the press, 88% of plaintiffs
specifically requesting the media to take remedial action credited the media's
response (or non-response) as a factor in their decision to sue).
3 See SPECIALTY SOC'Y MEDICAL LIAB. PROJECT, AMA, A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
TO THE CIVILJUSTICE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY DIsPUTES: A FAULT-
BASED, ADMINISTRATIVE SYsTEM (1988).
132 If many patients currently do not file claims because ofaffection or respect for
their erring physicians, or as a result of their own or a lawyer's cost-benefit analysis,
all these barriers will recede when claims are allowed to be filed with some sort of
impersonal and routinized compensation agency, somewhat like filling out one's
health insurance forms. On this reasoning, the California Medical Association study
cautioned against a no-fault system for medical malpractice. See CALIFORNIA MEDICAL
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C. Attorney Decision to Accept Case
Even those victims who wish to press their claims cannot
realistically do so unless a lawyer agrees to handle their case, and
lawyers usually do not accept a case unless they see an acceptable
probability of economic success for themselves in doing so. This
selective acceptance further reduces the number of actionable
injuries that become litigated cases.
What determines an attorney's decision to accept a case is
another of the more neglected questions in a system that suffers
from a lack of hard data at nearly every stage. A 1973 study by the
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) found
that a large percentage of cases brought to attorneys was rejected by
them and not filed.13 3  The Civil Litigation Research Project
found that only half the complaints brought to a lawyer became
filed cases.1 34 At an extreme is a report of one New York City law
firm that earns 15% of its business from personal injury cases
against the city.l3 5 The firm rejects any case that is expected to
yield awards of less than $50,000.136 Of 2500 medical malpractice
complaints offered to the firm in one year, it accepted only
forty.' 3 7 Clearly, lawyers engage in some filtering of cases and
turn away a large number of them.1
8
AsSOCIATION, supra note 89, at 105. The findings of the Harvard Medical Practice
Study suggest this option might be placed back on the table for consideration. See
HARvARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 85, at 11-6 to 11-8.
Even physicians may not really be aiming to trade away the costs they and their
spokespersons usually talk about. They may be willing to incur greater dollar costs
if in exchange they free themselves from the need to submit to the legal process. In
one study of physicians who had been sued for malpractice, 22% found it to be the
single most traumatic experience of their lives. See Sara C. Charles et al., Appraisal
of the Event as a Factor in Coping with Malpractice Litigation, 14 BEHAv. MED. 148, 148
(1988).
133 See PoCINCKI ET AL., supra note 88, at 50.
134 See CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 107, at S-19.
135 See Patricia B. Gray, City's Nemesis: Lawyer Hariy Lipsig Makes a Killing Suing
People of New York, WALL ST.J., Mar. 16, 1988, at 1.
136 See id.
137 See id. at 16.
138 A study of anesthesiology malpractice claims found that of 1004 filed lawsuits,
in which evaluations of injury severity could be made in 869, the median level of
injury was major permanent disability and the modal injury was death. See Frederick W.
Cheney et al., Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261JAMA 1599, 1601 (1989).
Why did the claims involve such severe injuries? Where had the great bulk of cases
with lower levels of injury gone? No doubt many were simply lumped by the injured
patients. But of those brought to lawyers for filing as suits, many no doubt were
rejected by the lawyers as insufficiently serious to warrant bringing a claim, even if
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Attorneys may turn cases away for a variety of reasons. The
plaintiff may be thought to be too unsympathetic or unappealing to
juries, the evidence may contain ambiguities, or the attorney may
lack the needed experts or expertise. For the present discussion, I
shall concentrate on the basic economics of legal practice.
An attorney's cases may be thought of as a portfolio of invest-
ments. Economically rational investors seek profitable returns from
their investments.1 39  For plaintiffs' lawyers, the risk exists of
investing time and out-of-pocket expenses on cases that may not
produce adequate returns, or any returns at all. Presumably,
plaintiffs' attorneys prefer cases with the clearest evidence of
liability and the largest damages. They will avoid cases with weak
evidence of liability or only a small margin between the cost of
litigating the case (the value of the attorney's time and the opportu-
nity cost of taking the case) and the expected fee from the
case.
140
If the projected cost to a lawyer of litigating a case to a
judgment is X dollars, in order for the attorney to break even, the
expected award or settlement, discounted by the probability of
success at trial, must be three times X (3X), if the lawyer's fee is one
third of the award. The attorney will then add to that 3X the profit
margin he requires. Injuries below this final amount are, therefore,
unlikely to become litigated cases.
Assuming lawyers evaluate cases using a model approximated by
this description, several implications for the litigation process
emerge. First, the more selectively plaintiffs' lawyers choose the
cases they will take, the more cases will be resolved in the plaintiffs'
favor and the more damages will be paid. This screening should
produce a pool of filed cases that tends to exclude those where the
liability appeared to be dear. Cheney et al. comment further that, because of this
prior filtering by patients and lawyers, the current tort system probably results in
fewer payments to injury victims than would occur in either a no-fault or a fault-based
administrative system. See id. at 1603.
59 "[A] lawyer should decide to take a case if the predicted income is greater than
the predicted expenses. Conversely, he should decline the case if the predicted
expenses exceed the predicted income." Stuart S. Nagel, Applying Decision Science to
the Practice of Law, PRAc. LAW., Apr. 15, 1984, at 13, 14; see also M.W. Reder, Medical
Malpractice: An Economist's View, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 511, 562 (concluding
that attorneys handling malpractice claims on a contingent fee basis are profit
maximizers).
140 Danzon notes that her evidence "supports the belief that small malpractice
claims are often barred from recovery because of the high fixed costs of participating
in the legal process." DANZON, supra note 6, at 42.
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potential defendant's liability is insufficiently clear or the victim's
losses are not large. Furthermore, if the number of personal injury
lawyers per capita and the number of cases taken by each remains
fairly constant, the screening process should, as the proportion of
the actionable injury base presented to an attorney increases, yield
a pool of cases with a greater expected return. Indeed, this is
consistent with increases in plaintiff victories and increasingly large
settlements and awards, and provides a parsimonious explanation
for those trends (if they really exist).' 4 1
Moreover, while an economically sensitive screening process
such as this means that all defendants gain an added layer of
protection, 142 some kinds of defendants enjoy a greater level of
protection than others. Cases that are less expensive to litigate
(because they are more routinized and require less attorney time,
fewer experts, etc.) will be accepted more readily because they are
investments that will require a smaller return to be profitable for
the attorney. These are more likely to be cases of the auto
negligence and slip-and-fall variety than medical malpractice or
product liability, which involve more complex proofs, more
elaborate discovery, and more experts. Cases that are more
expensive to litigate will be accepted less readily and will require a
higher expected return before they will be litigated. 1 43  Once
certain types of injury become sufficiently common-such as torts of
mass destruction-they are transformed from the latter category to
the former. Asbestos cases provide a good example of this. Once
a lawyer handles a fair number of asbestos cases, even complex
evidence gathering and proof become routine and easily replicated.
This kind of product liability case is then treated more like an auto
negligence case.
144
141 Ironically, the solution sometimes suggested to solve the liability "explosion"-
that plaintiffs' attorneys commit themselves to taking only the most meritorious cases
deserving the greatest compensation-may be exactly what they have been doing. This
solution tends to produce precisely the results critics have taken to indicate the
existence of the "explosion" in the first place.
142 Potential defendants receive several protections before suit is ever filed. First,
victims, as a class, tend not to seek compensation. Additionally, some of those who
do cannot get beyond the barrier posed by the selectivity of the plaintiff lawyer.
Plaintiffs' attorneys are not often thought of as serving defendants' interests, but to
this extent, as gatekeepers to the litigation system, they do.
143 For a discussion of how this reasoning suggests an alternative interpretation
to the findings of studies of damage awards, see infra notes 340-46 and accompanying
text.
144 Although these cases may become simpler for lawyers, they do not necessarily
become so for courts. See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 650-51 (E.D.
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Thus, some classes of defendants (corporations, professionals,
etc.) have greater freedom to conduct their activities than others
(e.g., motor vehicle drivers). 45  Conversely, people are better
protected from injuries caused by some classes of injurers than from
others.
Assessment of the litigation system's performance at this stage
of the litigation process requires consideration of the base rate of
actionable injuries discussed earlier. Figure IV illustrates this point,
using approximations of some of the reported data on medical
malpractice injuries and claims.
146
Tex. 1990) (detailing the complexities of a class action asbestos litigation).
145 This ceases to be true for products that have caused mass injury.
146 In Figure IV and several figures that follow it, I am performing much like a
paleontologist of the legal system. See supra text accompanying note 2. I am trying
to construct as accurate a picture as possible of the flow of cases into, through, and
out of the litigation system based on fragmentary evidence. The evidence is discussed
in the text and then assembled, by stages, into a whole in the Figures. Like building
a dinosaur skeleton, the solid pieces we have are fixed and the unknown parts that
are to be filled in must remain consistent with what is already known. This means
that the picture constructed may be incorrect. But it is the best we can do with
present knowledge. We know, for example, that the ratio of negligent iatrogenic
injuries is about 1:100 (or 10,000:1,000,000),seesupra notes 88-91 and accompanying
text, and that filings number about 10% of the total of actionable injuries (200+800
over 10,000 equals 10%), see supra note 121 and Table I. We can be far less sure
about the ratio of true positive filings (200) to false positives (800). The Harvard
Medical Practice Study, for instance, found that only one claim out of every six filed
had been determined, by review of medical records, to have been a negligent
iatrogenic injury. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 85, at 7-34.
But that 1:5 ratio (which would translate in Figure IV as 167:833) overstates the skew,
because it does not include actual negligent injuries that had not manifested
themselves until after discharge. Thus, the 1:4 ratio (200:800) used in the Figure IV
seems a reasonable estimate. Finally, the ratio of cases presented to attorneys
(400:2400) is little more than a guess, though it is well within the bounds of the
findings described in the text. It is by these fragments and educated guesses that this
and later Figures have been constructed.
The disproportionate use of medical malpractice data here and elsewhere in this
Article is compelled by the fact that medical malpractice has been the most
researched category of tort. We must note, however, that in the world as well as in
the litigation system, medical malpractice is one of the more infrequent torts. Rand
found that 1% or fewer of accidental injuries were the result of medical injuries. See
COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES, supra note 110, at 31. (Since these data
were patient self-reports, the more veridical figure may be either somewhat smaller
or larger, depending on whether respondents tended to mistake non-negligently
caused injuries for negligent injuries, or whether they tended to overlook injuries or
misattribute iatrogenic injuries as unavoidable.) In both the federal and state courts,
medical malpractice cases account for no more than a few percent of cases. I leave
it to the reader to try to figure out why the world has come to know relatively much
about so little, and next to nothing about so much.
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FIGURE IV 147
FLOW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES THROUGH
PART OF THE LITIGATION SYSTEM
Negligent latrogenic
Injury
Base of actionable injuries
Decisions to claim
Prospective cases presented to lawyers
Lawsuits filed
Settlements negotiated
Trials commenced
for Plaintiff
Trial Verdict
for Defendant
Awards
Changes from additur/remittitur review
Appeals
Compensation paid
Present Absent
10,000* 1,000,000*
400 2,400
200* 800*
Suppose plaintiffs' attorneys find that for every potential client
presenting an apparently meritorious claim, six others appear
presenting invalid claims-in Figure IV this scenario is represented
as 400 individuals with injuries caused by negligence and 2400
without negligent injuries consulting attorneys. From these data,
one might erroneously infer that most cases involve frivolous claims.
What is not apparent, even to plaintiffs' attorneys, who see only this
stage of the system, is the sharply skewed base rate of injuries from
147 The sources for Figure IV are known and hypothetical transition probabilities
(see relevant text sections for details). Empirically determined ratios are indicated
with an asterisk; others are estimated. See supra note 146.
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which it arises: only one injury for every 100 patients. Thus, the
400 meritorious claims are only 4% of the total pool of negligent
injuries (the other 96% have elected not to claim), and the 2400
cases without merit are less than one quarter of one percent of the
non-negligently injured (or non-injured).
If plaintiffs' attorneys were asked for a candid appraisal of the
litigiousness of Americans, based on their "actual experience with
potential clients who came knocking on their doors," their answers
naturally would focus on the distribution of those clients who
presented claims-not on those who might have but did not. Based
on their experience, they would conclude that a large number of
people with claims lacking merit are looking to sue. Viewing the
same potential clients against a background of the base rate of
injuries from which claims could come would suggest that only a
tiny proportion of people are seeking to bring claims lacking merit.
In addition, very few of the negligently injured seek to claim either.
Therefore, ignoring the base rate leads to distorted inferences.
1 48
The data on filings can be similarly misleading. If, as estimated
in Figure IV, 200 claims arise out of the base of negligent injuries
and 800 arise out of the base of non-negligent injuries, the
superficial analyst might conclude that it is a perverse litigation
system that allows four times as many non-meritorious claims to be
filed as meritorious ones. But the 200 cases represent only half of
the valid cases plaintiffs' lawyers could have filed, while plaintiffs'
lawyers have already screened out two-thirds of the non-meritorious
claims. Moreover, the 200 filed cases represent only 2% of the
10,000 known negligent injuries, 149 while the 800 cases filed
148 Comparable errors occur in other areas. Physicians who treated histoplasmosis
mistakenly believed it to be a rare and nearly always fatal condition. See HISTOPLAS-
MOSIS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE 15 (Albert Ballows ed.,
1971). They came to this conclusion from looking at the patients who appeared in
their clinics and hospitals seeking treatment. But when public health researchers
examined the incidence of the disease in the population at large, they found that the
disease actually was very common and rarely fatal. See id. at 9-15. Obviously, only
those who were seriously ill from the disease sought treatment. Where one looks-at
the population or at the self-selected and unrepresentative sample that appears for
attention-affects the inferences drawn about the frequency and nature of the
condition. See also Stanley Schachter, Recidivism and Self-Cure of Smoking and Obesity,
37 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 436,437 (1982) (criticizing estimates of smokers' ability to quit
based on data from smoking cessation clinics rather than from the general population
of smokers).
149 Thus, under this system 98% of tortfeasors are spared from answering to their
victims.
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represent only eight one hundredths of one percent of the non-
negligently injured base from which they arise.
150
Perhaps the most precise conclusion is that filings represent few
false positive errors (defendants who are wrongly sued) and many
false negative errors (meritorious claims that are never filed). Yet,
paradoxically, the extreme skew of the base rate means that the
number of claims lacking merit has to exceed the number of
meritorious claims, probably by several fold.' 51 The base rate has
a powerful effect on the distribution of filings. The absolute
numbers of cases and their proportions relative to their base rate
paint very different pictures about what is taking place. Moreover,
the two types of errors are asymmetrical. False positive errors will
have repeated opportunities to be caught and removed from the
system without payment. On the other hand, false negative errors
are unlikely ever to be corrected.
D. Case Filings
As the reader must now appreciate, filing data can be meaning-
less or misleading if examined without reference to context: the
initial base of injuries, victims' decisions whether to claim, and
attorneys' decisions whether to accept cases. Yet, the literature of
filings and the changes in filings over time typically treat these data
as if they existed in splendid isolation. Nevertheless, these data and
their implications should be considered.
1. Federal Case Filings
Along with awards, filing data have attracted the most attention
in recent years, perhaps because they are the most available of the
relevant data. Federal data on filings are readily available from the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO), whose
annual reports can be found in most law libraries and whose data
tapes can be obtained at low cost.
150 The .08% erroneous filing rate is quite good when compared to the rate of
negligent medical injury (about 1%) or the rate of diagnostic errors. See Joseph L.
Gastwirth, The Statistical Precision of Medical Screening Procedures: Application to
Polygraph and AIDS Antibodies Test Data, 2 STAT. Sci. 213, 215-17 (1987) (finding that
AIDS testing on a randomly selected population produces about 95% false positives).
151 This will be true unless screening by plaintiffs' lawyers is considerably more
accurate than we have any reason to suppose it would be.
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Figure V graphically depicts raw data on the amount of civil
litigation in the federal courts, as well as more detailed information
on several categories of civil cases. The data presented include the
period from 1975 through 1985.153 Some might point to the
increase in the total number of civilfilings as evidence that there had
been massive and precipitous growth in torts. For example, from
1975 to 1985 the total number of civil filings grew from 117,320 to
152 Figure V is a stacked area chart whose data come from Appendix B infra.
15' These were the data available to the debate that erupted in 1986. In Appendix
B, infra, the data are carried as far forward to the present as available.
300
n
250'
200
Filings
(in 000's)
150.................
50
Corts
.n . . . . . .
BEHAVIOR OF THE TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM
FIGURE V
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FEDERAL CIVIL FILINGS
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273,670, an increase of 133%.15 4  Although this may at first
appear to be a dramatic increase, the liability crisis debate was
focused on torts, and thus the total federal civil caseload is actually
overinclusive by a considerable margin.
155
Other commentators aimed a bit more precisely, pointing to the
growth of the tort portion of the caseload, up 62% from 1975 to
1985 (from 25,691 cases to 41,593).156 To be sure, that is growth
in the number of tort cases filed-an increase of 15,902 to be exact.
As the Justice Department's report commented, "The Working
Group was particularly struck by the extraordinary growth over the
last decade of the number of tort lawsuits .... 157
But the question remains whether tort cases were indeed
responsible for swelling the federal caseload. Several comparisons
make clear that they were not. First of all, although there were 62%
more tort cases filed in 1985 than in 1975, non-tort cases (all civil
cases other than torts) grew by 153%.158 Another way to view the
situation is to realize that those 15,902 additional tort cases
constituted only about 10% of the 156,350 additional cases the
system had to contend with by 1985 (compared to 1975).159
154 See infra Appendix B. It is important to clarify how this calculation of
percentage increase, which represents the amount of increase as a percentage of the
starting point amount, is made. It is calculated by forming a fraction, using the
number of additional cases as the numerator and the initial frequency as the
denominator, and multiplying the quotient by 100. The initial frequency (117,320)
is subtracted from the latter (273,670), which yields 156,350 additional cases.
Dividing that difference by the initial frequency (117,320) yields the quotient, which
expresses the latter frequency as a proportion of the initial frequency (1.33).
Multiplying by 100 converts this proportion into a percentage. Thus:
273,670 - 117,320 = 156350 = 1.33 x 100 = 133%
117,320 117,320
If the initial and the latter amounts were the same, the numerator would equal zero
and the percentage change would be zero. If the number doubled-that is, as many
additional cases as there were to begin with-the percentage increase would be 100%.
155 Between 1975 and 1985, the proportion of federal filings that were tort cases
constituted only between 14% and 22% of total filings. See id.
156 See id.
.157 TORT PoLicY REPORT, supra note 27, at 2 (emphasis added).
158 See infra Appendix B (indicating that non-tort cases grew from 91,629 to
232,077). Presumably, this was two-and-a-half times as "extraordinary."
159 See id. For a discussion of this, see Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big
Six; or, The Federal Courts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIs. L. REV. 921, 924-28;
Galanter, supra note 25, at 15-28.
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FIGURE VI-A
160
TORTS AS A SLICE OF THE FEDERAL CIL LITIGATION PIE - 1975
FIGURE VI-B
TORTS AS A SLICE OF THE FEDERAL CIL LITIGATION PIE - 1985
Another way to analyze this pattern of growth is to look at the
federal caseload through pie charts, as in Figures VI-A and VI-B.
The area of the pie is proportional to the total number of federal
160 Appendix B, infra, supplies the data for Figures VI-A & VI-B.
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Non-Torts
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Non-Torts
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civil filings. Thus, the tort slice for 1985 is 62% larger than the
1975 slice. But the total pie has grown much larger. Importantly,
we can see that the 1985 tort slice is a smaller portion of the 1985
civil litigation pie (15%) than the 1975 slice was of its pie (22%).
During this whole period, torts constituted a shrinking proportion
of the federal civil caseload, as Figure VII indicates. The years
1983, 1984, and 1985 formed a valley for tort cases as a proportion
of federal civil litigation-an ironic period for a crisis in the volume
of tort cases to have been declared.
FIGURE V11
161
SEVERAL CATEGORIES OF FEDERAL CIVIL CASES AS
PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL CASELOAD
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Other kinds of civil cases clearly were growing faster than torts.
Table II reveals that tort cases were far overshadowed by, among
161 Appendix B, infra, supplies the data for Figure VII.
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others, recovery of federal overpayments (8440% growth), social
security cases (288% growth), and contract litigation (117% growth).
TABLE I1162
FEDERAL CIVIL FILINGS: GROWTH RATES FOR
SEVERAL TYPES OF CASES
Over- Social
Year Total Torts Non-Torts Payment Security Contracts
1975 - - - - - -
1976 11 0 14 60 77 1
1977 11 1 14 27 73 2
1978 18 3 23 173 70 9
1979 32 12 37 1259 70 33
1980 44 27 49 2189 55 62
1981 54 31 60 2567 67 58
1982 76 33 88 4312 119 74
1983 106 42 124 5952 248 97
1984 123 46 144 6683 413 100
1985 133 62 153 8440 238 117
While tort cases went from 25,691 in 1975 to 41,593 in 1985,
recovery of overpayment cases jumped from a trickle of 681 to over
58,160, social security cases went from 5846 to 19,771 (29,985 in
1984), and contract cases increased from 12,391 to 26,849.163
One might wonder why the crisis did not include any of those other
categories of cases.
164
162 Appendix B, infra, supplies the data for Table II.
163 See infra Appendix B. The AO's 1984 report stated: "In recent years the
number of civil cases... has been greatly influenced by two case categories. These
two categories are recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments and
Social Security Act cases." 1984 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. Crs. ANN. REP. 125. For
further discussion of the large growth areas, see Galanter, supra note 159, at 925
(finding that six categories of cases together account for 79% of the growth in filings
over the quarter century from 1960 to 1986; the "big six" are civil rights (17.9% mean
annual growth rate over the period), social security (13.5%), recovery cases (11.8%),
prisoner petitions (11.1%), other contracts (5.0%), and torts (3.0%)).
164 The answer likely reflects a concern not so much with numbers of cases and
their burden on the courts, but rather with the direction of transfers of wealth that
result from different categories of cases. Tort cases usually involve allegedly injured
citizens seeking compensation from those they believe injured them-if not from
manufacturers or professionals (as defendants), then from insurance companies.
Thus, the transfers are from corporate profits to injured individuals. Contract cases
usually entail businesses slugging it out with each other (and silence about that may
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Of special interest to many commentators, including the Justice
Department's Tort Policy Working Group, was the product liability
category. From 1974 to 1985, it grew from 1579 cases to 13,554,
the oft-cited 758% growth rate. 165 Figures I-A & I-B contained
these same data.166 For a number of reasons, the 758% may not
reflect the reality of growth in federal product liability cases.
First, the count used by the Justice Department and academic
commentators is composed of all kinds of product liability cases,
including some contract actions. By lumping together all kinds of
product liability cases, some contract cases are counted as torts.
167
be a kind of professional courtesy) or bill collection (a context in which courts and
lawyers are transformed into essential, if not heroic, partners in a productive society).
The growth in social security cases and recovery of overpayment cases represented
a deliberate change in federal policy. President Reagan's first Secretary of Health and
Human Services adopted a policy of thinning the ranks of people receiving social
security disability benefits. Many of these cases resulted in litigation, as tens of
thousands of persons already determined to be disabled had to appeal Social Security
Administration actions to the federal courts in an effort to restore their benefits
under the Social Security Act. See Robert Pear, Culling of U.S. Disability Rolls Is
Underway, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1986, at A24 ("The disability reviews were halted...
in response to harsh criticism from many members of Congress, Federaljudges, and
governors, who said the Reagan Administration was improperly throwing thousands
of disabled people off the rolls."). Recovery of overpayment and enforcement of
judgment cases reflected an attempt by the federal government to retrieve benefits
it overpaid and to obtain judgments it had won in lawsuits. See Galanter, supra note
159, at 928-29. Although the public rhetoric often was about welfare queens and
college students who defaulted on their loans, interestingly, "[m]ost of the cases
involved actions to recover overpayment ofveterans' benefits." 1985 ADMINISTRATIVE
OFF. U.S. Crs. ANN. REP. 141.
We need not question the federal government's wisdom in trying to keep our
financial house in order, or its choosing to use the courts to help accomplish that
task. It is more than a bit ironic, however, that the same Justice Department that
helps establish and carry out policies that add the lion's share of cases to the federal
docket looks at that overall growth and is "particularly struck" only by the "extraordi-
nary growth... of the number of tort lawsuits." TORT POLIcY REPORT, supra note
27, at 2.
165 See infra Appendix B; see also TORT POLICY REPORT, supra note 27, at 45; Priest,
supra note 45, at 323-24. In this Article, I have been using a 1975-1985 time frame.
For the analysis of the product liability category, I have followed those commentators
in stretching to an 11-year span. I will discuss the implicatioas of such a choice
shortly.
166 See supra figures accompanying note 42.
167 See, e.g., 1989 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 116 (indicating, in
Table S-11, the total number of product liability cases commenced by nature of suit,
which includes a listing of "contract actions"). Also, not all product liability tort cases
are personal injury cases, though they are usually treated as if they were. Some of
these suits are for damage to property, and those are often brought by businesses.
Breach of warranty claims are also based on strict liability. These probably are nits
too small to pick, however.
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Second, when the starting point is a small number, growth rates
can easily appear huge. As has been noted elsewhere, 1974 was the
first year that product liability cases had their own separate listing
on the cover sheets that lawyers fill out when filing a case in federal
court.168 The count for 1974 is almost certainly an understate-
ment of that year's actual incidence of product liability cases. In
1974, the supply of older cover sheets (without the product liability
category on it) may not have run out. Furthermore, it may have
taken lawyers a few years to notice and use the new category. Thus,
the 1974 count may be artificially low. The apparent sudden growth
following 1974, then, may not be entirely due to growth in the
actual number of cases, but may be partially due to growth in the
supply of sheets on which to check off "product liability," as well as
growth in lawyers' awareness that there is a place to record that
fact.
169
TABLE 111170
FEDERAL CIVIL FILINGS: GRoWTH OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
From 1974
83
134
158
177
288
391
474
466
484
580
758
Percentage Growth
From 1975
28
41
51
112
169
214
210
220
272
370
371
From 1976
10
18
66
110
145
142
149
191
267
268
310
Third, the years chosen for comparison cause the apparent
growth to seem especially dramatic. For example, as Table III
168 See Galanter, supra note 159, at 937.
169 See id. at 937 n.54.
170 Appendix B, infra, supplies the data for Table III.
Year
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
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shows, taking the starting point as 1975, instead of 1974, results in
growth by 1985 of 870% instead of 758%.171 Using 1976 as the
starting point, we discover that by 1985 the growth has been only
267%.172 In short, the particular years examined make the growth
rate for product liability appear to be more than double what it
would be otherwise.
Finally, what are we counting? Does the growth, be it 758% or
half that, reflect an enduring change in some underlying pattern?
Several commentators have suggested that personal injury product
liability cases come in waves, rising as certain products that have
caused mass injuries bring a tide of cases into the courts, and
receding after a fairly circumscribed period.1 7 One-third of all
product liability cases in the system in the mid-1980s were attribut-
able to a single product: asbestos. 174 This wave of cases, like
other waves, flooded the system and created enormous problems of
management as well as justice. But it would be more sensible to
view them as what they are and debate the proper solution to their
distinctive nature, rather than to pretend they are merely one
indication of broader changes in the way Americans use their
courts. 
17 5
One study examined which industries and companies have been
defendants in federal product liability suits. 176 Between 1970 and
1986 there were 85,694 suits naming 19,456 different defen-
dants. 177 Most industries were represented, but a few predomi-
nated. Asbestos accounted for 20,888 of those cases,178 while
cases involving tools/machinery/equipment, pharmaceuticals, and
motor vehicles totaled over 30,000.179 The companies named as
defendants formed quite a skewed distribution: a mere thirty-four
171 Perhaps the better comparison is to look at the eleventh year (1986) following
the starting point (1975). This time period witnessed a 371% increase in case filings.
172 By 1987, the eleventh year following 1976, the growth rate in filings was 310%.
173 See infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
174 See AD Hoc COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REPORT TO THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES 7-10 (1991) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT];
TERENCE DUNGWORTH, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR: LITIGATION
TRENDS IN FEDERAL COURTS 35-38 (1988); THOMAS E. WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS
LITIGATION 117-19 (1987).
175 See infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text (discussing the "three worlds"
of tort cases).
176 See DUNGWORTH, supra note 174, at 17-29.
177 See id. at 17 tbl. 3.1.
178 See id. at 21.
179 See id. at 19.
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companies were lead defendants in over 35,000 suits while 17,000
companies led in only one.18 0 Thus, some industries face many
more suits than others and within any given industry a few compa-
nies face many more suits than other companies.
181
"In both the asbestos and pharmaceutical industries, for
instance, the dominance of major defendants appears to be
declining[;]" in autos, it is increasing.182 Asbestos topped all
other industries with its geometric increases.183  Within the
pharmaceutical industry, companies showed sudden blips and
declines, reflecting the harms of specific products that were
introduced and then removed from the market.18 4  Other than
these two situations, no other industry or product has experienced
similarly high levels of litigation. 85 Excluding those two categories,
the product liability growth rate is not much different from the
general tort rate.186 This picture may not depict a system that is
finely tuned, but neither does it appear to target products in a
random and irrational way, as so much of the popular imagery of
the civil justice system would suggest.
Even were it true that the federal courts were trying nothing but
tort cases, federal data constitute only a small piece of the picture.
We need to see what is happening in the states, where about 98%
of the cases occur.
187
180 See id. at 24.
'81 No doubt a large part of this skew reflects their respective market shares,
although not all of it.
182 DUNGWORTH, supra note 174, at 50.
183 See id. at 35-38.
184 See id. at 38-42. Sometimes, however, those harmful drugs have been known
to be shipped to foreign markets, exposing the companies and their officers to the
possibility of more than just civil liability. SeeJoHN BRArrHwAITE, CORPORATE CRIME
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 257-61 (1984).
185 See DUNGWORTH, supra note 174, at 57.
186 See id. While this pattern of litigation might suggest that once the few
exceptional products are removed product liability cases do not differ significantly
from other tort cases, the study's author found support both for the "'thousands of
products and businesses' point of view [the broad, gradual increases] and for the
'epidemic of litigation' notion [surges of litigation with a limited time span]." Id. at
X.
187 For civil litigation in 1989, the federal courts saw 233,529 cases filed compared
to 17,321,125 in the state courts for a 1.3% to 98.7% split. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1989, at 7,21
(1991) [hereinafter NCSC 1989 REPORT]. For 1985, the figures were 273,670 federal
versus 14,357,757 state. See NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT
CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1985, at 213 (1987); infra Appendix B. This
converts to a 1.9% to 98.1% ratio.
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2. State Court Filings
Although state cases are far more numerous than federal cases,
careful counts of them are harder to find. The quality of state
record-keeping varies, and the process of persuading states to
collect and keep comparable data using comparable definitions is
still under way.
l88
STATE TORT CASES:
State-Ct
Cal.-S
Colo.-D
Fla.-C
Haw.-C/D
Kan.-D
Md.-C
N.J.-S
N.Y.-S/Co
P.R.-S/D
Tenn.-C
Tex.-D
Utah-D
Wash.-S
TABLE IV 189
FILINGS PER 100,000 POPULATION
'76 '77 '78 '79 '80 '81 '84 '85 '86 '87 '88
383
123
266
210
115
184
533
205
171
243
131
57
194
335
172
256
190
558
223
175
261
194
188
425
140
263
221
166
230
557
200
264
230
76
221
483
188
304
234
174
277
598
180
194
274
229
152
437
468
137
278
229
184
306
728
171
180
217
83
188
188 See NCSC 1988 REPORT, supra note 20, at 3-4 (describing problems of
comparing statistics from different states); CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINISTRA-
TOPS ET AL., STATE COURT MODEL STATISTICAL DICTIONARY 1-2 (1980) (noting the
problems of compiling national statistics resulting from the abundance of terms used
by states to report their caseloads).
189 The data for Table III come from NCSC 1988 REPORT, supra note 20, at 32;
NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL
REPORT 1987, at 36-37 (1989) (providing data for 1981 and 1984-1987); NATIONAL
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1980,
at 77-78 (1984); NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD
STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1979, at 77-78 (1983); NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1978, at 64 (1982);
NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL
REPORT 1977, at 61 (1981); NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT
CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT 1976, at 79 (1980). Court abbreviations are
as follows: C = Circuit, Co = County, D = District, and S = Superior (except New York
where S = Supreme).
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Table IV summarizes the most recent and complete data the
National Center for State Courts (NCSC) has reported. These data
are not as fine-grained as those of the AO; the NCSC utilizes the
general category of "torts," rather than particular kinds of torts.
These data do not suggest that any general abrupt increase in
tort filings has occurred. The period from 1978 to 1984, just
preceding the announced "explosion," shows about a 9% increase
in tort filings. The population in the jurisdictions counted
increased 8% during the same period.19 ° Such data suggest tort
litigation, in total, kept approximate pace with population growth.
Interestingly, a general upward trend in state court tort litigation
took place between 1978 and 1981, followed by a decline from 1981
through 1984. In 1986, as the movement toward legislative reforms
began to fill its sails, filing trends reversed direction and surged
upward. The NCSC report suggests that this may reflect a "'race to
the courthouse' . . . to avoid the limits imposed by the legislation
before it went into effect."191 In general, various analysts, looking
at various data and using various calculations have concluded that
in the aggregate, state tort cases grew at a modest annual rate of
somewhere between 2.3% and 3.9%.192 Adjusting for population
growth, the figure does not rise above 3%.
193
These state data teach us several important lessons about the
litigation system. First, they show considerable variation from state
to state. In a given year, for example 1984, the states' tort caseloads
varied from a low of eighty-seven tort filings per 100,000 population
to a high of 555.194 All states are not alike. A recent study,
reporting on tort litigation in thirty-eight large urban courts during
a single month in 1988,195 shows filings averaging 36.8 per
100,000 population, but varying between 2.5 and 164.8.196 Sec-
ond, states varied over time. Some showed increases in the tort
filing rate, some remained about level, and others showed declines;
their various trends varied in steepness; and over periods where
190 See NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS:
ANNUAL REPORT 1984, at 184 (1986) [hereinafter NCSC 1984 REPORT].
191 NCSC 1988 REPORT, supra note 20, at 27.
192 See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY
BEHIND THE STATISTICS 6 (1987) (summarizing these studies).
193 See id.
194 See supra Table IV.
195 See David B. Rottman, Tort Litigation in the State Courts: Evidence from the Trial
Court Information Network, ST. CT. J., Fall 1990, at 4.
196 See id. at 6.
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some states were moving up others were moving down. 197 In
addition, some of the more recent state studies show the relative
volume of various kinds of cases. The tort caseload is dominated by
auto torts, accounting for 46.1% of filings in the NGSO's study of
urban areas. 198 Product liability cases constituted 2.1% and medical
malpractice 5.9%.199 Without a doubt, the pattern would be
different in smaller, non-urban jurisdictions.
These findings suggest that local, regional, and state circum-
stances vary considerably and that the behavior of the citizens and
the system vary over time and place for reasons that still await
recognition, not to mention explanation. Thus, sweeping national
generalizations cannot accurately reflect the behavior of the tort
litigation system as a whole. We need data that will allow states to
assess their own situations. For Kansas to overhaul its civil justice
system because of something that might be going on in New Jersey
does not make much sense.
2 00
To understand these data still better, we might want to ask how
they compare with other kinds of civil litigation in the same places
and at the same times. In most states for which data are available,
tort cases represented less than 10% of civil filings.2 0 l Thus, to
an even greater degree than in the federal system, tort cases were
overshadowed by other kinds of civil litigation such as contracts,
property, small claims, and family law.20 2 Moreover, in terms of
197 See id. at 5. That is, some that went up rose faster than others; some that went
down declined more sharply than others.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 The NCSC data on the various states, as well as some individual state studies,
show that many states were experiencing level or declining tort filings (either in terms
of raw frequencies or as a fraction of the total civil litigation pie or both), yet most
were somehow convinced they had a crisis to address.
201 See NCSC 1989 REPORT, supra note 187, at 44. States where torts constituted
fewer than 5% of total civil filings for all or most years from 1984 through 1989
include Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, North Dakota, and Utah. By contrast, during the
same period, in Maine, torts constituted between 26% and 31% of the cases. In New
York, they constituted between 27% and 30%. See id.
202 See id. Why does the public hear nothing about these categories of state
litigation? Probably because they are not as likely to involve well organized
defendants (e.g., industry, insurers, or professionals). From 1978 to 1984, the area
of greatest growth in state courts was small claims (population up 4%, filings up 11%).
See NCSC 1984 REPORT, supra note 190, at 181. Perhaps we hear no complaints from
the business community about those cases because in small claims courts businesses
most often are the plaintiffs, not the defendants. This has been the finding of most
small claims courts studies. See, e.g., Suzanne E. Elwell, The Iowa Small Claims Court:
An Empirical Analysis, 75 IOWA L. REv. 433, 483-87 (1990) (reviewing studies).
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growth rates, contract cases showed "moderate annual growth" and
real property cases showed "substantial growth," while the figures
on tort trends were deemed "far from conclusive."
203
Before we can say we understand the civil justice system, we
ought to be able to determine why the number of non-tort civil case
filings has risen more sharply than tort case filings. The 1989 NGSG
Report offers one possible answer, suggesting that the economy may
be behind this trend. The Report also offers the following predic-
tion: "Given the prevailing economic climate, it is possible that
those types of cases [such as contracts and real property] will
replace torts as the significant indicators of the volume of litiga-
tion."20
4
There is much that the filing data, and those who have relied on
them, do not tell us. They have taken in too much or too little of
the picture. Those who point to the total growth in federal
litigation point to much more than the tort portion of the caseload.
On the other hand, federal cases constitute only a fraction of the
national caseload, so whatever those cases show is likely to be
unrepresentative of the whole picture.
20 5
When tort filings themselves are disaggregated into subcatego-
ries and controlled for population changes, we find that some
subcategories are growing, some remain constant, and others are
shrinking. Not all of the activity of life proceeds at an equal pace.
Neither do all torts. These differences among subcategories have
led some researchers to describe tort litigation in terms of three
separate "worlds," each behaving differendy.206 The first world
is regarded as stable and consists of routine personal injury suits,
mostly auto cases, with modest stakes and settled law. The second
world is growing and consists of high stakes cases, notably product
liability, medical malpractice, and business torts. The third is the
world of mass latent injury cases, such as those involving asbestos
and the Dalkon Shield. This world is characterized by rapidly
evolving and often problematic law. It has the potential for
enormous growth because the injuries involved affect large numbers
of people.
20 7
203 NCSC 1989 REPORT, supra note 187, at 46-47.
204 Id. at 47.
205 See, e.g., TORT PoLicy REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-3 (generalizing from one
subcategory of tort cases in the federal system to the nation as a whole).
206 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 192, at 30-34.
207 See id.
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The "three world" theory suggests that, although tort litigation
overall has grown only modestly, one of its subparts has already
grown substantially and another has the potential to do so. These
differences suggest explanations for the behavior of the tort system
contrary to the hypothesis of the litigious society. The cultural and
psychological explanations of litigiousness predict broad and
general increases in filings, not selective and uneven changes. The
observation that different subsets grow at different rates, or that
some grow and others decline, requires a more complex explanation
than the ones currently offered by the public debate. Some theory
explaining the differences in growth rates is essential.
One explanation, put forward by researchers at Rand and by
Galanter, suggests that rather than being motivated by "litigious-
ness," people merely are responding to the objective circumstances
of the world in which they live. 208 This is most evident in the
world of mass latent torts. These burst onto the scene, produce a
tidal wave of litigation that threatens to overwhelm the courts, and
then fade as the problem that engendered the litigation is van-
quished.20 9 To treat one such burst of litigation as a systemic
change in the culture or in the legal system is to mistake one
colossal tree for the whole forest. On the other hand, as the Rand
study suggests, these sorts of injuries form a distinct type of
litigation of their own, and the litigation system is not well adapted
to handling them. 210 In light of this problem and the changing
208 See id. at 10; Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 5 (1983); Galanter, supra note 25, at 8.
209 Hensler has noted:
As the metaphor suggests, this explosion of tort filings may be
temporary-a bulge that the system slowly absorbs. But because these cases
appear on the legal scene suddenly and in very large numbers, they
contribute to a general impression of hectic court activity and may well
overwhelm courts in certain locations.
HENSLER ET AL., supra note 192, at 10-11; see also Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F.
Supp. 649, 651-52 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (commenting on the great volume of asbestos
litigation and its "astronomical" transaction costs). Note that these "worlds" refer to
the underlying (and unmeasured) injury base rate, of which litigation is an echo, and
that this explanation alludes to the system's external environment to explain its
behavior.
210 See HENSLEi ET AL., supra note 192, at 33-34. When the number of people
harmed is massive, the number of cases will be massive. Even now, for each asbestos
case the federal courts dispose of nearly two more are filed. The federal courts are
struggling to find a way to avoid drowning in these cases. See MichaelJ. Saks & Peter
David Blanck,Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling
in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992); Stephen Labaton,
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nature of product liability law (as compared, say, to the law of auto
negligence), the hyperbolic reactions of insurers and defendants
become more understandable. Yet, it would be an error to view the
bursts of litigation arising from a small number of mass-produced
items as emblematic of the universe of tort litigation, most of which
has been growing only gradually.
211
Finally, if filings appear to be up, we cannot know whether that
is true in real terms unless we have determined that nothing that
precedes filings in the system has caused the apparent change. To
illustrate, if other factors remain constant but the injury base rate
is up and filings are up proportionately, then in real terms filings
are level. On the other hand, if the injury base rate is not up, we
still do not know whether increased filings are a result of a larger
fraction of the injured seeking legal representation, or of lawyers
accepting a larger fraction of the cases offered to them, or of some
other factor.
Why is population, and population alone, the statistical control
used in trying to make sense of filings data? This adjustment
strategy implicitly assumes that the number of injuries is a simple
function of the number of people-regardless of changes in age,
economic condition, types of employment, and activities. 212 Why
is the appropriate control the number of people in each state rather
than the number of actionable injuries? Perhaps tort filings have been
rising at exactly the same rate as actionable injuries, and the data
reflect nothing more than an increase in injuries for which the
population controls are incapable of adjusting. We just do not
know. And few who discuss legal policy seem to realize that we do
not know.
Judges See a Crisis in Heavy Backlog of Asbestos Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at Al.
211 If this analysis is correct, the removal of mass torts from the judicial branch
through legislated administrative rescues of mass tortfeasors and their victims would
subtract much or most of the apparent growth from the tort litigation system. For a
proposal on how to eliminate legislatively the burst of litigation occasioned by the
asbestos cases, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 174, at 1-39.
212 For an example of how these other factors may affect the number of injuries,
see COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES, supra note 110, at 28, 47, 49, which
shows different patterns of injuries as a function of activity engaged in, age, and
income, respectively.
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E. Settlements
To move from filings to trial awards-the two topics which have
attracted the most attention-students of the litigation system must
leap the formidable settlement mountain. But leap it they do,
oblivious to its implications for what will happen at trial.
The focus on trials is somewhat misplaced, because the great
majority of cases are settled, not tried.213 Their outcomes are not
determined by judges and juries but are under the bilateral control
of either professional negotiators representing the parties or the
parties themselves. Although pre-trial settlements are the principal
stage at which tort disputes are resolved, they inspire little more
than a footnote in the policy debate and research on the litigation
system. At the same time, attention to the relatively few cases that
are resolved through trial is unavoidable, not only because of the
salience of the trial and its verdict, but also because negotiators
have an eye on what a judge or jury would regard as a fair and
proper resolution. Thus, private settlement discussions often are
said to be carried out in the "shadow" of the law.
214
Data on the settlement phase are lacking because of the private
nature of the resolution of so many tort disputes. Parties control
knowledge about settlements, while trial data are owned by the
public. Indeed, many settlement agreements require secrecy as one
of their terms. The lack of data has contributed to a lack of
attention to the settlement process and its outcome. By ignoring
settlement, the policy debate has failed to define the issues that
warrant concern. This, in turn, limits the pursuit of further data by
government agencies and researchers. In short, the largest phase of
the litigation process, in terms of dispositions, remains hidden.
2 15
What is most important to know about litigation and settlement
has already been stated: Settlement is where the action is. Fewer
213 See infra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
214 See Marc Galanter,Jurj Shadows: Reflections on the CivilJuy and the "Litigation
Explosion," in THE AMERICAN CIVILJURY: FINAL REPORT OF THE 1986 CHIEF JUSTICE
EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES 15, 17 (1987);
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
915Without settlement data, even if the filing and trial data presented no evidence
of an explosion, we could not be sure whether the cost to insurers was rising or not.
Thus, it could well be true, as some insurance industry officials argue, that "the cost
of liability awards may be escalating despite no evidence of a widespread 'litigation
explosion.'" ALLIANCE OF AM. INSURERS ET AL., PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE
INDUSTRY DATA AND THE CASE FOR TORT REFORM 45 (1986).
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than 10% of lawsuits require a trial for their resolution.216 This
fact has important implications for understanding the tort dispute
process. But to say that only a small percentage of lawsuits went to
trial does not necessarily indicate that the rest were settled. A large-
scale study of all kinds of civil litigation found that while only 8% of
filings went to trial, the termination of 31% of the cases reflected
some judicial involvement such as arbitration or dismissal.
217
Fifty percent of cases were terminated by voluntary agreement of
the parties.
218
Moreover, these figures vary with types of cases and parties,
over time, and perhaps even across defendants or insurers. A study
directed at medical malpractice settlements found an increasing
dependence on courts to resolve the claims; the proportion of cases
resolved by the courts rose from 7% to 18% over the period of the
study.219 In addition, claims against physicians were more likely
to go to trial than claims against hospitals.
220
In any event, the role played by settlement in the processing of
disputes is enormous. Negotiated settlements, more than anything
else, may be responsible for Danzon's conclusion that:
The allegation that the tort system is an erratic lottery is exagger-
ated.... More than 90 percent of claims are settled out of court.
Two-thirds are dosed within two years of filing. On average,
claims settle for 74 percent of their potential verdict.
22'
As rates of pre-trial settlement change, we ought to ask what is
responsible for those changes. The changes impinging on settle-
ment patterns can come from upstream or downstream of the
settlement process. If the nature or mix of cases being filed
changes, we might expect changes in the rate and content of
settlements. If juries change their characteristic decision patterns,
that ought to be reflected in the settlement negotiations. If
216 See Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Cray, 70
JUDICATURE 161, 161-62 (1986).
217 See CIvIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 107, at S-23; see also
Kritzer, supra note 216, at 163-64.
2 18 See CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 107, at S-23.
2 19 See NATIONAL Assoc. OF INS. COMM'RS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: FINAL
COMPILATION 21 (M. Patricia Sowka ed., 1980) (study of medical malpractice closed
claims 1975-1978).
220 See id. at 20.
221 Patricia M. Danzon, The Medical Malpractice System: Facts and Reforms, in THE
EFFECTS OF LITIGATION ON HEALTH CARE COSTS 28, 30 (Mary Ann Baily & Warren
I. Cikins eds., 1985).
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plaintiffs or their attorneys begin to press for more favorable
outcomes, or defendants decide to resist more, that too should be
reflected in settlement patterns. Those tactics might be expected to
produce more successful negotiations. 222 But they might also be
expected to result in more losses at trial by the side that resisted
settling weaker cases.
223
If settlement amounts provide a reasonable measure of the value
of civil cases, they are not worth as much as is commonly thought.
The Civil Litigation Research Project, which studied 1,649 represen-
tatively sampled cases in five jurisdictions in the early 1980s, found
that of that diverse body of cases, 56% involved $10,000 or less and
only 12% involved $50,000 or more.2 24 The median settlement
was $4500 for state cases and $15,000 for federal cases.2 25 Mega
cases most of them are not.
The challenge to negotiators, however, is to put the appropriate
price tag on the cases, even if it is zero. A British study of the
personal injury litigation settlement process found that both
plaintiff and defendant solicitors had difficulty in evaluating liability
and damages. 226 A Rand Corporation study confirms that these
assessments are, indeed, less than an exact science. 227 That study
222 The mean proportion of medical malpractice filings closed without payment
is typically 50%. See DANZON, supra note 6. Among physician-owned insurance
companies it was 74% from 1980-83. See 2 AMA SPECIAL TASK FORCE ON PROFES-
SIONAL LIAB. & INS., PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY IN THE '80S 6 (1984).
223 Thus, changes in success rates at trial could as easily be a reflection of changes
in attorney settlement practices as of changes in jurors' attitudes and decisions:
Plaintiffs will win more verdicts if defense counsel refuse to settle strong plaintiff
cases. See PETERSON, supra note 111, at 19-20 (giving examples of how changing
certain settlement practices could result in changing jury verdicts).
224 See CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 107, at S-10 to S-11, S-21.
225 See id. at S-21.
2 26 See HAZEL GENN, HARD BARGAINING: OUT OF COURT SETTLEMENT IN
PERSONAL INJURY ACTIONS 72-78 (1987). The task might be even more difficult for
American lawyers. In comparing the United States and British systems, Genn points
out that tougher rules on contributory negligence increase uncertainty as to whether
a U.S. plaintiff will be able to uphold a finding of primary liability. Moreover, in
Britain, a judge always decides liability and damages. See id. at 30. Finally, in the
United States, we lack the comparative schedules employed in the British system. See
P.S. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 220-23 (3rd ed., 1980)
(describing the British "judicial tariff system" for computing damages). Cutting the
other way, discovery rules in the United States produce more disclosure early in the
process, while the British system fosters trial by ambush, making it harder for British
lawyers to assess liability and damages. See GENN, supra, at 32.
22 7 See MARK A. PETERSON, NEW TOOLS FOR REDUCING CIVIL LITIGATION EXPENSES
3 (1983). If two people can disagree over what a claim is worth, they will disagree
even more in their prediction of what ajudge or jury will think that claim is worth.
1992] BEHAVIOR OF THE TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM
found wide differences in the values adjustors placed on similar
claims.228 Sixteen members of the Los Angeles Claims Managers
Association were asked to evaluate a hypothetical claim. Nine
valued the claim at $50,000 to $150,000; the rest were spread from
$6,000 to $750,000. The same variation occurred among claims
staff within a single company, and the more experienced the claims
adjusters, the wider the variation. 229 Settlements of actual cases
show similar degrees of unexplained variation.
230
To find variation in evaluations of the same or similar cases is
not to say that larger settlement patterns cannot be detected. It still
can be true that order exists, that cases with different characteristics
produce systematically different settlements, or that the settlement
process systematically produces overcompensation or undercompen-
sation in relation to the losses of injury victims. Moreover, some
research suggests that ambiguity facilitates settlement.231 If so,
an increase in predictability would make settlements more difficult
to reach and perhaps would force more cases to trial.
One study of medical malpractice claims found settlements and
awards to be strongly related to the severity of injury.232 The
study concluded that the single most important factor in settlement
was whether the insurer viewed the case as meritorious and that
cases were more likely to go to trial when high awards were
expected, litigation costs were low, and outcome was uncertain.
233
Thus, bargaining in the shadow of a third-party decision-maker is bound to
compound the unpredictability.
228 See id.
229 See id.
230 See infra notes 263-66 and accompanying text; see also DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL,
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 79-93, 202-07 (1974) (discussing variables
in injury valuation and giving results of study showing variance in such determina-
tions); GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SEITLEMENT 111-14 (1983)
(describing injury valuation as a missing skill of lawyers and citing studies showing
variation in valuations).
231 See Cynthia Fobian & Jay J. Christensen-Szalanski, Ambiguity and Liability
Negotiations: The Effects of the Negotiators'Role and the Sensitivity Zone, ORGANIZATION-
AL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES (forthcoming 1993).
232 See PATRICIA M. DANZON, THE DISPOSITION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
30-31 (1980).
23 See id. at 60-62; see also Cheney et al., supra note 138, at 1601 (finding that
severity of injury had no effect on likelihood of payment to anesthesiology
malpractice claimants, but quality of care did, with at least some payment being made
82% of the time when care was found to be substandard but only 42% of the time
when care was judged to be within standard); Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White,
Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J.
ECON. 199, 216 (1991) ("[S]trong evidence [suggests] that negligence, as measured by
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A number of studies compare settlement (and trial) awards to
independent assessments of the plaintiffs damages. Perhaps the
most recent and analytically complete work in this genre is a series
of studies by Rand researchers on aviation accidents. 234 Plane
crashes provide a useful context for the study of tort settlements
because many of the usual uncertainties of contested cases are
obviated. When a commercial airplane crashes, liability rarely is
disputed and contributory negligence is not an issue. Also, because
the great majority of victims die, and die quickly, the losses are
simplified. The dispute comes down to the amount to be paid.
The Rand researchers first computed losses. They defined and
calculated losses using the "full economic loss" or human capital
approach. This method is more conservative and conventional than
the alternative method, the market approach. 235 It is also the
compensation principle for the deterrence objective of tort law.
The human capital approach measures the present value of the
decedent's before-tax market earnings and non-market services.
23 6
Because these calculations focus exclusively on economic loss and
therefore omit valuations for loss of consortium, mental anguish,
and other "non-economic" losses, one would expect to find that
settlements and awards would, on average, tend to exceed economic
losses, but the reverse occurs-"compensation, on average, falls far
below economic loss.
" 237
care quality, plays an important role in the negotiation and dispute resolution process
in medical malpractice cases faced by one hospital. The hospital's expected liability
for damage is 25 times as high on average in cases where negligence occurred ...
than in cases where it did not .... ").
234 See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN AVIATION
ACCIDENT LITIGATION 86-95 (1988); ELIZABETH M. KING & JAMES P. SMITH,
COMPUTING ECONOMIC Loss IN CASES OF WRONGFUL DEATH (1988) (giving
computational details); ELIZABETH M. KING &JAMES P. SMITH, ECONOMIC LOSS AND
COMPENSATION IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS 100-04 (1988) [hereinafter AVIATION
ACCIDENTS].
235 See AVIATION ACCIDENTS, supra note 234, at vi. The alternative approach, the
market approach, calculates "loss to survivors." The market approach turns from
what the injurer should pay in order to be optimally deterred to what the plaintiff
should receive in order to be compensated. It is the economic principle that better
corresponds to the compensation objective of tort law. It is composed of the present
value of provable contributions the deceased, had he or she lived, would have made
to the survivors. See id. at vii.
236 See id. at vi. The authors note that although this approach is less well-
grounded in economic theory and produces smaller estimates of the value of human
life, it is the approach favored by courts. See id.
237 Id. at vii. While Rand's calculations are conservative in one sense, they are not
in another. The question is whether one should count what the law says it counts or
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Based on the human capital approach to valuing lost life, "on
average, tortfeasors in our airliner accidents paid out twenty-six
cents for every dollar of social cost incurred." 238 Based on the
market approach, compensation came to seven cents per dollar of
the true loss.2 9 From these payments must be deducted legal
fees, which averaged 20% of the amount paid.240 Over time,
constant dollar payments from defendants to survivors did, indeed,
increase. 241 At every point in time, however, they represented
underpayment relative to survivor losses.
242
TABLE V
243
COMPENSATION AND LITIGATION EXPENDITURES IN RELATION TO
ECONOMIC Loss TO SuRVIVORS (IN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT CASES)
Economic Loss Mean Compensation
to Survivors Compensation as percent of
(in 000's) Midpoint N per Death Economic Loss
00-99 50000 519 148160 296
100-249 175000 376 192620 110
250-499 375000 267 255049 68
500-749 625000 144 362334 58
750-999 875000 126 468449 54
1000-1499 1250000 177 585598 47
1500-1999 1750000 109 822395 47
2000 plus 2250000 265 867098 39
what it usually does count. These researchers chose to take the law at its word rather
than by its deed.2
3
8 Id. at xvii.
239 See id. An interesting sidelight is that the study was commissioned by aircraft
manufacturers who thought they were being taken to the cleaners by lawsuits. This
suggests that the manufacturers genuinely did not appreciate the advantage they
enjoyed in the existing tort system.
240 See id. at xviii. To some degree, this undercompensation is supposed to reflect
the discount for settling rather than going to trial. Since the survivors receive their
money sooner, the defendant pays less. Whether the plaintiffs really are willing to
give up 74 cents on each dollar in order to receive payment sooner rather than later
is not clear. The gap between the discount the plaintiffs might be willing to give up
versus the discount they do allow may reflect an irrationality that occurs in settlement
and is not essential to the process.
241 See id. at xix.
242 See id. at xx.
243 The data for Table V come from KAKALK ET AL., supra note 234, at 58 tbl. 4.7.
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Another remarkable pattern is the amount of compensation
across the range of economic loss. As Table V shows, overcompen-
sation occurs at the low end of the range of economic losses. In the
$100,000-249,000 range, settlements are approximately equal to
losses. Where economic losses exceed $250,000, undercompensa-
tion occurs. Indeed, the higher the actual economic loss, the lower
the award as a proportion of what is due.
This pattern of overcompensation at the lower end of the range
and undercompensation at the higher end is so well replicated that
it qualifies as one of the major empirical phenomena of tort
litigation ready for theoretical attention. Cognitive psychology
provides a possible explanation for this error. People are poor at
estimating amounts that require intuitive exponential adjust-
ments.2 44 Amounts may grow exponentially, but our cognitive
apparatus makes linear estimations. Figure VIII illustrates, with
hypothetical data, the growing divergence between linear and
exponential estimations of lost income over time. People are
likewise poor at estimating power functions' or at intuitive com-
pounding. 245 If the negotiators in these air crash cases relied on
intuitive estimates of future lost earnings, rather than explicit
calculations, their resulting figures might be low end overestimates
and would certainly be high end underestimates.24 6 An alterna-
tive explanation may be popular notions of social justice. People
may feel that no life is worth less than some amount (and therefore
they overcompensate those legally entitled to what they see as too
little). At the opposite extreme, people may feel that no life is
worth "that much" and so they progressively shave amounts down
from what the legal entitlement really is.
2 47
244 Intuitive decision-makers are believed to make such estimates by starting with
a salient amount (an "anchor") and then adjusting upward or downward on the basis
of various factors. For a discussion of anchoring and adjustment, see Saks & Kidd,
supra note 36, at 140-42.
245 To suggest another example: if asked to estimate what a $1.25 loaf of bread
will cost in 100 years at an annual inflation rate of 5%, most people would arrive at
an amount well below the correct figure of $164.38. (The reader is invited to test this
on whoever may be nearby).
246 Some evidence that the negotiation process is a rough and intuitive one comes
from Genn's study of tort bargaining in Britain. See GENN, supra note 226, at 134.
She observes: "The nature of bargaining in the field of personal injuries claims is
relatively crude." Id. She continues, "tactics appear to be limited to a preliminary
search for information about the strength of the other side's case, followed by
relatively inelegant haggling over sums where it was clear that some compromise was
capable of being achieved." Id. at 135.
247 This alternative explanation was suggested to me by Professor Oliver Houck.
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FIGURE VIII
CUMULATIVE LOST INCOME By LINEAR ESTIMATION
vs. EXPONENTIAL CALCULATION
Moreover, these undercompensations result in considerable
cumulative gaps between victim losses and defendant payments. In
the sample of aviation cases studied, the balance of non-payments
favoring defendants totals over $650 million.248 Aviation accident
248 By multiplying the errors presented in Table V by their number (N cases), we
see that the net underpayment by defendants in these 1983 cases totals over $650
million:
AGGREGATE OVER- AND UNDER-PAYMENT IN THE SAMPLE OF AIR CRASH CASES
Economic Loss
to Survivors
(in $000's)
00-99
100-249
Total Over-
or (Under-)
Payment
$50,945,040
$6,625,120
$1,400
$1,200
$1,000
0
0 $800
.8 $600
$400
$200
Work Years Lost
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cases represent the tort category with perhaps the highest rate of
claims per accident and the highest proportion of paid claims. As
we have seen in medical malpractice, for example, approximately
10% of injured parties claim and half or fewer of those receive any
compensation. 249 If that compensation is similarly undervalued,
then the aggregate compensation paid in medical malpractice will
be a vastly smaller fraction of the total costs incurred than the
aviation accident fraction. Such errors of underpayment of
economic damages can be multiplied across the tens of thousands
of cases where injurers are or would be liable for the injuries.
250
Recent research on automobile crash cases found that under
either tort or no-fault regimes, compensation-unless reduced by
payments from other sources or contributory negligence of the
claimant-came closer to the total of the victim's entitlement than
in the air crash cases. 251 The settlements increased as medical
costs, time lost from work, extent of disability, and attorney
representation increased.2 52 Moreover, claimants received about
93% of their economic loss, in both no-fault and tort jurisdic-
tions.253 These data reflect the same pattern of low end overpay-
ment and high end underpayment that we have seen before. Here
too, more undercompensation than overcompensation occurred.
Interestingly, this distortion, while present in both tort and no-fault
jurisdictions, is less exaggerated in no-fault jurisdictions.
254
250-499 ($32,026,917)
500-749 ($37,823,904)
750-999 ($51,225,426)
1000-1499 ($117,599,154)
1500-1999 ($101,108,945)
2000-plus ($368,059,030)
TOTAL ($650,273,216)
249 See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
250 Compare these data showing systematic underpayment with assertions about
"dramatic, often breathtaking, jury awards and settlements." COMMITTEE TO STUDY
MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, supra note 26, at 3.
251 SeeJAMES K. HAMMIT, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: PAYMENTS BY
AUTO INSURERS 45-46 (1985).
252 See id. at 33-41.
253 See id. at 45. When the amount for general (non-economic) damages was
added in, claimants received up to $3.20 for every dollar of economic loss. See id.
254 See id.; see also ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND
PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION 248-52 (1964) (an
older study in this line of research). In Conard's data, too, small losses were
overcompensated and large losses were undercompensated. See id. In these 1958
data, however, overall undercompensation was greater than in Hammit's data on
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Consider the implications of these findings for the debate about
our liability system. In cases that generally involve smaller losses
(such as auto cases) we should expect to see the least undercompen-
sation. In higher stakes cases, such as air crashes, product liability,
and medical malpractice, the undercompensation will be dramatic.
Ironically, few have expressed concern over damage payments in
auto crashes, where defendants pay a larger proportion of the actual
losses. Concern is voiced, instead, for the high stakes cases, where
undercompensation is far more pronounced.2 5 5 Perhaps this
paradoxical situation arises because defendants and insurers do not
compare what they pay to the injury costs suffered by those who
bring valid claims-or, indeed, to the full base of injury costs
inflicted-and then bask in the advantage of undercompensation
they enjoy. Instead, defendants and insurers compare what they pay
today to what they paid yesterday and discover that those expendi-
tures have increased. What seems to catch their attention is an
apparently rising tide of settlement and award amounts. In low
stakes cases, there is little room to rise because the initial gap is not
large or there is overcompensation. In high stakes cases there is
much more room for rises to occur; a large gap exists to be
filled.
256
The relationship between settlements and verdicts might cast
light on several issues about the litigation process. First, if
negotiators are doing theirjobs well, in economic terms, settlements
ought to reflect a discounted assessment of trial awards. Defen-
dants should be willing to settle only if the amount they would pay
in settlement is less than what they would expect to have to pay
following trial. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, ought to be willing to
accept less than the amount they would expect to win at trial
because doing so permits them to avoid the uncertainty associated
crashes in the 1980s.
255 See Michael Wines, Bush Unveils Plan for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1992,
at Al (citing the President's plan to save on health care by changing malpractice
laws); see also Milt Freudenheim, Executives Skeptical on Bush Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 10, 1992, at D1 (evaluating the President's plan for "limiting payments in
medical malpractice lawsuits").
256 Medical malpractice cases are perhaps most likely to incur a double whammy:
Not only is there room for an undercompensation gap to be filled, but because
medical malpractice involves one of the lowest ratios of claims to injuries, the sheer
number of claims can rise greatly to close that gap. The closing of the actionable
injury-to-claim gap multiplied by the dosing of the high-end undercompensation gap
will register as an enormous increase in costs. But in proportional terms, it will
merely make medical malpractice cases behave more like auto crash cases.
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with going to trial and it allows them to have their money, albeit a
smaller amount, much sooner.
257
Some of the available data are consistent with these expecta-
tions. For example, the massive undercompensation of injuries seen
in the Rand aircraft settlement data may make sense in light of the
fact that they are the product of settlements. 258 Had the plaintiffs
insisted on something closer to the true .value of their losses, a
settlement would have been less likely. Similarly, the Wisconsin
Civil Litigation Research Project found this expected pattern in the
settlement of the wide array of suits they studied.
259
On the other hand, some studies do not demonstrate the
expected effect. In Rand's 1985 study of auto crash cases, 2% of the
cases went to trial. 260 The average awards for these cases were
approximately equal to those for comparable settled cases.
261
Similarly, King and Smith found those air crash cases that went to
trial resulted in an average recovery of 44% of the actual loss,
compared to 48% in cases settled without a lawsuit and 50% in cases
settled following the filing of a suit.262 These studies reveal a
surprising absence of the expected discount.
Although it commonly is asserted that lawyers and insurance
adjusters "know what a case is worth," and that this knowledge is
based on their ability, borne of experience, to predict what ajudge
or jury would award, this may be legal folklore. While this claim
may be helpful in maintaining professional mystification, how well
lawyers and adjusters really perform remains to be demonstrated.
First of all, there appears to be no empirical evidence directly
supporting the existence of such skills. In addition, consider some
of the evidence against their existence: Insurance claims adjustors
vary widely in the value they place on the same case. In studies of
auto and plane crashes, lawyers are found not to be settling for less
than the comparable trial awards. Furthermore, some data suggest
thatjudges, who once were lawyers and now observe more jury trials
than any litigator does, overpredicted (by a wide margin) whatjuries
would award in a sample of personal injury trials-that is, the juries
257 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 420 (1973).
258 See AVIATION ACCIDENTS, supra note 234, at 74-75.
259 See CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT, supra note 107, at S-21.
260 See HAMMIT, supra note 251, at 26. About 1% of the claims were tried to
verdict. See id. at 6.
261 See id. at 74.
262 See AVIATION ACCIDENTS, supra note 234, at 76.
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consistently awarded less than the judges predicted they would
award.263
Finally, from where could the feedback come that supplies this
negotiating expertise? The average active litigator tries only a
handful of cases each year. If a personal injury litigator disposes of
one hundred cases per year, one every two-and-a-half week days, of
which ten are resolved by a trial verdict, and half of those are
defendants' verdicts, then feedback about awards is possible from
only five cases.264 Because those five cases will differ from each
other on many dimensions, it will be difficult to attribute the
amount of the award to any of the many factors. 265 Moreover,
the feedback loop from juries is an infrequent and a fuzzy one.
266
A trial lawyer's situation is similar to that of a blindfolded archer
who is permitted to see the target only 5% of the time, and then
only through a fog at dusk. If relevant data were developed that
demonstrated that cases are settled for a fairly consistent percentage
of jury awards, those data could simply reflect the fact that lawyers
and juries are looking at the same cases with the same losses. This
is, however, quite different from lawyers predicting jury awards.
Negotiators may nonetheless develop consistent and confident
patterns of "what a case is worth," but such patterns would be based
on the negotiating culture, not on predictions of jury awards. The
263 See NATIONAL CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., A
COMPARISON OF THE PERFORMANCE OF EIGHT- AND TWELvE-PERSON JURIES 71-72
(1990). Perhaps the judges' direct observations ofjuries had been outweighed by
what judges heard about juries being out of control and they erroneously adjust
upward. Thejuries, meanwhile, having not heard that they were supposed to be out
of control, continued to assess modest damages. Lawyers, erring like the judges,
overvalue cases relative to their past settlement value, although they still undervalue
them relative to true losses.
Another study examined the ability ofattorneys on both sides of482 cases across
the United States, about half civil and half criminal, to predict outcomes of their own
cases. Their predictions were then compared to the actual eventual outcomes. For
dvil cases more than three months from resolution, predictive accuracy was essentially
zero. See Stephen Teller et al., Attorney Case Assessments: Quality of Predictions by
Attorney Type and Time to Trial, Presentation at the Biennial Meeting of the
American Psychology/Law Society (March 1992); Stephen A. Teller, Predictions of
Near and Distant Future Event Outcomes by Attorneys, Law Students, and
Undergraduates 24 (1991) (unpublished M. Psychol. thesis, University of Washington).
264 My informal poll of litigators from several cities, including Washington,
Baltimore, Columbus, and San Francisco, suggests that my hypothetical overestimates
the number of cases tried per year.
265 Such dimensions include the characteristics of the parties, the circumstances,
the cause and extent of the injuries, the theory of the case, and a multitude of other
potentially important differences in the fact pattern of each case.
266 See Galanter, supra note 214, at 16-18.
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norms of the negotiating culture may, therefore, react slowly to
changes in actual jury awards. Alternatively, these norms may
reflect a belief that there have been changes injury awards that have
not, in fact, occurred.
Research comparing settlements with verdicts could test other
issues as well. The possibility that many of the alleged changes in
tort verdicts and awards are in actuality the product of a changing
mix of cases could be tested in light of the frame of reference
provided by settlements-that is, changes in verdicts over time could
be compared with changes in settlements over the same period. For
example, if settlement amounts rise at the same time and rate as
jury awards, more reason exists to attribute the increase to a
changing case mix, rather than to the jurors' increased generosity.
Such an approach would be particularly informative since cases
from the same filing cohort will settle sooner than those that are
tried; settlements would be an early warning system for expected
changes in trial awards, rather than the reverse. By comparing
actual jury verdicts with the jury verdicts expected through
extrapolation from settlements, we could determine whether jury
verdicts were climbing faster than expected, as expected, or slower
than expected.26 7 This method would provide a better test of
supposed changes injury behavior than any research yet undertaken
on the question.
Because we are examining a system, changes in other parts of
the system, as well as real and mistaken feedback loops, complicate
the analysis. For example, lawyers may change their settlement
practices due to what they mistakenly believe is a change in jury
decisions. They will attribute these changes in their own behavior
to changes in jury behavior. In addition, as previously noted,
lawyers might change the mix of cases going to juries even if the
mix of cases being filed remains the same. This could be verified
only by monitoring the nature and value of cases entering the
system, a very complicated proposition. Such monitoring, however,
would simplify and clarify the behavior of lawyers and jurors.
Since settlements, as compared to filings and verdicts, are
currently rarely studied, it is easy to assume that settlement
practices have not changed. If settlement practices were studied,
267 Settlements would provide a better statistical control than, for example, the
Consumer Price Index (CPI). Although the CPI tracks overall inflation and the
medical CPI tracks medical costs, settlement amounts respond to the actual pool of
cases in a given jurisdiction and to the actual losses in those cases.
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however, changes would be noted, leading to proposed explanations
of their causes and their effects. We remain largely ignorant about
settlement patterns and their relationship to the rest of the system.
F. Liability Verdicts at Trial
FIGURE X268
FLOW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES THROUGH
PART OF THE LITIGATION SYSTEM
Negligent atrogenic
Injury
Base of actionable injuries
Decisions to claim
Prospective cases presented to lawyers
Lawsuits filed
Settlements negotiated
Trials commenced
for Plaintiff
Trial Verdict
for Defendant
Awards
Changes from additur/remittitur review
Appeals
Compensation paid
Present Absent
10,000* 1,000,000* I
400 2,400
200* 800*
(170) (730)
30* 70*
_ _--------_ _----
Although trials are the legal system's iconographic center, they
also are its chief aberration. Fewer than ten cases in one hundred
268 For a discussion of the estimates used in Figure IX, see supra note 146. See
also supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text (summarizing several studies of medical
malpractice case disposition). Empirically determined ratios are indicated with an
asterisk; the remaining ratios are estimated.
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proceed to trial. The great majority are resolved through negotiat-
ed settlements. Figure IX places into perspective where cases have
been before they reach the trial stage. 269 Out of 10,000 action-
able negligent injuries, approximately 9600 disappeared when injury
victims did not pursue a claim. Half of those that were presented
to attorneys never became filed lawsuits. Of the 200 cases filed (2%
of those negligently injured), 170 will be settled, paying most
plaintiffs less than their actual losses. Trials will commence for
about thirty of these cases. Of the 1,000,000 patients who were not
negligently injured, an estimated 2400 will mistakenly regard their
injuries as resulting from negligence, and about one third of those
become filed lawsuits. For a variety of reasons, cases in the without-
merit column will leave the system at the negotiation stage more
readily than those with merit. One hundred cases (10% of those
filed) will reach trial. Those that lack merit will outnumber those
with merit.
Is this a picture of a system that does a good or a poor job of
sorting cases? Recall my earlier observation that these medical
malpractice cases ought to be the most difficult ones for the system
to handle. 270 If the system can handle medical malpractice with
reasonable "accuracy," it probably can handle almost anything. In
the pretrial stages of the process, few cases lacking merit are
brought to the system or tend to be rejected by plaintiffs' lawyers.
The system's greatest error is that an enormous number of persons
who have been negligently injured will not receive the compensation
that would be due them if they exercised their right to claim and
had been able to find a lawyer willing to represent them. Before the
complaints are filed at the courthouse, defendants are billions of
dollars ahead of where, under the law, they might expect to be.
Since so many cases are resolved through negotiated settlements,
the principal focus of attention for evaluating the system might be
whether settlements reflect damages discounted by the probability
that liability could be proved at trial. I know of no data addressing
the correlation between the amount for which cases are settled and
the amount for which they ought to be settled.
271
269 See supra note 268.
270 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Inpatient medical treatment, for
example, even when done perfectly well, can be expected to result in untoward
outcomes approximately 3% of the time. Such grim prospects do not confront one
watching television or driving in the family car.
271 Insurance company data reveal that about half of the malpractice cases that are
filed are dismissed without any payment to the plaintiff. See DANZON, supra note 6,
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Of the cases that finally arrive at trial for the judge or jury to
take their turn at sorting, in which ones is liability found and why?
Can we explain and predict trial outcomes? Or are they random
and unpredictable? If patterns exist, have they changed over time?
Little broad and systematic data on federal trial outcomes were
available until recently-too recently to follow trends across time or
try to explain those trends. The federal courts did not begin
recording data on trial outcomes until 1979.272 Similarly, few, if
any, state courts collected data on trial outcomes, and this continues
to be the case. 278 This lack of data is precisely what led some
researchers to undertake many of the recent studies that are
discussed in this Article.
274
From the data of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, it cannot be determined how many cases were resolved by
a trial verdict, only how many resolutions occurred at various stages,
including "during or after trial." The number of such dispositions
increases, of course, as the number of filings increases. Interesting-
ly, however, these represent a decreasing fraction of filed cases; that
is, over time proportionately fewer cases have been reaching
trial.
275
From reports of the National Center for State Courts, we cannot
learn about trials or verdict trends over time, but we do have an
important snapshot of the mode of disposition of tort litigation in
at 42. Most of those would be expected to come from the right-hand column of our
table, but no study has considered this.
272 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 15.
273 See NCSC 1988 REPORT, supra note 20, at 51-53, 59-63. I wrote to the office
of the court administrator of each state requesting the information or reference to
publications in which the data appear. Not one administrator replied that they
collected such data before the 1980s and most still do not collect these data.
274 Among these are most of the Rand Corporation studies cited throughout this
Article, the American Bar Foundation's studies (conducted by Daniels & Martin), and
some of the NCSC's studies. See, e.g., MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON,
COMPARATIVEJUSTICE: CIVILJURY VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES,
1959-1980, at 1 (1983) ("Concern about how juries decide civil claims has led us to
study jury decisions in Cook County, Illinois."); Daniels & Martin, supra note 25, at
321 ("Our interest is in the one part of the civil justice system which reformers have
identified as a key indicator of system failure-the behavior ofjuries."). This absence
ofinformation itself stands as one of the most important findings concerning liability
verdicts. Without basic data on trial verdicts and awards, informed consideration
about the nature or existence of a liability crisis is not possible.
275 See Galanter, supra note 159, at 947-48 & n.100. In 1940, 15.2% of cases
terminated "during or after trial;" in 1950, that figure fell to 12.8%; in the beginning
of the 1960s the figure decreased to 11%; and by 1986 it was only 4.4%. See id.
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thirty-eight urban trial courts during one month in 1988.276
Overall, only 4.8% of tort cases were resolved by a trial verdict.
2 77
Medical malpractice cases stood out as the most likely to go to a
trial verdict (11.1%).278 Thus, even the most hotly contested
category of cases is usually resolved short of a trial. Product liability
cases were among the least likely to require a trial (3.9%), the most
likely to be uncontested (6.2%), and, therefore, the most likely to
result in a default judgment.279 Most cases, of course, are settled
or dismissed. In the federal system, in comparing the number of
terminations during or after trial with the number of filings,
Galanter found that torts is one of the case types least easily settled,
with about 10-12% entering the trial stage in recent years.
280
In another geographically broad-ranging but temporally limited
study of state court trials, Daniels and Martin found tort success
rates varied considerably from place to place, from a low of about
40% to a high of nearly 80%.281 On the whole, plaintiffs win
more trials.2 8 2 In only four counties, did defendants win more often
than plaintiffs.2 8 3 In thirty of forty-three counties, the range for
plaintiff success was between 55% and 65%.284 In only three sites,
276 See Rottman, supra note 195, at 4.
277 See id. at 6.
278 See id. at 8-10.
279 See id.
280 See Galanter, supra note 159, at 949 fig. 10 (the 10-12% for torts compares to
6-8% of contract cases and 2-4% of social security cases).
281 See Stephen Daniels &Joanne Martin, CivilJuiy Awards Are Not Out of Control.
And Here Is the Data, 26 JUDGES'J. 10, 13 tbl. 1 (1987); Daniels & Martin, supra note
25, at 328 (data coming from local jury verdict reporters in 43 counties in 10 states,
and spanning the period from 1981-1985).
When these tort trials are disaggregated into types of torts, vehicular accidents
are found to be the most frequent kind of case in every site (and have the highest
proportion of plaintiff wins.) See id. at 333-35. Product liability cases account for
fewer than 10% of the cases in all sites, and fewer than 5% of the cases in 34 of the
43 sites. See id. Medical malpractice trials constitute fewer than 10% of the trials
everywhere except in New York City (where they constitute as many as 17.6% of the
tort trials). See id.
The overall tort success rates for plaintiffs varied considerably, from highs of
78.9% (Skagit County, WA) and 71.9% (Bronx County, NY) to lows of 39.7%
(Westchester County, NY) and 43.9% (Nassau County, NY). See id. at 329-31. The
variation in success rates is at least as great between counties within states as it is
between states. See id. This suggests that differences in local circumstances within
and around the litigation system are equally or more determinative of who wins as is
the substantive law. See id. at 332-33.
282 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 25, at 330-33.
283 See id.
284 See id. at 329-31.
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did plaintiffs win more than 65% of the time. 285 At least over the
five years these data cover, no trends were apparent. More
impressive than the lack of any consistent trend over time is the
variation among sites and states. The greatest consistency appears
to be that which exists within each county site, suggesting stable
local conditions and decision patterns.
2 8 6
Rand researchers have focused on trials in San Francisco and
Cook County, Illinois. Although geographically more limited, these
studies spanned a longer time period (1959-1979) than those of
Daniels and Martin. The number of trials in both Cook County and
San Francisco showed marked fluctuations from year to year, but
the long term trend in both places was similar: "Both caseloads
peaked in the mid-1960s, then declined during the rest of the
period."287 The case mix changed in both counties, however, so
that some kinds of torts were becoming an increasing fraction of the
trials, some remaining stable, and others decreasing.288  The
proportion of San Francisco verdicts favoring plaintiffs varied over
the years between 52% and 64%, with no discernible trend.
289
Verdict ratios in Cook County also stayed within a fairly narrow
range, although this range was closer to 50/50, and a slight trend
toward more plaintiff victories was detected.
290
The overall stability of these verdict ratios masked differences
associated with the various types of cases. For example, although
plaintiffs were winning an increasing proportion of automobile
accident cases, fewer of these cases were coming to trial.291
Conversely, although plaintiffs were winning a decreasing propor-
285 See id.
286 See id. at 343-45.
287 SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 274, at 20. To give a sense of the number
of trials we are talking about, up until the mid-1970s, San Francisco averaged 290jury
trials per year. In 1978, the number dropped to 158. In 1979, it was 210. See id. at
19.
288 See id. at 20-22. For example, among those on the rise in San Francisco were
intentional torts, contract/business cases, and product liability cases. See id.
Malpractice was stable. See id. Among those decreasing were worker injury, injury
on property, and automobile accident cases (although automobile cases were by far
the largest single category). See id.
289 See id. at 23-26.
290 See id. at 23-24. Compare these data with the following- "[T]he scales [of
justice] have been totally tipped to the plaintiffs." Hearings to Consider S. 2760, the
Product Liability Act Before the SenateJudiciaty Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1986)
(statement ofJames K. Coyne, President of the American Tort Reform Association).
291 See SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 274, at 21, 24-25.
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tion of product liability cases, more were coming to trial.
292 If
nothing else, the differences in success rates between case types
makes assertions of a sea change in favorability toward plaintiffs
highly doubtful
2 93
Because of their reliance onjury verdict reporters, the research-
ers of the state cases studied do not account for judges' verdicts,
even though in half of the states for which data exist judges decide
more tort cases than juries do.2 94 In the federal courts, Clermont
and Eisenberg found that tort cases tried before judges were more
likely to result in liability verdicts than those tried before juries.
This result was most pronounced for medical malpractice and
product liability cases.2 95 Judge decision-making has been largely
292 See id.
293 See MARK A. PETERSON & GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN
TRIALS AND VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960-1979, at 33-57 (1982); SHANLEY
& PETERSON, supra note 274, at 50-74. The trend analyses are by eyeball only; the
authors did not conduct statistical tests. Like the Daniels and Martin data, these were
obtained by using local jury verdict reporters. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 281,
at 286; Daniels & Martin, supra note 25, at 328. It is worth noting that the two sites
in the Rand study are major urban counties in highly industrialized states. See
SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 274, at 20. Therefore, we should be cautious about
generalizing the results.
294 See NCSC 1988 REPORT, supra note 20, at 59-60. The Report produces the
following table:
PERCENTAGE OF CIvIL DISPOSITIONS
REACHED AT TRIAL, 1988
State By Jury By Judge
California 1.6 2.3
Florida 4.7 1.0
Hawaii 1.9 0.9
Massachusetts 2.3 4.2
Michigan 2.9 0.4
Minnesota 4.5 11.8
Ohio 3.2 4.1
Texas 3.9 9.5
Washington 4.6 1.8
Wisconsin 4.1 1.4
See id. at 60 tbl. 8.
295 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 15. For most categories of litigation,
there is no significant difference in the plaintiff's success rate beforejuries or before
judges (that is, a ratio of about 1.00 in the finding of liability by judges for every one
byjuries). The two categories in which judges find for plaintiffs significantly more
often than do juries are medical malpractice (a ratio of 1.72) and product liability
(1.71). See id. As the authors point out, interpretation of these findings is difficult
given the present evidence. The confounding of case and decision-maker makes it
impossible to determine from these whether the reason for the differences is who
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neglected in studies of the tort system, suggesting that juries have
been serving well their function as a lightning rod for the judiciary.
Excessive interest in jury trials may also distract us from what
appellate judges do when their turn comes to sort cases. In a study
of 3542 published product liability cases that went to appeal,
Henderson and Eisenberg found that in both 1976 and 1983,
defendants were successful about 51% of the time.296 That rate
of success improved steadily so that by 1988, defendants were
winning 63.4% of the time.
297
With such limited data, it is impossible to draw informed
conclusions about the number or outcomes of trials over time, in
different places, or for different categories of torts. Even if
complete data on trials were available, however, such information
would reveal very little about juries or the litigation system.
Verdicts turn largely on the evidence skew in the cases and, in the
aggregate, evidence seen by juries is controlled by the decisions that
precede trial. Screening and settlement decisions thus control the
verdict ratio more than juries do. For example, if plaintiff attorneys
accepted weak cases and defense attorneys refused to settle them,
trial verdicts would favor defendants. With no change in jurors or
their decision-making, if plaintiff attorneys started accepting
stronger cases and the defense continued resisting their settlement,
then trial verdicts would shift in the direction of plaintiffs. These
changes in trial outcomes would occur independent of changes in
the composition of juries or in the psychology of jury decision-
making. In short, to know only what happens at trial is to know
dangerously little about the litigation system.
On the other hand, certain comparisons of trial decisions to the
decisions that precede them could be informative. If we could
compare the contents of what arrives at trial (the case mix) and
their verdict ratios with comparable ratios at earlier stages of the
litigation process, we could learn something about how decisions
are made as cases move through the litigation system, with some
decides or the characteristics of the cases routed to that type of decision-maker. The
findings of Kalven and Zeisel indicate a 79% agreement rate between judge and jury
liability verdicts in personal injury cases. See HARRY KALVEN,JR. & HANS ZEIsEL, THE
AMEICANJURY 64 n.12 (1966). Their results are unconfounded, but they are also a
generation old.
296 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 504
(1990).
297 See id.
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cases being filtered out and others passed on to later decision
stages.
29 8
To illustrate the difficulty in interpreting most of the studies of
trial data, consider the classic research of Kalven and Zeisel, in
which 600 judges presiding over 8000 trials were asked to explain
how they would have decided the case while the jury still was
deliberating over its verdict in the same case. 299  Suppose this
research had found no correlation whatsoever between judge and
jury decisions so that knowing how ajudge decided a case provided
no guidance whatsoever in predicting how ajury would decide the
same case. Such evidence would likely be interpreted to suggest
that juries decide completely at random,3 00 and that their unpre-
dictability makes them a hazardous legal decision-making institu-
tion.
30 1
But suppose we inquired into the pre-trial settlement phase that
gave rise to the case mix that those juries and judges were deciding.
Suppose, further, that we found that the settlement process
performed at a high degree of efficiency, perhaps as perfectly as any
commentators have ever supposed. °2 That is, cases even slightly
favoring plaintiffs were settled favorably for plaintiffs and those
even slightly favoring defendants were settled favorably for
defendants, with settlements discounted to reflect the strength or
weakness of the evidence. The only cases to survive such a
settlement process and go on to trial would be a narrow slice of
cases on either side of equipoise (those depicted in Figure X-a).
298 A recent study of federal trials found approximately the same ratio of plaintiff-
to-defendant success in cases terminated on pre-trial motion and at trial, across a
wide range of case types. See Theodore Eisenberg, The Relationship Between Plaintiff
Success Rates Before Trial and at Trial, 154J. ROYAL STAT. SOC'Y SERIES A 111, 113
(1991).
299 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 295, at 113-29; Harry Kalven,Jr., The Dignity
of the CivilJuty, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1063-68 (1964).
300 Alternatively, is it not possible that the judges decide randomly?
30' See MichaelJ. Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy in Adjudication, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 243, 247 [hereinafter Saks, Enhancing and
Restraining Accuracy] (suggesting that the common distrust of the jury as a legal
institution is unwarranted in light of available evidence); MichaelJ. Saks, Blaming the
Jury, 75 GEo. L. J. 693, 708-09 (1986) (reviewing VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR,
JUDGING THE JURY (1986)).
302 See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 4 (1984) (suggesting a rational model for litigation).
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FIGURE X
ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONS OF CASES SUBMITrED TO JURIES
I
Favos I Favors
Defense Plaintiff
A. Case Distribution that would produce random verdicts
Favors F::~~1Favors
Defense ..:::....Plaintiff
B. Case Distribution that would produce Kalven & Zeisel's results
I
Favors I:i: Favors
Defense PlaintiffI
C. Case Distribution that would produce apparent agreement but apparent bias
How would any rational decision-maker decide such cases?
Answer: randomly.303 If the cases going to trial were so close as
to be toss-ups, rational decisions about them would resemble coin
tosses. Thus, seemingly random and unpredictable verdicts might
merely reflect a highly effective filtering of cases through the
settlement process, allowing only the insoluble, too-close-to-call
cases to proceed to trial. Moreover, trial outcomes may tell us less
about trial decision-making than they do about settlement decision-
303 A narrow focus on the trial, and in particular the jury trial, rather than on the
system, produces the common misperception thatjuries make random decisions. See
Court toJuy: We're Not in the Lotteiy Business, MED. ECON. FOR SURGEONS, Jan. 1985,
at 10 (noting a decision by a New York Supreme Court judge sharply reducing a
medical malpractice award on the grounds that "'negligence litigation is not a court-
sponsored lottery'"); Mortimer B. Zuckerman, The National Lottery, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP.,Jan. 27, 1986, at 80 (arguing that damage awards are transforming the
courts into a "national lottery").
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making. Decisions linked together in a system cannot be interpret-
ed without taking into account the other decision nodes in the
system.
Kalven and Zeisel found that judges and juries agreed on
personal injury verdicts 79% of the time and that when they reached
different verdicts neither systematically favored plaintiffs or
defendants. s0 4  These findings have long been interpreted to
suggest that juries understand the evidence about as well as
judges, 0 5 and that neither judges nor juries are more receptive
to the claims of either plaintiffs or defendants. But an alternative
interpretation is possible: These data might indicate that in the
settlement phase, negotiators pass a wider slice of cases along to
trial, and the resulting case mix includes more plaintiffs' cases that
should have been settled. This situation, illustrated by Figure X-b,
occurs when negotiators reach settlements that are less than ideal.
Suppose that defense attorneys began to resist settlement more
determinedly. The result would be a mix of cases going to trial that
favored plaintiffs more strongly, as in Figure X-c. Consequently, a
higher proportion of verdicts by juries, as well as by judges, would
favor plaintiffs. The resulting verdict data, considered non-
dynamically-that is, without reference to changes in the behavior of
other components of the system over time-would be misconstrued
as evidencing a growing bias on the part of judges and jurors
favoring plaintiffs.
In sum, if trial factfinders are rational, then the content of the
cases will determine verdicts and the case mix will determine the
verdict ratios. Changes in trial outcomes are more likely to reflect
changes in the behavior of earlier phases of the litigation system,
notably settlements, than they are to reflect changes in jurors (since
changing the nature of the case mix is far easier than changing the
nature of people). The more perfectly the litigation system
performs, the more random trial outcomes will be.
The larger point is that to offer interpretations of trial outcome
data, without taking account of behavior in the system that has
preceded trials, is to make assertions about the behavior ofjuries or
304 See Kalven, supra note 299, at 1065. In 44% of cases, the judge and jury both
found for the plaintiff; in 35%, both found for the defendant; in 11%, the jury found
for the plaintiff while the judge found for the defendant; and in 10%, the jury found
for the defendant and the judge for the plaintiff. See id.
305 For a discussion concerning the size of awards, see infra notes 472-73 and
accompanying text.
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of the system that cannot be inferred from data on trials. Asking
questions such as, "Has the number of trials increased over time?"
and "Who wins?" can easily produce answers that are either
meaningless or misleading.
Questions capable of producing answers that are interpretable
and potentially meaningful include: Has the ratio of trials to filings
changed?306 Are trial verdicts determined by the evidence? What
is the relationship between liability verdicts at trial and the direction
of settlements?30 7 What is the relationship between trial awards
and the amount of settlements? 08  On only one of these ques-
tions does a considerable body of data exist, namely, whether trial
verdicts are based rationally on the evidence. As a result of
academic research on this issue over the past generation, we know
more aboutjury decision-making than about any other aspect of the
legal process.
30 9
The best known research on juries, conducted by Kalven and
Zeisel, found a rate of agreement of about 80% between the liability
decisions of judges and juries in both criminal and civil trials.
3 10
Recall that these findings derived from the process of having
hundreds of judges in thousands of jury trials provide their own
306 Galanter's study of federal trial data includes such information. See Galanter,
supra note 159, at 946-50. The study provides an important measure of the efficiency
with which the system processes filed cases. Whether the system should strive for
increased efficiency of this sort is far more difficult to answer. Is it better if people
settle their disputes without needing third-party adjudication? Or is it better if
disputes are settled in courts, with procedural fairness and under the guidance of
more consistent and explicit principles of law? If too many cases go to trial, the legal
system would collapse. If too many cases are disposed of short of trial, the system
may be deprived of the ability to maintain effective legal rules. See Saks, Enhancing
and Restraining Accuracy, supra note 301, at 245-46.
307 Moreover, are cases understood similarly byjurors andjudges and bylawyers?
308 Are losses appraised similarly by negotiators and adjudicators (with appropriate
discounts for settlement)? See infra note 484 and accompanying text; supra notes 260-
61 and accompanying text.
309 See VALERIE P. HANs & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY (1986) (reviewing
much of the research on jury decision-making). The Supreme Court has turned to
this body of research in addressing questions involvingjury behavior. See, e.g., Ballew
v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 230-39 (1978) (reviewing extensively the research on the
effects of reduction injury size onjury verdicts). The Court does not enjoy a similar
advantage for most other questions about the litigation system.
310 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 295, at 58; Kalven, supra note 299, at 1064-65.
It would be interesting to replicate Kalven and Zeisel's study to determine whether
the rate of agreement betweenjudge andjury has changed in the past 25 years. Hans
and Vidmar have suggested such a study. See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The
American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 323, 347-49 (1991).
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assessment of the case while the jury was deliberating so the judges'
views could be compared with those of the jury. 
11
Of the basic level of agreement between judges and juries,
Kalven observed that "the jury agrees with the judge often enough
to be reassuring, yet disagrees often enough to keep it interest-
ing."3 12  More refined analyses of the data strengthened the
conclusion that the jury understood the evidence (as well as the
judge did). Kalven and Zeisel reasoned that if disagreement
stemmed from a lack of understanding of the evidence, the
disagreement rate should be higher in difficult cases and lower in
easy ones. Based on assessments by the trial judges, they classified
the cases as "difficult to understand" or "easy" and then repeated
the analysis. 13 The disagreement rate remained the same.31 4
Moreover, judges rarely cited jury misunderstanding as the reason
for the differences in verdict that did occur.
31 5
One of the most interesting comparisons may be to ask how the
level of concordance between judges and juries compares with data
on other decision-makers, such as the rate of inter-judge agreement
on sentencing, physician agreement on diagnosing illness, or
scientific consensus on the merits of research proposals. The jury
compares quite favorably against such benchmarks. 31 6 The jury's
concordance rates are particularly impressive given its unique
situation of having to deal with a body of cases from which the
easiest 80-95% have been removed. 317  Those other decision-
811 Kalven and Zeisel thus brilliantly solved the problem of what ajury's verdict
is to be compared with in order to determine its validity. As we saw earlier, in all
studies of changing patterns of verdict ratios over time, the vital, but missing,
benchmark is some measure of the factual and legal merits of the cases. Apparent
increases in plaintiff success may be nothing more than a shift in the mix of cases
going to trial toward cases with stronger evidence for plaintiffs. An approach like
that of Kalven and Zeisel would offer the possibility of sorting out the causes of the
apparent change.
312 Kalven, supra note 299, at 1064.
313 See id. at 1066.
314 See id.
815 See id. at 1067.
816 See Shari Seidman Diamond, Order in the Court: Consistency in Criminal
Decisions, in 2 THE MASTER LECTURE SERIES, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 119, 125-28
(C. James Scheirer et al. eds., 1983) (reviewing studies finding the following
concordance rates: scientists deciding whether proposed research merited funding
(75% inter-decisionmaker agreement), employment interviewers (70%), psychiatric
diagnosis (70%), physicians' diagnoses (55-65% and 67-77%), federal judges'
sentencing decisions (79 and 80%)).
317 See supra notes 213-67 and accompanying text.
BEHAVIOR OF THE TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM
makers have the luxury of the full range of their cases, which makes
higher concordance rates easier to attain.
A considerable body of research both on actual juries and in
well controlled trial simulations supports the conclusion that juries
make reasonable and rational decisions.318 A detailed review is
beyond the scope of this Article, but two illustrations of this
research are illuminating.
One study collected data on 331 jurors in thirty-eight forcible
sexual assault trials, including "information on jurors' background
characteristics and attitudes about the criminal justice system and
rape as well as their reactions to trial participants and proceed-
ings."319  Information was also gathered about the evidence
presented in each trial. A linear regression model was developed to
predict jurors' judgments of guilt using the numerous variables,
both legally relevant and extra-legal. The study found that seven
evidential variables accounted for 34% of the variance in judgments
of guilt, victim and defendant characteristics contributed an
additional 8%, and juror characteristics and attitudes caused 2% of
the variation in guilt judgments.
3 20
318 There is reason to believe that in complex cases, a jury can be a better
factfinder than a judge. A group can bring deeper and more diverse intellectual
resources to a conceptually complex task. See Richard 0. Lempert, CivilJuries and
Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REv. 68, 91-95 (1981)
(suggesting that the jury likely provides the most reliable mid-level of performance
because as a group it will contain a mix of intelligence and knowledge, while the
solitary judge presents the risk of being inferior to, as well as the possibility of being
better than, the average jury); MichaelJ. Saks, Small-group Decision-makingand Complex
Information Tasks (Federal Judicial Center, 1981), microformed on Sup. Docs. No.
JU13.10:81-1 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office) (reviewing the research literature on small-
group decision-making in order to shed light on whether juries are capable of
competently deciding complex and protracted civil cases). The advent of the one-day,
one-trial jury system, which greatly increases the representativeness of the jury, may
have tipped the balance even further in favor ofjuries. Oncejuries include engineers
or accountants or even high school mathematics or science teachers, it is hard to
imagine how the average judge would be able to understand the technical facts of a
case better than the average jury.
319 Christy A. VisherJuror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 1, 7 (1987).
320 See id. at 13. Should we applaud the jurors because relevant evidence
dominated other factors in their decision-making? Or should we condemn them
because the research could not ascertain what accounted for half of the variation in
their verdicts? Is the unknown portion the result of imperfections in the research or
of random and irrational components ofjuror decisions? It is clear that both of these
factors contribute to the unexplained variance; we should try to determine specifically
how much variance each causes.
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In a second study, a trial simulation, Colorado jurors were
presented with a summary of simulated trial testimony in an age
discrimination case. One of three versions of the trial was randomly
presented to each juror. In the first version, there was no expert
advice on the calculation of damages. In the second version, a
plaintiffs expert economist testified to his calculation that the
correct award would be $719,354, while the defense made an
unsupported argument that the correct amount should be $321,000.
In the third version, the plaintiffs expert was countered by a
rebuttal expert explaining the basis for the $321,000 recommenda-
tion of the defense.32 1 The results of this study will be given in
the next section.
322
In general, studies show persistent correlations between
evidence and outcomes in many contexts.3 23 But while there is
substantial predictability, there also is considerable variation within
conditions, that is, unpredictability and error. The two are by no
means incompatible. While most juries respond to pro-plaintiff
evidence with verdicts for the plaintiff, and to pro-defendant
evidence with verdicts for the defendant, not all do. The closer the
evidence is to equipoise, the greater will be the rate of disagreement
among juries. The more extreme the evidence, the greater the
proportion of juries that will reach the same verdict.
324
That is a point rarely written about, but one that every jury
researcher must heed. The easiest way to ruin an experiment is to
have case facts that lean so far to one side that all the jurors and
juries reach the same decision. With no variation in verdicts, it
becomes impossible to discern the effect of the variables of interest
to the study because the case facts have overwhelmed the decisions.
Consequently, for research to be done, the mock case must be
titrated to a point of sufficient ambiguity; the very power of case
facts must be tamed in order for other variables to be studied.
3 25
321 See Allan Raitz et al., Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert Testimony on
Jurors' Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 385, 388-89 (1990).
322 See infra note 459.
323 See generally HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 309, at 116-20 (analyzing empirical
evidence on jury competence).
324 This relationship, which is true of virtually all decision-makers, itself suggests
a rational response to information.
325 See MICHAELJ. SAKS, JURY VERDIcTs: THE ROLE OF GROUP SIZE AND SOCIAL
DECISION RULE 45-46 (1977) (citing one study that "was so heavily weighted toward
the defendant that not a single verdict favored the plaintiff," rendering analysis of
independent variable variance impossible).
BEHAVIOR OF THE TORT LITIGATION SYSTEM
Data showing a lack of agreement between juries and some
other decision-maker provide a familiar basis for criticism of the
jury (or the trial) as a decision-making institution. But the issue
really must be: With what are jury decisions to be compared?
Inter-judge agreement is also far from perfect. Moreover, decision-
making in other fields shows rates of error or disagreement that are
no better than those of judges and juries.3 26 These findings are
all the more remarkable when we recall that unlike most decision-
makers, trial factfinders receive the most ambiguous and difficult
subset of cases.
Without these data, commentators and policy-makers must
assess the jury (or the trial) by relying on far more dubious
benchmarks. Lawyers will recall cases in which juries decided
contrary to their expectations or hopes. Experts will recall
occasions on which juries decided contrary to the direction
suggested by their testimony.3 27  Such commentators forget to
compare the jury's performance in the aggregate to the imperfect
decision-making of their own fields. They overlook the filtering that
has preceded the factfinder's task. Moreover, their own cognitive
machinery will operate to recall instances of discordance more
readily than instances of concordance. 328 Such anecdotes hardly
qualify as any evidence at all.
In the light of more complete and systematic evidence on the
jury, it is hard to avoid the unexpected conclusion that juries are
one of our society's most reliable decision-making institutions. This
conclusion is not undermined by the next paragraph, properly
understood.
3 29
326 See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
327 For example, in an anecdotal report, a physician recalls several verdicts that
brought multi-million dollar awards even though he did not consider the defendant
surgeon to be negligent. On the other hand, he recalls cases in which he believed the
claims were meritorious, yet the jury found for the defendant on the basis of
favorable defense testimony "that could only be regarded as less than scientific." See
Charles A. Fager, Professional Liability and Potential Liability, 16 NEUROSURGERY 866,
872 (1985). If these instances of discordance were to be taken as a generally valid
description ofjury performance, it would lead to the bizarre conclusion that people
are more often convinced by bad experts offering bad science than by good experts
relating good science.
328 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
329 The accuracy of some of our society's tools is regularly overestimated. At the
same time, the accuracy of many aspects of the legal process is systematically and
enthusiastically underestimated by participants in the legal system as well as by the
general public. Why the legal system encourages this view of itself is another
interesting puzzle. For one attempt to fathom an answer, see Saks, Enhancing and
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FIGURE XI330
FLOW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES THROUGH
PART OF THE LITIGATION SYSTEM
Negligent Iatrogenic
Injury
Base of actionable injuries
Decisions to claim
Prospective cases presented to lawyers
Lawsuits filed
Settlements negotiated
Trials commenced
for Plaintiff
Trial Verdict
for Defendant
Awards
Changes from additur/remittitur review
Appeals
Compensation paid
Present Absent
10,000* 1,000,000*
400 2,400
200* 800*
(170) (730)
30* 70*
15* 19*
14* 52*
Let us turn, for the final time, to our chart of the flow of
medical malpractice cases through the litigation system. Assume
that the one hundred cases that reach trial result in the verdicts
displayed in Figure XI. About 34% of the cases have been decided
in favor of plaintiffs.3 31  That percentage tells us nothing about
Restraining Accuracy, supra note 301, at 271-78.
330 Empirically determined ratios are indicated with an asterisk. Others are
estimated.
331 See, e.g., PETERSON & PRIEST, supra note 293, at 19 tbl. 3 (showing Cook County
to range from 26% to 37%, depending on the year); SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note
274, at 25 tbl. 8 (showing San Francisco to range from 27% to 43%, depending on the
year); Stephen Daniels, Tracing the Shadow of the Law: Juty Verdicts in Medical
Malpractice Cases, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 4, 13 (1990) (finding plaintiffs won 32.4% of the
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whether or not correct decisions were reached. The factfinder might
be criticized for reaching more findings of liability that were false
positives (nineteen) than true positives (fifteen).3 2 On the other
hand, defendants won 73% of the cases they should have won, while
plaintiffs won only 52% of the cases they should have won, for
results that serve the interests of defendants more than of plaintiffs.
Overall, 67% of the trial verdicts were decided as they should have
been. Would such data indicate that the trial system was doing a
satisfactory job of deciding cases?3 3
G. Awards
Damage awards by juries have long been a central issue in
considerations of the tort litigation system. Debate about a possible
liability crisis has similarly emphasized jury awards. The Insurance
Information Institute warns of a system characterized by "exorbitant
awards and unpredictable results."3 34  The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce complains of "outrageous awards." 335  An article in
America's most prestigious scientific journal asserts:
At the time of cancellation, the phosphate fiber336 program
director ... observed that "seven-figure jury awards on claims
without merit are enough to send shivers down anyone's spine."
The costs of litigation are so high, the uncertainty of courtroom
outcomes so great, and the possibility of multimillion dollar
1886 malpractice jury trials decided in forty-six counties around the nation during a
five-year period); Thomas B. Metzloff, ResolvingMalpractice Disputes: Imaging theJury's
Shadow, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs., Winter & Spring 1991, at 43, 48-49 & n.16
(reporting results of North Carolina study wherein of 895 malpractice cases filed over
three-year period, 118 went to trial and 55 were studied closely; 24% of verdicts
favored plaintiffs (35 for the defense, 11 for the plaintiff)).
32 The debate over trial verdicts focuses almost exclusively on false positives and
ignores false negatives.
"' Should our judgment take into account the fact that 900 cases were removed
from the system before reaching trial? The ratio of false positives to true positives
in these data is about 1.2:1-that is, for every correct determination of liability, there
are 1.2 incorrect determinations. Should our judgment of the trial system be
informed by the fact that the comparable ratio for a biomedical test such as that for
HIV, which is more than 97% accurate, is about 19:1? See supra note 150. Should
our evaluation take into account the standard of proof, preponderance of the
evidence, which requires that a slight balance of evidence in favor of either party is
to result in ajudgment in favor of that party?
334 INSURANCE INFO. INST., supra note 24, at 1.
335 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 6932, LIABILrrY CRisis PROJECT (1986).
336 Phosphate fiber is an asbestos substitute.
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awards so real that winning every lawsuit would still have been a
Pyrrhic victory.
5 3 7
Jury Verdict Research recorded its first "million dollar" award in
1962; by 1985, 2422 were counted, with 590 in that year alone; by
1989, the total had grown to 4329.338 Vice President Quayle
recently warned that tort litigation is a "system we believe is in
danger of spinning out of control."
339
1. Erroneous Impressions
No one has the data necessary to draw intellectually defensible
conclusions about patterns of change in awards or their causes. As
we shall see, the impression that damage awards have soared out of
control is almost certainly incorrect. Indeed, from the lack of data
and reliance on anecdotes and factoids grows a series of mispercep-
tions about the behavior of the legal process.
a. Misplaced Attention
Jury awards are a relatively minor part of the litigation system's
activity. The rhetoric devoted to juries is vastly out of proportion
to the volume of damages they assign. Since only a fraction of filed
cases end in trial judgments, and only about half of those result in
liability verdicts, jury awards are responsible for a very small
proportion of the compensation that defendants pay to plaintiffs.
The great bulk of compensation is made through the agreement of
the principals and their attorneys. Furthermore, the largest losses
due to injuries will never be seen by juries. Cases involving clear
liability, grossly negligent injurers, and large damages are almost
certain to be settled, and for large amounts.
340
337 Richard J. Mahoney & Stephen E. Littlejohn, Innovation on Trial: Punitive
Damages Versus New Products, 246 SCIENCE 1395, 1395 (1989) (footnote added). The
first author is the Chief Executive Officer of the Monsanto Company. See id.
338 See JURY VERDIcT RES., PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS 19-20
(1991). These are, of course, awards of $1 million or more. jury Verdict Research's
reports on million-dollar awards show a peculiar statistical obsession, doing various
breakdowns of the number of these awards over time, byjurisdiction, and by type of
case, as if numbers of million-dollar awards really conveyed some meaning.
339 Quayle, supra note 13, at 25.
340 Such cases will not, however, settle quickly or easily. Frye and Saks's data on
malpractice cases suggest that the slowest cases to settle are those presenting the
clearest liability and largest likely loss to defendants. See Susan Frye & Michael J.
Saks, Data and Notes on the Data Analysis (Jan. 13, 1991) (unpublished study, on file
with author). One insurer who supplied us with data acknowledged this finding to
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Although some will argue that jury awards are inordinately
important because they are the tail that wags the dog of settlement,
I have discussed earlier why that probably is not nearly so true as so
many have so long assumed.341 That settlements reflect changes
in jury behavior to which attorneys are sensitively tuned is a
doubtful proposition. Studies of lawyers and judges show that they
do not, in fact, know what juries have been doing.342 Norms
concerning the value of cases are far more likely to grow out of
interactions among settlement professionals: lawyers, adjusters,
consulting economists, and judges.343 In his study of settlements,
Ross found:
The evaluation of the routine case is strongly affected by under-
standings common to both adjusters and attorneys concerning an
appropriate relationship between settlement and the degree of
injury as measured by medical bills. This can be termed the
formula method of evaluation. The hospital and physicians' bills
are totaled, and are multiplied by an arbitrary coefficient-typically
from two to five, depending on the practice of the area-to yield
an agreeable figure for the intangibles of the case, the pain and
suffering and inconvenience. With represented claimants, a figure
of three times the medical bills is sometimes described as allocat-
ing one third to the lawyer, one third to the physician, and one
third to the claimant
3 44
Indeed, any increase in settlements could easily be the result of
misperceptions about jury behavior. If lawyers and adjusters
mistakenly believe that jury awards are soaring, they will negotiate
settlements more favorable to plaintiffs than they need to or used
be consistent with its experience. Whether the delay is due to more contentious
bargaining in the face of higher stakes, or simply to an economically rational strategy
by insurers to delay as long as possible paying large claims, we cannot say.
341 For a discussion ofsettlements, see supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
342 See supra notes 15, 22 & 263 and accompanying text.
343 Why does interest in the trial so far overshadow interest in settlements, where
as much of the psychology and more of the economics of the legal process take place?
The answer may lie in the fact that through settlements, the great bulk of compensa-
tion dollars are under the control of the parties, their insurers, and their lawyers.
Few of us organize movements to reform our own behavior. Thus, another virtue of
the jury may be that it can be a lightning rod for the mistakes of lawyers, insurers,
and the parties themselves, whose settlement mistakes can be blamed on the imagined
future behavior ofjuries. In addition, to acknowledge that the awards complained
of are overshadowed by the settlements agreed to would make it more obvious that
the real impact of many proposed reforms (caps on awards, for example) would not
be on what happens at trials but what happens at settlements.
344 H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT 107-08 (1980).
1992] 1243
1244 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 140:1147
to. When facing a complex task such as predicting jury awards, it
is a hinderance not to have systematic and well-controlled data, to
focus on a small number of extreme awards, or to trust in casually
asserted myths about the system. Under such circumstances, error
comes easily.
345
b. Changes in Case Mix
Changes in patterns of jury awards cannot be interpreted
without taking into account the characteristics of the cases being
decided or changes that may have occurred in the stages preceding
trial. Any number of trends could result in increases injury awards
without any change whatsoever in juries, jurors, or the law. The
following are examples of changes that could result in such
increases: the base of injuries shifting to include a larger propor-
tion of more expensive losses; a greater proportion of tortious
injury victims bringing grievances to lawyers, permitting lawyers to
select cases with more valuable losses; or the settlement process
becoming more contentious with respect to cases involving large
losses, thereby resolving fewer of those cases through negotiation.
Put simply, anything changing the value of the case mix reaching
trial would be expected to change damage awards at trial. Unless
one controls for those changes, one can make no sense of patterns
of seeming "change" in jury awards.3 46 This important problem
of confounding case mix with case outcomes will be developed
further below.
345 This is part of the price paid for not knowing enough about the behavior of
the system within which one must make decisions. One might think that knowing
how and why juries decide cases is of such importance to lawyers that as an industry
they would see to it that such data were collected and analyzed, rather than trusting
government agencies and academics to do it for them (and do it poorly from the
perspective of providing answers that lawyers need to know). The fact that lawyers
have not carefully collected such data may be further evidence of the relative
unimportance ofjury verdicts to their work. See Saks, supra note 15.
4 To make simple time series comparisons is to assume no changes occurred in
the case mix reaching thejury. If changes in the mix did occur, then comparisons of
awards are comparisons of apples to oranges. Compare PETERSON & PRIEST, supra
note 293, at 12-16 (ignoring the effects of changes in the case mix) with MARK A.
PETERSON, COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES: CIVILJURY VERDICTS IN COOK COUNTY 34-
37 (1984) [hereinafter COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES] (using the same data and
considering the effects of changes in the case mix).
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c. Absence of Data
The available data are insufficient to support any general
conclusions about changing patterns of awards. Broad and
systematically gathered data on awards simply do not exist. No state
has kept track of these data 47 and the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts began doing so only recently. 48 Precise-
ly because of these shortcomings in the database, private and
government researchers have undertaken the specialized studies
cited throughout this Article.
3 49
Some of the data reported demonstrate no effort to present
representative data, but instead focus on the upper edge of the
distribution of awards, usually awards of one million dollars or
more.350 Such a focus on the extreme upper portion of the
distribution, consisting, for example, of at most a few percent of
jury awards in Cook County, is inadvisable. By analogy, one does
not assess the ability of a school to place its students in jobs by
seeing how well the last ten valedictorians fared. A few big numbers
do not tell much of the story.
Although practitioners sometimes turn for information about
awards to reports from Jury Verdict Research (JVR), no serious
students of the litigation system regard those data as reliable
347 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. As noted above, state court
information management has only recently begun to collect systematically case flow
data, and half or more of the states do not even do that uniformly. As far as I have
been able to determine, no state keeps track of case outcomes. I have written to the
office of the court administrator of each state requesting data on civil jury awards
comparing the 1970s and 1980s and all have replied that they do not have such data.
See Written Correspondence with State Court Administrators (July 2-13, 1989) (on file
with author).
348 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
349 For some areas of litigation, the sheer number of awards has been too small
to attempt to discern statistical trends. For example, in my own state of Iowa,
agitated physicians urged state legislators to save them from awards they claimed were
growing out of control. They placed brochures in their offices explaining the crisis
to patients. A count of every malpractice case in the state's courts in the preceding
five and one-halfyears revealed a total of 26 plaintiffs' verdicts, an average of only 3.7
per year, which is not enough each year to compute a meaningful average. See
Northeastern Regional Office, Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Iowa Tort Liability Study
(Sept. 13, 1986) (on file with author). Note, however, that had the Iowa awards been
averaged, one would find a decline in the size of awards in the later years of that
series. If the crisis did exist, it was clearly not in every jurisdiction. But even in
major cities, the numbers were too small to permit serious analysis. For example, by
the end of the 1970s, San Francisco had only five malpractice plaintiffs' verdicts per
year. See SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 274, at 51.
350 See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
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summaries of jury behavior. The JVR data are not the product of
systematic and representative sampling.3 51 The resulting sample
of awards is taken disproportionately from the high end of the
distribution, and the resulting summary statistics therefore overstate
the size of awards. In addition, reporting practices may vary with
geography, case type, and over time, such as when public controver-
sy over awards rises. As a result, apparent changes in award
patterns may reflect little more than changes in reporting patterns
and changes in the nature of the sampling bias.
352
d. Absence of or Erroneous Inflation Adjustments
Much of the data that have been gathered have failed to adjust
properly even for the most obvious of confounds: inflation. Some
studies have not adjusted at all, most notably those that measure the
increase in "million dollar awards." One million dollars at time-1 is
not one million dollars at time-2. A 1970 dollar shrank to about
thirty-six cents by 1985.353 Thus, in 1970 dollars, the 1985 "mil-
lion dollar awards" are closer to "one-third of one million dollar
awards." By 1985 it took $2,773,707 to buy what $1,000,000 bought
in 1970.354
Of the studies that have "adjusted for inflation," most have done
so by using the overall Consumer Price Index (CPI). Against this
351 See PLRA Hearings, supra note 28, at 226-27 (describingJVR's data collection
procedures); A. Russell Localio, Variations on $962,258. The Misuse of Data on Medical
Malpractice, LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE, June 1985, at 126, 126-27 (discussing the
shortcomings of JVR's data). Because of the inadequacy of JVR data for research
purposes, those who have wanted to study awards data rigorously have used a limited
number of local jury verdict reporters determined to contain an unbiased and very
nearly complete set of the cases for the jurisdiction each covers. See, e.g., PETERSON
& PRIEST, supra note 293, at 2-3 (obtaining data from case descriptions reported by
the Cook County Juy Verdict Reporter); Daniels & Martin, supra note 25, at 326-48
(noting problems in usingJVR studies for patterns injury verdicts and then surveying
state court verdicts in 43 counties in 10 states).
352 The consequences of these errors may extend beyond simply misinforming us
about the system's actual state; such misinformation can produce unwanted changes.
TheJVR data are, after all, intended to be used as a guide to what ajury would award
for a certain kind of loss. Lawyers who rely on JVR's unrepresentatively high
amounts have their own frame of reference stretched upward and that in turn
produces higher settlements over time.
353 The purchasing power of the dollar for consumers fell from $2.574 in 1970 to
$0.928 in 1985, using 1982-84 dollars as the benchmark. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra note 94, at 467 tbl. 756 (providing statistics for dollar values from 1950 to
1988).
354 Conversely, a 1985 award of $1,000,000 is the equivalent of a 1970 award of
$360,528.
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benchmark, they have concluded that increases in the severity of
insurer losses have exceeded the rate of inflation.355 But using
the overall CPI, as the preceding paragraph does, underestimates
the effects of inflation on the tort award dollar.
A more precise inflation adjustment would reflect the inflation
of actual components of tort awards, rather than a general average
inflation. The bulk of damages paid are for medical treatment for
injuries suffered and for lost earnings. Health care costs have risen
at a faster rate and to greater heights than the overall cost of living.
In the decade from 1975 to 1984, the CPI for all goods and services
rose 93%, while for medical care it rose 125%.356 In the thirty
years from 1955 to 1985, the constant dollar cost of physicians'
services rose more than 600%357 and per capita disposable per-
sonal income approximately doubled.358 One Rand study found
that when measured in unadjusted dollars, medical specials
increased 167% over two decades.3 59  After adjusting with the
medical cost deflator, however, the increase was only 10%.161
Different types of harms, characteristic of different categories of
torts, involve different repair costs. For example, the cost of auto
replacement parts rose 12.56% from 1981 to 1985. During the same
period, the increase in physicians' fees was 33.38%, general medical
care 36.88%, and hospital room charges 47.68%.361 If jury awards
for car repairs lagged far behind jury awards for passenger repairs,
that would be quite rational. Thus, when a more appropriate index
of inflation is applied, the apparent increases are not nearly as
dramatic as they would otherwise seem. Unfortunately, few students
of the litigation system, including serious researchers, have applied
the proper adjustments3 62  Yet the reasonableness of damage
355 See, e.g., DANZON, supra note 6, at 62-63 ("[T]he steady upward trend in claim
severity [from 1969 to 1979] outpaced the general rate of inflation."); PETERSON &
PRIEST, supra note 293, at 20 & nn.14-15 (noting that increase in awards exceeded
inflation adjustments).
356 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 94, at 470 tbl. 761.
357 See id. at 99 tbl. 150 (providing 1985 figures); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at B262-74
(Bicentennial ed. 1975) (providing 1955 figures).
358 See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 94, at 428 tbl. 695 (providing 1955 and
1985 figures).
359 See COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES, supra note 346, at 49-50.
360 See id.
361 See INSURANCE INFO. INST., INSURANCE FACTS: 1988-89 PROPERTY-CASUALTY
FACT BOOK 55 (1988).
362 Indeed, no one even knows what the proper adjustments would be. The first
step in determining the proper adjustments is to determine what the components of
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awards cannot be evaluated unless properly adjusted to reflect the
actual inflation. Jury awards that have increased proportionately to
that would be perfectly reasonable.
3 63
The underadjustment to which inflation generally has been
treated still is better than the near total disregard of other equally
obvious confounds. Although the effects of many confounds, in
addition to inflation, may well have distorted the appearance of
awards even more profoundly, they often have simply been left
altogether uncontrolled.3 6 4
e. Other Statistical Mirages
A variety of other statistical mirages can interfere with making
sense of awards data. For example, California appears to have
unusually high awards compared to courts of other states. 365 Is
that evidence of the profligacy of California jurors? Or does it
reflect the fact that cases involving less than $15,000 are heard in
limited jurisdiction courts and are not included in the jury verdict
reporters that provided the data?366 If the lower portion of the
case distribution is lopped off, the "average" award in the remaining
sample of cases will appear to be high.
3 6 7
Similarly, Rand data show an abrupt upward climb in San
Francisco awards after the 1970s. 368  Although one might think
typical tort awards and settlements are for each case category. The next step is to
determine the correct measure of inflation for each of those components. Only at
this stage can a researcher draw a meaningful conclusion about how tort awards or
settlements have moved when adjusted for inflation.
363 The marginal difference, if any, between the expected awards (taking into
account the actual injuries and the real-dollar cost of repairing them) and aggregate
jury awards could then become a subject of inquiry. But no one has come close to
approaching these questions in a rigorous way.
36' These include changes in age and income mix of plaintiffs, severity of the
plaintiffs' damages, qualitative changes in treatment effectiveness (and associated
costs), and other matters to be discussed.
365 See Stephen Daniels &Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75
MINN. L. REv. 1, 41-42 (1990).
366 See PETERSON, supra note 111, at 8-9 (describing procedural changes in San
Francisco courts and their probable effects on jury trials).
367 Federal data, some of which appear in Appendix B, have the same problem.
When the jurisdictional limit was raised in 1988 from $10,000 to $50,000, the
automatic result was that the number of filings declined and the average award rose.
The change in the jurisdictional limit, then, makes time series comparisons more
complicated. Perhaps this factor will make more obvious what should always have
been obvious but was not: the caseload is a changing mix, rendering superficial
comparisons across time misleading.
368 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 192, at 15-17; PETERSON, supra note 111, at vi-
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that these findings confirm skyrocketing awards, the more likely
explanation is that they reflect a change in the composition of the
court's caseload. Beginning in the early 1980s, cases with less than
$25,000 at issue were diverted to arbitration.3 69  By removing a
large number of less expensive cases from the data, the average
award inevitably "climbed" precipitously.
37 0
Change in Illinois law produced the opposite illusion. When, in
1981, Illinois moved from a rule of contributory negligence to
comparative negligence, cases that previously would have been
losses for plaintiffs, producing no awards at all, became plaintiff
victories, albeit smaller ones.3 7 1 As a result, the average award of
the later cases grew smaller.
There has been persistent debate over the use of means rather
than medians as the method of summarizing many different awards
into an average.172  The statistic employed can determine the
conclusions drawn. Figure XII, presenting Rand's Cook Countyjury
viii, 28-30.
369 See PETERSON, supra note ill, at 9, 31.
370 In San Francisco between 1975 and 1979, more than half thejury awards were
below $25,000. See SKANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 274, at 26 fig. 6.
11 This probably also explains the upward trend in the likelihood of plaintiff
verdicts in Cook County, rather than juror sympathy for plaintiffs or hostility toward
defendants.
372 The median is the value that divides a distribution into two equal halves; it is
the 50th percentile. The mean is the quotient resulting from dividing the sum of
awards by the number of awards (or the number of tried cases, thereby including the
zero awards in verdicts for defendants). "Average" is a generic term referring to
measures of central tendency generally. Given the importance of the choice of
measure of central tendency, the use by some researchers of the term "average" to
stand for "mean" has been an unfortunate practice. The least they could do is be
sure to tell the reader which average they are using. One undergraduate statistics
textbook introduces the topic of averages as follows: "Almost any presentation of
data uses averages-average gas mileage, average income, average score on the exam,
average absolute refractory period of the tibial nerves of rats fed DDT." DAVID S.
MOORE, STATISTICS: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 172 (2d ed. 1985). The book
continues: "Everyone has heard that statistics features the mean, the median, and the
mode [the value which appears most frequently in the data]. Those are in fact the
three 'averages' we will study." Id. at 173.
A well-known book on the misuse of statistics makes the following comments:
[T]he word 'average' [has] a very loose meaning. It is a trick commonly
used, sometimes in innocence but often in guilt, by fellows wishing to
influence public opinion or sell advertising space. When you are told that
something is an average you still don't know very much about it unless you
can find out which of the common kinds of average it is-mean, median, or
mode.
DARRELL HUFF, How TO LIE WITH STATISTICS 28 (1954). Huff also notes that "an
unqualified 'average' is virtually meaningless." Id. at 29.
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awards data,3 73 demonstrates the difference between using the
mean as opposed to the median value. Note that as the mean (they
label it as "average") award moves through time, it rises from about
$35,000 in 1960 to about $65,000 in 1977. Thus, it appears that
awards have increased. But the median shows remarkable stability
at below $10,000 and, if anything, shows a small decrease over time.
The statistical phenomenon in Figure XII occurs because the
distributions of awards are drastically skewed, with many small
awards and a few very large awards. Because the mean takes into
account the exact value of each score in a distribution, it is highly
sensitive to extreme scores. One astronomical award in an
otherwise unchanging distribution will pull the mean higher,
creating the impression that the whole distribution has changed.
Medians, unlike means, change only when awards in the distribution
shift from one side of the 50th percentile to the other.374 The
two measures produce different inferences, 375 yet nothing surpris-
ing to statisticians.
3 76
373 See PETERSON & PRIEST, supra note 293, at 23.
374 The behavior of these numbers gives additional information about the
distribution of awards and how it changes over time. First, the differences between
the means and medians indicate the presence of a strongly skewed distribution, with
a massive lower end and a tiny upper end. Second, because the mean and the median
are moving so differently, we can infer that the great bulk of the distribution is
staying still while the upper tail is rising.
75 The "average" award in Cook County was both up (if measured by the mean)
and level (if measured by the median).
376 Which is the "correct" one to use? The convention among statisticians is to
use means to describe the central tendency of "normal" distributions (the familiar
bell-shaped curve) and medians to describe the central tendency of skewed
distributions. See LEONARD A. MARASCULIA & RONALD C. SERLIN, STATISTICAL
METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 53 (1988). This convention is
not arbitrary. It is a solution to the problem of trying to give as meaningful a sense
of where a distribution sits as possible using a single number. Because of this
convention and its reasoning, some researchers (Daniels and his colleagues, for
example) consistently use medians to report the central tendencies of awards and
eschew means. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 25, at 340-42 tbl. 4; Daniels &
Martin, supra note 365, at 42 tbl. VI, 44 tbl. VII, 51 fig. IV, 53 fig. V. Other
researchers (Peterson and his colleagues, for example) take pains to present both,
leaving to their readers the responsibility to make the choice and the interpretation.
See MARK A. PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGEs: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS passim
(1987); PETERSON, supra note 111, passim.
The two measures of central tendency answer different questions about the
distribution and about the litigation process. That the median has remained
unchanged or has dropped suggests that the typicaljury's response to the typical case
has remained stable. The increasing mean, at the same time, tells us that insurers are
paying more in total and much more in the largest cases than had been true
previously. Insurers are right that their liability costs rose (at least in those
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FIGURE XI13
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f. Contrary data
The data that are available are not consistent with the conclu-
sion that jury awards have in general risen sharply.37 8 Mentioned
just above were the findings for Cook County, where median jury
awards remained "remarkably stable" over a considerable length of
jurisdictions where they did rise). But those who blame it on juries "spinning out of
control" are not paying attention to most of the evidence (the bulk of the distribu-
tion).
377 Figure XII is adapted from PETERSON & PRIEST, supra note 293, at 23 fig. 8.
37 8 Although sometimes data fromJVR are cited in support of the proposition, in
1986, the Executive Director ofJVR told a congressional committee that "JVR has
neither asserted nor published any conclusions that the average size ofjury verdicts
has recently sky-rocketed. Although verdicts, as well as many other items, have
increased substantially over the years, our studies do not support any claim of
recently escalating jury verdict awards." PLRA Hearings, supra note 28, at 226.
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time.3 79  South Carolina's typical jury awards rose slowly and
slightly over the period of one study.380 The Daniels and Martin
study of jury verdicts in forty-three counties in ten states found that
the median awards in twenty-nine counties were below $50,000.381
In twenty-three counties, the medians were below $25,000.3
s2
These data do not show any obvious growth trends in the size of
awards. The most impressive differences are variations between
states and between counties within states.3 8 3 These large differ-
ences suggest that differences in the milieu externe or the local legal
culture may have an equal or greater impact in determining awards
than differences in the substantive law.
38
4
The Minnesota Department of Commerce conducted a study of
all of its and its neighboring states' medical malpractice insurers to
379 See supra notes 373-76 and accompanying text.
380 See Hubbard, supra note 22.
381 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 25, at 336-37 & tbl. 3.
382 See id. at 336-37. When the data are disaggregated by case type, impressive
differences emerge. Auto negligence cases usually have low awards (medians below
$40,000 in three fourths of the sites, below $20,000 in half the sites). See id. at 339.
Median product liability awards were over $100,000 at 85% of sites reporting at least
one award and over $1 million at six of them. See id. Median medical malpractice
awards were over $100,000 at 70% of the sites reporting at least one award and over
$1 million at three. See id. For possible explanation of these differences, see supra
notes 139-42 and accompanying text (discussing the economics of case selection), and
infra notes 486-501 and accompanying text (discussing research on "deep pockets").
Compare the NCSG study, however, which found that the highest median awards in
38 cities were for automobile cases ($32,000). See Rottman, supra note 195, at 15 fig.
13.
383 Within each site, the variation in awards was not great: interquartile ranges
(the distance between the 25th and 75th percentiles) were under $100,000 in two-
thirds of them. Thus, "most awards fall within a well-defined and relatively narrow
range." Daniels & Martin, supra note 25, at 338. Between states and between counties
within states, however, the variation is remarkable. See id. at 336-39. Awards data
vary dramatically by site. In general, interstate variation was greater than intrastate
variation. The following is the basis of the inference. To acquire some indication of
variation, I began with the medians Daniels Martin present for each county in their
study. I obtained my index of intrastate variation by calculating the standard
deviation of these county medians within each state. The mean of these state-by-state
standard deviations was $9125 and the median of them was $6468. My index of
interstate variation was obtained by taking each state's median award and computing
their standard deviation, which came to $19,890. Thus, the interstate variation
appears to be greater than the intrastate variation. How much of these differences
is attributable to differences in law and how much is due to differences in the social
or economic environments is impossible to say with present data.
384 Differences in awards between counties within states cannot be attributable to
differences in state law. This raises questions as to why there are no increases where
changes in the law would lead one to expect increases, and where so many
commentators obviously have expected and assumed increases.
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evaluate assertions such as this: "'The huge amounts awarded for
punitive damages, pain and suffering, and other non-economic loss
provide a windfall for the plaintiff while resulting in substantial
costs to all other patients in the aggregate. ' "38 5 The Department
found that of the 110 cases tried in the survey states over the six
years of the study, not one assessed punitive damages or awarded
damages for pain and suffering; indeed, only twenty cases awarded
anything at all to plaintiffs. 8 6 Moreover, these insurers excluded
punitive damage awards under the terms of their policies and so
would not have had to pay the damages in any event.387  The
results imply that noneconomic damages could not have been
increasing because no noneconomic damages were being awarded.
As soon as control variables are included, the apparent increases
begin to melt away. That is, when changes over time in the severity
of injuries or losses to plaintiffs are taken into account, the data
show only slight, if any, real increases in awards. In the most
careful analysis of changes in medical malpractice awards in five
jurisdictions during most of the 1970s and 1980s, Sloan and Hsieh
concluded:
Once we accounted for general inflation and the other factors
in the regressions, the coefficients of the time variables generally were not
statistically significant at conventional levels. This result at least
partly contradicts assertions about the "explosive growth in
damage awards." Awards have increased, but a large part of the
increase reflects changes in the mix of cases brought to ver-
dict.
388
These are illustrative of the contrary data. The best way to
"find" that juries in general have been making awards that soar
above those of the past has been to violate many of the standards of
good empirical research: failing to adjust for extraneous, confound-
ing variables; comparing apples to oranges; selecting a narrow slice
of data and overgeneralizing to the entire realm of interest; and
385 STATE OF MINN. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM STUDY:
1982-1987, at 22 (1989) [hereinafter MINN. CLAIM STUDY] (quoting NAT'L Assoc. OF
INDEP. INSURERS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A SECOND OPINION 10 (1986)).
386 See id.
387 See id.
388 Frank A. Sloan & Chee RueyHsich, Variability inMedicalMapracticePayments:
Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 LAw & Soc'y REV. 997, 1025 (1990) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted). The italicized phrase means that awards did not increase over
time, once extraneous variables were controlled for.
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using means instead of medians in spite of the strongly skewed
distributions of awards.
g. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages have been another area of purported extraor-
dinary growth, both in frequency and in size. According to Justice
O'Connor: "Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing."
89
Brief after amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court in a recent
punitive damages case asserted that punitive damages are more
frequent, more extreme, and more outlandish.3 90 Such claims
have been made by the executive branch as well. According to the
White House:
Another item of great concern to the [President's] Council [on
Competitiveness] is punitive damages....
... Even a casual observer knows that, in the last several
decades, punitive damages have grown dramatically in both
frequency and size. What began as a sanction only for the most
reprehensible conduct has now become almost routine. In
California, estimates are that one in every ten jury awards now
includes punitive damages, in amounts averaging more than $3
million. And as these awards become more common, so do the
instances of their arbitrary, even freakish application.
391
But every empirical study of the question has reached conclu-
sions that, to say the least, fail to support these beliefs. In Rand's
research on accidental personal injury trials in Cook County,
Illinois, and San Francisco, the proportion of cases in which
punitive damages were awarded was small and had risen little in the
twenty-five years from 1960 to 1984.392
Cook County averaged, for personal injury cases, 1.8 punitive
damage awards per year during the 1960s and 1970s and 2.8 per
year during 1980-84. 393 During the entire twenty-five-year period
389 Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
390 See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). A brief
submitted by the Institute of Architects, for example, stated: "Punitive damages are
today awarded with a frequency and in amounts that are startling.... This system of
punitive damages-where punitive awards are routine and fantastic verdicts receive
little attention-is entirely a product of the last 20 years." Id. at 1038 n.4 (citing
numerous amicus briefs filed in this case).
391 Quayle, supra note 13, at 15, 25.
392 See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 376, at 12.
393 See id. at 10 tbl. 2.3.
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there were fifty punitive damage awards in total.8 94 In products
liability and medical malpractice cases, the categories where most
concern is expressed, the data showed that punitive awards are rare
indeed. The research found exactly one punitive damage award in
product liability during the two decades from 1960-1979 and one
such award during the 1980-1984 period.395 For medical malprac-
tice, there were zero such awards in 1960-1979 and three in 1980-
84.396
San Francisco averaged 0.2 punitive damage awards per year
during the 1960s and 1970s and 1.2 per year during 1980-84l
97
During the entire twenty-five-year period, San Francisco juries
granted ten punitive damage awards in personal injury cases.
3 98
In product liability cases during the decades from 1960-1979, one
punitive damage award was made and during 1980-1984, three were
awarded.3 99 For medical malpractice there were zero such awards
in 1960-1979 and one in 1980-1984.40o
Even had there been large increases in the number of punitive
damage awards, the proper inquiry is not "Was there an increase?"
but, "Was there an unjustified increase?" The "crisis," if one exists,
may be in the conduct of the tortfeasors, rather than that of the
jurors or judges.
40 1
394 See id.
395 See id. at 13 tbl 2.5.
396 See id. For both classes of cases, there are not enough awards to even state (by
the standards of any science) that the apparent increase is statistically reliable, let
alone to declare a national emergency.
397 See id. at 10.
398 See id. During the same period, thesejuries also awarded punitive damages in
70 intentional tort cases. See id.
399 See id. at 13.
400 See id.
401 It may be useful to explain where the Justice Department, the White House,
and at least one member of the Supreme Court have gone astray. The Peterson study
noted that each of two other categories of cases (of concern neither to this Article
nor to the tort policy debates) registered an overall increase in damage awards in
recent years. See id. at 8-10, 19. One of these categories is business/contract
litigation. It consists primarily of bad faith, rather than tort, cases. See id. at 10.
Recall Galanter's and the NCSC's observations, quoted earlier, that contracts is the
area to watch for real increases in litigation activity. See Galanter, supra note 159, at
942; supra note 204 and accompanying text (quoting NCSC 1989 REPORT, supra note
187). The second category is intentional torts (deliberate infliction of illegal injury).
See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 376, at 10 (finding that while punitive damage awards
in San Francisco intentional tort cases decreased from 3.0 cases per year in the period
from 1960-1979 to 2.2 cases per year in 1980-1984, Cook County statistics indicate
a growth in such cases from 2.0 to 7.6 over the same periods). For San Francisco,
these categories each contained seven times as many punitive damage awards as
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Rand's findings suggest, however, that while the proportion of
such cases has not grown, the size of mean punitive damage awards
has increased.4 °2 The mean increase, however, reflects the impact
of very few cases with exceptionally large awards. Between 1960
and 1984, median punitive damage awards rose in Cook County
from $1000 to $43,000 and in San Francisco from $17,000 to
$63,000.403 Even if we ignore the point made in the margin, and
ordinary torts did. See id. Juries may not be amiss in finding a sounder basis for
punitive damage awards in these other categories. As a legal and historical matter,
bad faith breaches of contract and intentional torts are where punitive damages got
their start, and were well established in American law before the middle of the
nineteenth century. See, e.g., Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362, 370-73
(1851) (discussing the appropriateness of "exemplary or vindictive" damages in
intentional tort and trespass actions); A Reading on Damages in Actions Ex Delicto, 3
AM. JURIST 287 (1830) (analyzing the rationale for and proper extent of damages in
various tort actions).
The Justice Department's report misreads the data in several ways. See TORT
POLICY REPORT, supra note 27, at 35-41. First, it lumps together punitive damage
awards from all kinds of suits, even though the report is by the "tort policy working
group" (so the Justice Department could not have been interested in business/
contract cases) and their topic was the "insurance crisis" (so the authors ought not to
have been concerned about intentional torts, which are not generally insurable, and
are becoming even less so as commercial general liability policies have been
withdrawing coverage in those states that had interpreted such contracts as applying
to punitive damages). See id. at 39, 42. After lumping together the tort apples with
the oranges and the grapefruits of other categories, the report proceeds as though
all the data had been about ordinary tort cases (instead of only one-fifteenth of the
data). Furthermore, the report uses means rather than medians. See id. at 35-42.
The mean, as a measure of central tendency, is especially susceptible to distortion by
a single (and for all anyone knows, a much deserved) "blockbuster" verdict (as Rand
reports have pointed out), and this distortion can lead to distorted conclusions from
data exhibiting an otherwise stable trend. For a discussion of the merits of using
either the mean or median as a measure of central tendency, see supra notes 372-76
and accompanying text.
402 See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 376, at 15.
403 See id. Assuming these figures are correct, do they reflect a change in juror
punitiveness toward tort defendants, especially corporate tort defendants? Ifjudges
are handing out longer criminal sentences, this could reflect growing punitiveness
amongjudges. But, it could equally reflect the more serious nature of the crimes
coming before them. Could jurors similarly be taking their usual approach to
punitive damages, but reacting to more serious offenses or "different" defendants?
One way to assess this would be to compare the apparent increase in punitive
damage awards to the increase in the wealth of the defendant corporations. Where
punitive damages are determined to be appropriate, the law requires jurors to assess
an amount that will suitably punish the defendants in light of their wealth. Although
$10,000 may punish a company whose assets amount to only $1 million, under like
circumstances it might require ten times more to "equally" punish a company with
ten times the assets.
San Francisco punitive damage awards increased by a factor of 3.71 from 1960
to 1984 ($17,000 is to $63,000 as 1 is to 3.71). See id. We do not know the net worth
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regard these numbers as real increases, they obviously have not
quite reached the heights that most people seem to believe. Finally,
the Rand study found that about half of these awards resulted in
downward post-trial adjustment, resulting in a payment of about
45% of the amount originally awarded. °4
Daniels and Martin used a geographically wide-ranging data base
of forty-seven counties in eleven states covering from two to five
years (varying with the jurisdiction) to study punitive damage awards
for the first half of the 1980s.40 5  Variability proved to be the
norm in these data, as results ranged from no punitive damage
awards in some counties40 6 to punitive damage awards in about
25% of the successful verdicts in others. 40 7  Punitive damages
were least frequent where physical injury was involved and far more
frequent in cases involving financial oi property harm.
40 8
Median punitive damage awards, in jurisdictions with ten or
more punitive verdicts, ranged from under $10,000 in some
counties to as high as $204,000 in San Diego, with a median award
of the companies being assessed those 1960 and 1984 punitive damages, but we might
use the rate of growth in total assets of the Fortune 500 companies as a rough
approximation. From 1960 to 1984, these increased eightfold, from $176 billion to
$1409 billion. See Fortune Directory, FORTUNE, Apr. 29, 1985, at 284; Fortune Directoiy,
FORTUNE, July 1961, at 184. If the corporations in San Francisco against which
punitive damages were assessed enjoyed growth parallel to that of the Fortune 500
companies, then the apparent growth in San Francisco punitive damages is actually
a decline: punitive damage awards grew at less than half the rate of growth in total
assets. In real terms, punishment may have softened.
Cook County punitive damage awards showed a forty-threefold fold increase
(from $1000 to $43,000). See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 376, at 15. In light of the
Fortune 500 statistics, what might we make of that? Perhaps Chicago corporations
enjoyed a far steeper growth in assets. Or perhaps the $1000 awards of 1960 were
merely symbolic, so that $5000 would have been viewed as equally punitive. Ifso, the
increase would have been eightfold, like the increase in the assets of the Fortune 500
companies.
These are mere illustrations. A proper assessment of the growth of punitive
damages requires a comparison of the actual circumstances of the case and condition
of the defendants, on the one hand, to the amount of the awards, on the other. We
might then conclude that punitive damages really are up, or perhaps they are level
or even in decline. Looking only at naked and uncontrolled averages, however, is
surely inadequate.
40 See PETERSON ET AL., supra note 376, at 28.
405 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 365, at 28.
406 See id. at 32. These counties were Erie and Richmond in New York and King,
Pierce, and Spokane in Washington.
407 See id. These counties were Arapahoe andJefferson in Colorado and Clay in
Missouri.
408 See id. at 37.
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of less than $25,000 in twelve of twenty jurisdictions studied.40 9
California counties had the largest medians and are atypical.410
Is this indicative of unusual punitiveness by California juries, the
conduct or wealth of California defendants (properly taken into
account in punitive damage determinations), or the case mix (bigger
and more deplorable cases tried in California)? No one knows.
A focus on medical malpractice trials in the large Daniels and
Martin sample revealed: 1917 trials, 621 plaintiffs' verdicts, and
eighteen awards of punitive damages. 411 Product liability trials
numbered 967, of which 379 resulted in plaintiffs' verdicts,
including thirty-four punitive damage awards.412  Long-term
trends were examined in three different counties: Cook County,
Illinois, Dallas, Texas, and Jackson, Missouri. Upward trends were
barely discernible. Present patterns resemble past patterns.
418
Landes and Posner studied how punitive damage awards fared
on appeal.414 They looked at all federal product liability appeals
decided in 1982 through November 1984 and found that of a total
of 172 product liability cases, ten involved punitive damages, and
only three of those were upheld on appeal.415 In addition, they
looked at all of the state product liability appeals reported in the
ten most recent volumes of West's regional reporters between late
49 See id. at 42.
410 See id. In fact, California had the five jurisdictions with the highest median
punitive damage awards: Alameda, $90,000; Los Angeles, $111,000; Sacramento,
$180,400; San Diego, $204,000; and San Francisco, $87,300. See id. Compare these
data with the statement by the Vice President. See supra text accompanying note 391
(noting estimates that when California juries award punitive damages, such awards
average more than $3 million).
411 See Daniels & Martin, supra note 365, at 38. This translates into punitive
damage awards in about 1% of medical malpractice trials and about 3% of the cases
in which liability was found and compensatory damages were awarded.
412 See id. This translates into punitive damages awards in 3.5% of trials and about
9% of cases in which compensatory damages were awarded.
413 See id. at 43-62. Again, we should bear in mind that even if a sharp upward
trend were discernible, it might be entirely appropriate given the facts of the cases.
Conversely, if punitive damage award trends appear generally stable that does not
mean that the cases have not grown less egregious (and therefore arguably deserving
of lower than the "usual" awards). We cannot assume that the cases coming before
juries do not change over time. Examination of awards without examination of the
cases tells us nothing about whether the juries are reaching "correct" results. Put
differently, although these data suggest the alarmists are wrong in their assertions,
they could be correct if a different alarm were being sounded. No one can know
without looking at the cases to which the awards respond.
414 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages,
REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 33.
415 See id. at 35.
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1984-late 1985 and found a total of 119 cases, excluding New York
and California. Of this sample, only two punitive damage awards
survived appeal. New York and California, as two "liberal" states,
were counted separately. The cases from those states involved no
punitive damage awards at all.4 16 Landes and Posner concluded
that punitive damage awards "seem[ed] to be neither frequent nor
crushing in any absolute sense."
417
The most intensive examination of punitive damages in product
liability cases has recently been completed by Rustad.41  After
conducting an exhaustive search of many sources, he located a total
of 855 such awards in the quarter century between 1965-1990.419
The author attempted to learn all he could about those 355 cases by
interviewing attorneys who handled the cases and by studying law
reporters.
First of all, a total of 355 punitive damage awards in product
liability cases is not enormous, considering that each year there are
about 21,900 deaths and thirty million injuries in the United States
associated with the use of products. 420 In 1984, hospital emer-
gency rooms received 9,632,128 patients who had suffered product-
caused injuries. 421 Those figures are for a single year. Extrapolat-
ed over a twenty-five-year period, the number of product-caused
injuries and deaths might easily be ten or twenty times ten million.
Between 1974-1990 a total of 161,686 of these injuries and deaths
led to the filing of federal product liability cases,422 as well as an
unknown number of state product liability cases. In view of the
416 See id. at 36.
417 Id. at 54. The authors did note, however, that such awards may nonetheless
"still be too frequent, or too heavy in relation to the actual conduct of defendants."
Id. Of course, the reverse is equally likely to be true.
4 18 See MICHAEL RUSTAD, DEMYSTIFYING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CASES: A SURVEY OF A QUARTER CENTURY OF VERDICTS (Papers of the
Roscoe Pound Found. 1991).
419 The author "searched all available computer based statistical sources, regional
verdict reporters, law reviews and other scholarly sources, state products liability
practice guides, generalized case reporting services, court records [in Miami, San
Diego, and Los Angeles], asbestos reporters, and [news] media reports. In addition
[he] surveyed all attorneys in the reported cases [in order to learn about any other
cases]." Id. at 42.
420 See 1987 U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, ANN. REP. 1.
421 See NATIONAL INJURY INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, NAT'L ELECTRONIC INJURY
SURVEILLANCE SYs., TABLE OF BODYPART BY AGE, ALL PRODUCTS, CALENDAR YEAR
1989, at 5 (1989).422 See infra Appendix B.
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base rate of injuries and the number of filings, the number of
punitive damage awards seems comparatively modest.
The frequency of punitive damage awards in product liability
cases has increased in recent years; more punitive damage awards
were counted in the latter portion of the period studied.4 23
Perhaps that portends a worrisome trend. But what should be the
nature of that worry? To make a determination we would need to
look to see if the awards were warranted. If they were not, then
corrective action might be called for. If they were warranted, then
the awards themselves are the corrective action, and we might worry
instead about why the increased frequency of punitive awards has
not been a more effective deterrent to deliberate harm-causing
conduct.
The median award sizes from the Rustad study are given in
Table VI. First, it is obvious that these awards are not typically in
the multi-million dollar range. Second, punitives are not many
times the amount of compensatory damages. At the trial level, the
ratio is only about 1.2:1 and in more than one-third of the cases, the
compensatory damages are actually larger than the punitives.
424
After adjusting for inflation, no increase in the frequency of large
punitive damage awards over time is evident. Thus, contrary to
popular belief, punitive damage awards are not "skyrocketing."
425
TABLE V1
426
MEDIAN PuNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS IN PRODUCT
LIABILITY CASES, 1965-1990
Compensatory Punitive
Awards at Trial 500,100 625,000
Awards Following Appeal 212,783 135,000
Trials are not the end of the story, of course. Of the 161
punitive awards for which the appeals process was completed,
423 See RUSTAD, supra note 418, at 23, 25.
424 See id. at 29.
425 See id. at 28,45. Moreover, "punitive damages occur much less frequently than
is believed," and in the Rustad study of products liability cases from 1965-1990, only
355 cases were found in which punitive damages were awarded. Id. If asbestos cases
are controlled for, the number of awards per year over the last six years has actually
been falling. See id. at 23, 43.
426 The data for Table VI come from RUSTAD, supra note 418, at 29, 32 (dollar
figures are not adjusted for inflation).
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slightly over one half were reduced or reversed by an appellate
court.427 Another 126 verdicts settled while awaiting appeal.428
Thirty-seven percent of plaintiffs received no punitive damages on
appeal.429 In those cases where awards were received, median
damages were reduced as shown in Table VI. Compensatory
damages were reduced to about 40% of the jury's original award and
punitives to about 20%. For appealed cases, the ratio of punitives
to compensatories fell to about 0.6:1.
Rustad took the additional rare step of examining the factual
findings in the cases. In only 7% of the cases was the plaintiff
found contributorily negligent.430  In almost every case, the
plaintiff was seriously injured or killed by the product. There were
deaths in 27% of the cases and permanent disability in 54%.431
In only 7% of the cases were the plaintiffs only temporarily and
partially disabled.43 2
Factual findings in the 355 cases included instances of fraudu-
lent affirmative misconduct (18 cases), knowing violations of safety
standards (27 cases), inadequate testing and quality control in
manufacture (44 cases), failure to warn of known dangers (137
cases), and post-marketing failure to redesign, recall, or reduce the
risk of a known danger (120 cases). "Smoking memos" that
prompted punitive awards gave evidence of: explicit knowledge of
dangerous defects, efforts to conceal damaging evidence, files of
large numbers of injuries produced by the product that were not
accompanied by corrective action, and explicit decisions to continue
marketing highly dangerous products rather than make inexpensive
corrections.
433
427 See id. at 31-32.
428 See id.
429 See id.
450 See id. at 34; see also Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Lay Perceptions of
Business Responsibility for Harm, Paper Presented to the Joint Meetings of the Law
and Society Association and the Research Committee on the Sociology of Law of the
International Sociological Association 14 (June 20, 1991) (copies available from the
Division of CriminalJustice, University of Delaware) (compiling extensive interviews
with juries in various kinds of civil trials in Delaware and finding that they generally
are suspicious of the motives of plaintiffs and protective of defendants).
431 See RUSTAD, supra note 418, at 34.
432 See id.
433 See id. at 7-10 (citing examples including a manufacturer's knowledge that one
of its ladders had a tendency to collapse and a drug company's decision to continue
marketing a drug despite an FDA recommendation that it be recalled).
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Whichever of these studies of punitive damages strikes the most
fear in the hearts of defendants, the results are far more tame than
one might have expected given the impressions created in the minds
of the public and policy-makers. 3 4 In light of the empirical
evidence, the more interesting questions might be how such
mistaken beliefs came about and how the level of fear rose to the
heights that it has.
2. Accounting for Increases in Jury Awards
Contrary to the data and the analysis discussed in the preceding
section, let us assume that large and wide-ranging increases in jury
damage awards did in fact occur. What could explain them? More
than a few discussions of the asserted problem proceed along lines
that appear illogical on their face, such as attributing increases to
the existence of contingency fees. 435  Somewhat more plausible
are explanations suggesting that some sort of cultural shift in
attitudes and behavior has brought more cases into a system whose
decision-makers, especially jurors, have themselves grown more
hospitable to plaintiffs. Perhaps the most plausible of the explana-
tions focuses on changes in the substantive law of torts, which
434 See supra notes 390-91 and accompanying text.
4s5 For example, one commentator has stated: "There is no question that
'contingent-fee cases are in large measure responsible for the explosion in malpractice
cases. Combined with the huge sums juries award all too readily these days,
contingent-fee cases are in large measure responsible for the astronomical increase
in malpractice insurance premiums.'" Mosberg, supra note 53, at 863 (quoting Trial
Lanyers Should Trolfor Responsibility Not Victims, PHYSICIAN'S TRAVEL MEETING GUIDE,
Summer 1985, at 136-37). What requires explanation is how a practice that "by 1881
... was said to be an 'all but universal custom of the profession'" could produce a
sudden "explosion" now. John Fleming, The Contingent Fee and its Effect on American
Tort Law, in BUTTERWORTH LECTURES, 1988, at 50,55 (1989) (quotingNote, 13 CENT.
L.J. 381,381 (1881). Whatever the wisdom or folly of contingency fees, showing that
a constant can produce so dramatic a change requires more than merely asserting it
to be so. Moreover, would legislated decreases in contingency fees reduce the
number of cases accepted and filed by personal injury lawyers, or would it increase
the number (as they seek to maintain their incomes by enlarging their portfolio of
cases whose yield has been reduced)? The little serious research that exists on the
subject has found that the behavior of lawyers working under contingency fee
arrangements does not differ from that of lawyers working for hourly fees. See
Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Impact of Fee Arrangements on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 251, 251-52 (1985) (finding that in low stakes cases (under $6000)
contingency fee lawyers spend less time on cases than hourly fee lawyers, that in
higher stakes cases there is no significant difference in effort expended, and
concluding that "simple hypotheses about the relationship between fee arrangements
and the way lawyers handle civil cases are misleading at best").
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increase the pool of actionable injuries (perhaps allowing plaintiffs'
lawyers to select a pricier set of cases 'to bring to trial).4 6
None of these explanations can be tested rigorously without
controlling for confounds, that is, changes that are concurrent with
changes in the variables hypothesized to cause changes in
awards.437 Only by taking into account and controlling or adjust-
ing for these confounds can we rationally assess the impact of
intrinsically legal variables such as -legal rules or the system's
decision-makers. In addition, plausible rival hypotheses derived
from consideration of the system's milieu externe need to be
identified and studied in their own right if a real understanding of
the behavior of the litigation system is ever to be approached.45 8
Most of the plausible rival explanations I present-in contrast to
virtually all of the explanations that now dominate the public and
policy discussions about the litigation system-grow out of the
notion that changes in awards (and settlements, for that matter) can
arise from entirely normal, probably even desirable, social, econom-
ic, or technological developments outside the legal system. Other
of my rival explanations suggest the occurrence of changes in the
legal system that are far less malignant than those most widely dis-
cussed,45 9 some of which may even be viewed as improvements.
436 Such discussions are found throughout the literature of the liability "explo-
sion." Seesupra notes 23-27 and accompanying text (reporting the opinions ofvarious
commentators concerning why lawsuits have increased at an alarming rate). Typically,
the explosion is assumed or argued on the basis of a few factlets or factoids; changes
in substantive law are offered as the explanation for the assumed explosion, and then
a far wider array of changes is offered to cure the perceived problem. As we have
seen, research that has attempted to document the effect of some of these legal
changes has found some, but not others, to be associated with increases in frequency
and severity of claims. See, e.g., supra note 6.4 37 See generally DONALD T. CAMPBELL &JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND
QUAsi-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 16-21 (1963) (describinghow confounds
may lead to mistaken inferences of causation); THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T.
CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN AND ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD
SETTINGS 59-60 (1979) (defining "confounding" as the "possibility that the operations
which are meant to represent a particular cause or effect construct can be construed
in terms of more than one construct, each of which is stated at the same level of
reduction"); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 33-82 (2d ed. 1990) (explaining how rival hypotheses may threaten
the internal validity of research and, therefore, how research should be designed to
eliminate them).
438 In all likelihood, controlling for changes in the system's milieu externe is
necessary in order to see these latter changes in the system's milieu interne more
clearly
43. .Here is an example-from an advertisement placed by the Aetna Insurance
Company-that is not as extreme as it may seem, given a climate that is rhetorically
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They explain increases in jury awards as a result either of a change
in the mix of cases reaching trial or a change in the information
juries have about the cases.
A broad rival explanation is that over time more serious injuries
and losses have been coming to trial. Even if nothing at all has
changed in the way cases are tried or how juries decide them, if the
cases themselves have changed so that they involve greater losses,
it should not be surprising to find juries awarding more compensa-
tion.440  One study that attempted to measure not only the
amount of awards, but the attributes of the cases themselves,
provides evidence consistent with this explanation. 44 1  Gases
going to trial in more recent years, in the aggregate, may have
involved relatively more serious injuries and more expensive
medical costs than cases earlier in the time series.
442
A change in case mix may also be reflected in certain changes
in the relative number of different categories of torts that come to
trial. Peterson has noted: "Most of [the] variation [in awards
between types of cases] reflects differences in plaintiffs' injuries.
Plaintiffs who based their claims on malpractice, on injuries from
defective products, or on workplace accidents were more likely to
have severe and disabling injuries." 443 If juries are presented with
more cases from the high stakes categories and fewer from the low
stakes categories than they once were and they continue to decide
cases as they did before, we should expect the size of awards to
increase, and a gradual shift in category distribution is just what was
found. Although awards may appear to be going up over time,
when disaggregated into case types a remarkable sameness is found
across two decades of jury awards.
444
thick and empirically thin: "America's civil liability system has gone berserk." Aetna
on the Lawsuit Crisis and Your Insurance, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1986, at 9.
440 See, e.g., COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES, supra note 346, at vi ("[T]he size ofjury
awards was strongly related to the amount of medical specials [the total of all past
medical expenses related to a plaintiff's injuries], a relationship that was clearly
shown."). Peterson also notes that "[a]wards increased more rapidly than medical
[special damages]." Id.
441 See id. at viii-ix.
442 See id. at 50 (suggesting that the more than threefold increase in medical
special damages from 1960 to the late 1970s "suggests either that catastrophic injuries
worsened in recent years or that the plaintiffs received more (or more expensive)
medical care").
443 Id. at vii.
444 See id. at ix.
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What, in turn, could be responsible for such changes in case
mix? One possibility is that the injury base rate has enlarged over
the past generation. As discussed earlier, even if tort law remained
constant, and had not enlarged the circle of cases in which a
defendant would be liable, the sheer number or rate of actionable
injuries may have increased. 445 A few products that produce mass
injuries are enough to flood the system with cases. If nothing else
in the world changed except an increase in the initial pool of
actionable injuries, an increase injury awards would result. Because
of the enlarged injury base, more cases would be brought to lawyers;
those in which the evidence was more clear or the damages more
severe, or both, would be selected by lawyers for filing; and
eventually portions of that enhanced sample of cases would wind up
in front of judges and juries. If the number of actionable injuries
grew faster than the number of personal injury lawyers, then the
subset of cases filed would become richer.
Even if the base of actionable injuries has remained constant,
more of those cases may be arriving on lawyers' doorsteps.
Particularly in higher stakes cases, such as medical malpractice and
product liability, where the proportion of injuries complained of has
been low, there is considerable room for that complaint rate to
rise.446 If claiming has risen from 4% of actionable injuries to 8%
in some area of torts, that is a 100% increase in potential cases
presenting themselves to lawyers. This effectively increases the pool
of injuries from which attorneys may choose cases, and if they
accept or reject cases just as they always have, we should expect the
cases selected for filing, and eventual trial, to become a richer mix.
Alternatively, assume that the base rate of injuries and the
claiming behavior of injury victims have remained constant, but that
lawyers have become more efficient and business-like in selecting
cases from an unchanging assortment of potential plaintiffs. This
scenario is the convergence of economic self-interest and exclu-
sionary gate-keeping. Ironically, the suggestion that lawyers should
tell clients that some cases ought not to be brought or that they
should not file claims involving less serious losses is precisely what
445 See supra notes 64-101 and accompanying text (discussing the base rate of
injuries).
446 See supra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing the base rate of
actionable injuries and the proportion of those who bring claims). For example,
greater awareness of and education about the legal system may lead to an increased
proportion of medical malpractice claims being filed.
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would produce the increases in trial awards of which commentators
are complaining, by changing the case mix to a richer one.
4 47
Whether the hypothesized changes in case mix are caused by an
enlarged pool of actionable injuries, changed claiming patterns by
injury victims, more discriminating case-selection by attorneys, or
perhaps a growing tendency to settle less serious cases, no one yet
knows. Whichever may be the cause, however, all would imply that
the litigation system is being used for more, rather than less, serious
matters: fewer minor claims brought by complainants; more
stringent gate-keeping by lawyers; or negotiations which remove the
less serious cases from the system.
Even if the case mix remained identical, another quite different
set of changes could alter what is presented to juries. For example,
even if the case mix has not changed to present more serious
injuries to juries, the cost of treating the injuries has changed. This
is not a product of mere inflation in medical care costs, but a
reflection of qualitative strides in the ability to treat injuries. The
more treatments available, and the more sophisticated those
treatments, the more they are likely to cost.448  In addition,
improvements in the effectiveness of treatment, so that people
survive accidents that earlier would have killed them, has an impact
on accident costs.44 9  The larger the proportion of accident
447 Economic self-interest already propels attorneys in the direction that is
simultaneously complained of ("awards are too high") and encouraged ("just take
large, serious cases").
448 Moreover, as life expectancy increases, some components of damages will
increase commensurately, such as lifetime care for the seriously and permanently
disabled.
449 For example, important strides have been made in recent decades in the
treatment of head and spinal cord injuries. Many who once would have died from
their injuries now survive. "The improvements in methods of resuscitation that have
taken place during the last 40 years or so have abolished the previously fatalistic
readiness to accept that a week or two in coma after a head injury was virtually a
sentence to death .... " RUTH GARNER, ACUTE HEAD INJURY: PRACTICAL MANAGE-
MENT IN REHABILITATION at xiii (1990). But "the price of success, in saving lives, was
a population of cerebral cripples that was increasing at a rate of 1000 or more a year
throughout the country." Id. "Advances in emergency evacuation and neurosurgical
management of head injury have reduced mortality, resulting in a large population
of chronically disabled survivors." NEUROBEHAVIORAL RECOVERY FROM HEAD INJURY,
at vii (Harvey S. Levin et al. eds., 1987). Moreover, "[t]he medical problems of
patients who survive head injury are enormous, and the socioeconomic impact on our
society is staggering." Rebecca W. Rimel et al., Characteristics of the Head Injured
Patient, in REHABILITATION OF THE ADULT AND CHILD WITH TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY
8, 8 (Mitchell Rosenthal et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990). "Typically, the cost of acute care for
the first two years for a patient with a head injury is $435,000 .... It may cost over
$4 million to care for a child with a head injury over their lifetime .... " Evelyn
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victims who live and the smaller the proportion that die, the greater
the aggregate damages defendants can expect to pay.450  Thus,
highly desirable changes, particularly in medical technology and
technique, should be expected to generate more and more expen-
sive lawsuits.
Quite a different possibility is that over time, plaintiffs' lawyers
might be producing higher awards by doing a more competent job
of preparing the damages portion of their cases for trial. An
important study of mandatory pre-trial settlement conferences
found that while pre-trial conferences had no effect on the
likelihood of settlement or the ratio of liability verdicts, it was
producing larger awards.451 The most plausible explanation is
that the settlement conference was enabling plaintiffs' lawyers to see
the imperfections in their cases relating to damages and to prepare
themselves more fully for trial than if they had not gone through
the exercise of the conference. If other courts have adopted
comparable methods of trying to promote settlements,452 or if
plaintiffs' lawyers have otherwise improved the presentation of their
damages case, the expected effect would be larger damage awards.
Gilbert, American Re Urges Cyclists To Use Helmets, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP. &
CASUALTY/EMPLOYEE BENEFITS EDITION, Aug. 12, 1991, at 4. Most victims of head
and spinal cord injuries are young (aged 15-29, see Rimel, supra, at 9) so 40-45 years
of care would not be unusual.
450 Furthermore, the living victims and their families are more likely to sue. See
supra text accompanying note 122 (reporting The California Medical Association's
finding that moderately to seriously injured malpractice victims were between two and
three times more likely to file suits than were the families of persons who died as a
result of negligent injuries).
45 1 See MAURICE ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVEJUSTICE:
A CONTROLLED TEST IN PERsONAL INJURY LITIGATION 58-67 (1964). Another result
of mandatory pre-trial settlement conferences was that demand on judges' time went
up, contrary to expectation. See id. at 45-58. In light of the study's findings, New
Jersey terminated the pre-trial conference innovation.
452 The Vice-President has recommended the following pre-trial system:
We believe the system should provide a "multidoor courthouse," where
parties have options other than formal litigation. This idea builds on much
of the ABA's important work on this subject. The... recommendation [of
the President's Council on Competitiveness] is that before the machinery of
litigation kicks in, both sides sit down together-with a mediator or in a
conference where they tell their stories to an experienced lawyer volunteer-
ing his or her time. The object would be to probe the issues carefully but
informally, and to weigh the chances for concluding the matter as quickly
as possible and without a trial. In line with this procedure, alternative
dispute resolution would be made more widely available.
Quayle, supra note 13, at 15.
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Any change that helped jurors to more accurately compute
damages is likely to operate to increase awards. Kalven long ago
suggested that a more detailed description of damages, as opposed
to a rough guestimation, could lead to larger awards: "If one
seriously assesses the components in a case of any magnitude, they
are likely to add up to a surprisingly large figure."453 More recent
research on how juries reach award amounts confirms that those
who use the component approach usually arrive at a larger sum than
those who try to arrive at a single global estimate. 45 4 A partial
explanation may be that intuitive decision-makers tend to overlook
cost items and to underestimate cost projections.
The more jurors are left to their own devices, the more they
tend to use simple linear calculation strategies, such as multiplying
the number of years lost by the amount of earnings and perhaps
adding something for inflation, raises, and so on. 455 As Figure
VIII illustrates, even when jurors try to make exponential adjust-
ments intuitively,456 they usually underestimate the actual amount
by a considerable margin.4 57  The more they are given sound
quantitative guidance to understand the actual exponential growth
of the amounts they are trying to project (e.g., future lost earnings,
future treatment costs), the more the gap between the typical
intuitive under-estimation and the actual amount will be re-
duced.458 This refinement of calculations could come about in
numerous ways, such as from testimony by an economic expert,
459
453 See Harry Kalven,Jr., The Juy, the Law, and the Personal Injuty Damage Award,
19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158, 161-62 (1958). Moreover, as Kalven noted, "I take it this is one
reason why the plaintiffbar sometimes expresses a preference for the accountant type
juror in a case where damages are substantial and well documented." Id. at 162.
454 See, e.g., Jane Goodman et al., Runaway Verdicts or Reasoned Determinations:
Mock Juror Strategies in Awarding Damages, 29JURIMETRICSJ. 285, 295, 298-300 (1989)
(finding that the jury technique of picking a "fair number" without calculations
corresponded to comparatively smaller damage awards).
455 See id. at 301.
456 See Figure VIII supra accompanying note 248. Examples of such adjustments
include calculating the effects of inflation or raises compounded over a period of
years.457 A well-established finding of cognitive psychology is that people have difficulty
intuiting exponential growth. See Gideon Keren, Cultural Differences in the Mispercep.
tion of Exponential Growth, in 3 PERCEPTION AND PsYcHopHYsics 289, 289-92 (1983);
see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
458 Recall the finding that, on average, jury awards reflect an underestimate of
actual losses, especially when the losses are large. See supra notes 234-56 and
accompanying text.
459 Here are the findings of the Raitz et al. experiment described earlier. Seesupra
note 321 and accompanying text. Jurors determining damages without guidance
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more educational closing statements by counsel, or more financially
sophisticated jurors. 460 Accordingly, we might expect larger
damages with the increased use of economics experts, a better
educated pool of jurors, 461 more economically or statistically
literate attorneys, or simply more sophisticated urban jurors.
46 2
No doubt other plausible explanations for rising damage awards
could be found that similarly involve natural, normal, and often
desirable changes within and outside of the legal process. To date,
few have been proposed, fewer have been discussed, and barely any
have had the benefit of empirical testing.
A less obvious change has been a reduction in the size of civil
juries that occurred during the 1970s. Many states and most federal
districts reduced the size of their juries from twelve to six. The
effect of reducing the size of a sample, in this case ajury, is obvious
to those with statistical acumen: variability in verdicts and awards
will increase; unexpectedly high awards (and unexpectedly low
awards) will increase in size and frequency. An elementary
phenomenon of sampling theory is that as sample size decreases, the
sampling distribution's variance will increase. All other things being
equal, when jury sizes are reduced by half (from twelve to six),
damage awards would increase in variance by a factor of 1.41.463
arrived at a mean of $366,000. See Raitz et al., supra note 321, at 390-91. With
plaintiff's expert witness explaining "$719,354" and the defense arguing "$321,000,"
jurors arrived at an award of $700,000. See id. With plaintiff's expert explaining
"$719,354" and a defense expert explaining "$321,000,"juries arrived at an award of
$630,000. See id. Apparently, once the exponential calculation genie is out of the
bottle, even a rebuttal expert cannot put it back in.
460 Jurors who have IRAs, have seen graphs depicting the effect of compounding
or the ravages of inflation, or have taken a course in economics or accounting, might
acquire a better feel for exponential estimation.
461 This results from modernjury selection systems, such as the one-day, one-trial
system, and implies, incidentally, that as the level of education improves jury awards
would rise.
462 For a discussion of the findings on the relationship between urbanization and
medical malpractice litigation, see DANZON, supra note 6, at 74-75, 82-83.
46' The standard error of a sampling distribution is obtained by dividing the
population standard deviation by the square root of the size of the samples being
drawn from that population. If the denominator is made smaller, the quotient
becomes larger (intuitively, as samples get smaller, the error variation grows larger).
If samples are reduced in size from twelve to six, that is a reduction by exactly one
half. Reducing the denominator by exactly halfis the same as increasing the quotient
by exactly the square root of the reciprocal of one half, that is, the square root of 2.
The square root of 2 is 1.41, or an increase in error variation in awards of 41%.
There is also a considerable legal and academic literature on the subject, of
which only a few sources need be cited. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223,
232-39 (1978) (discussing the point made in the text); HANS & VIDMAR, supra note
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FIGURE XIII
46
CHANGES IN VARIABILITY IN COOK COUNTY
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AWARDs
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One illustration of the type of effect that would be expected is
provided by medical malpractice data from Rand's Cook County
research, presented in Figure XIII. Note that the line reflecting
changes over time in the amount of the ninetieth percentile of
awards has swung upward and the one reflecting the tenth percen-
tile has swung downward. This is the statistical picture that often
has been more vaguely described as an increased unpredictability in
309, at 165-76 (examining the impact of a reduction injury size and stating that "six-
person juries are four times as likely to have extremely low or extremely high average
damage awards"); Saks, Enhancing and Restraining Accuracy, supra note 301, at 249.
464 Figure XIII is adapted from PETERSON & PRIEsT, supra note 293, at 35.
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trial outcomes. 4 65 As lawyers realize that jury awards have be-
come less predictable, settlements are likely to reflect the same
volatility. In the face of trial unpredictability that seems to come
from nowhere, insurers began planning for an uncertain future by
raising premiums and bolstering reserves.
466
This problem of growing unpredictability due to the advent of
smaller juries has been understood for quite some time467 and
was even predicted. The cure, the way to restore the familiar level
of predictability, is simple and straightforward: Restore juries to
their traditional size.
3. Evaluating Civil Damage Awards
The central question to be asked is the same one that has long
been asked about juries: Do they make reasonable, rational
decisions? Superficial data regarding trends of jury awards are
incapable of answering the question. Such data demonstrate effects,
but leave the causes to speculation. Apparent increases may be the
result of growing juror munificence or a changing array of cases
involving greater losses (which the jurors are pricing as correctly or
as incorrectly as ever).468
The most visible studies of jury awards have provided data on
naked, superficial trends in the amounts of awards. As has been
discussed in some detail already, such studies tell us nothing about
jury decision-making. We need something against which to
compare the jury awards, some controls, some benchmarks.
When jury awards are compared to actual plaintiff losses, the
finding is that for relatively small losses, awards are excessive and
465 See, e.g., Richard J. Haayen, Destroying Myths, in WORKING TOWARD A FAIRER
CIvILJUsTICE SYSTEM 16, 20 (Insurance Info. Inst. ed., 1987) ("The problem is that
the liability system appears to be capricious to the point where the insurers' ability
to predict the real probabilities of liability outcomes has been weakened substantial-
ly.").
466 See MINN. CLAIM STUDY, supra note 385, at 17-20.467 See Hans Zeisel, ...And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the FederalJuty,
38 U. Cm. L. REv. 710, 717-19 (1971) (exhibiting data showing a wider variation in
six-member jury verdicts and discussing the impact of this variation on lawyers).
468 Indeed, if the cases grew in value faster than thejurors grew more stingy, their
growing miserliness would be hidden behind a curtain of superficially rising awards.
The more detailed kinds of questions that must be answered include: How well
do jurors do? Compared to what? How close do awards come to actual losses? Since
the case-specific goal of tort law is to try to "make whole" the victim of an actionable
injury, the least one may expect of ajury is that where it finds liability to exist, the
plaintiff's economic losses should be fully compensated.
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for relatively high losses, awards fall short.469 On average, awards
undercompensate losses. A recent study of medical malpractice
awards found that each one percent increase in loss resulted in an
additional one-tenth to one-twentieth of a percent increase in
award. 470
The benchmarks most often used to assess jury awards have
been decisions of other decision-makers in comparable circumstanc-
es. We previously discussed the research of Kalven and Zeisel in
regard to the rate of judge-jury agreement on liability verdicts.47 1
When judge and jury both decided for the plaintiff, juries awarded
more damages than judges would have 52% of the time, while
judges awarded more 39% of the time and they were in approximate
agreement 9% of the time.4 72 Overall, juries awarded 20% more
money than judges would have.478 Similarly, recent findings by
the National Center for State Courts found that jury awards in tort
trials were higher than judges' awards. 474 Who came closer to the
"correct" amount? We cannot say.475
Other studies raise the possibility that jurors arrive at lower
damage awards than judges, arbitrators, and administrators. In
comparing recent federal data, Clermont and Eisenberg discovered
that in federal trials where liability has been found, judges tended
to make larger awards than juries in personal injury cases and lower
469 See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
470 See Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 388, at 1019.
471 See supra notes 295-301 and accompanying text.
472 See Kalven, supra note 299, at 1065.
473 See id.
474 See Rottman, supra note 195, at 11 (finding that the median forjury awards was
$26,213 and forjudge awards was $8500 while the mean forjury awards was $108,181
and forjudge awards was $37,368). A familiar caution should be repeated, however.
Unlike the Kalven and Zeisel research design, see KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 295,
at 45-54, these juries and judges were deciding different cases, and there is no way
to know if the cases were comparable or if selection biases associated with counsel
strategy gave apples to juries and oranges to judges.
475 For economic damages, the available research suggests that trials as well as
settlements generally produce undercompensation. See supra notes 234-63 and
accompanying text. For other components, such as pain and suffering, the answer
necessarily is a matter ofjudgment. For this, the question can either be how close
or far the jury, as representative of the community, comes to what the community's
judgment would have been (a subject on which the reader may refer to the discussion
of the disruptive effects of reduced jury size, see supra notes 463-67 and accompanying
text). On the other hand, the judgment can be more normative, prescribed by a
legislature or court. So far, our system of civil justice has favored a democratic jury
system backstopped by ajudge. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct.
1032, 1043-44 (1991) (upholding the common law jury assessment of punitive
damages).
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awards in non-personal injury cases.476 When the verdict ratio is
incorporated to yield an "actual return ratio," it becomes even
clearer that personal injury plaintiffs beforejudges fared better than
those before juries.47 7 By this measure, virtually all types of
personal injury trials before ajudge yield larger awards for plaintiffs
than trials before juries do.478 The most pronounced categories
of cases are medical malpractice (1.78 times as much before judges
as before juries), motor vehicle (1.48), and product liability
(1.32). 479
Several other, better controlled, studies produce results
consistent with the conclusion that jurors are among the more
miserly of trial decision-makers. Vidmar presented the same North
Carolina medical malpractice case-in which the defendant admitted
liability but disputed the amount of damages-to a sample of
professional arbitrators and to samples ofjurors from two different
cities. 480 The arbitrators, as compared to jurors, awarded signifi-
cantly more money and came closer to the actual amount awarded
in the case by the actual arbitrators.
481
Indiana, as part of its reforms capping medical malpractice
awards at a maximum of $500,000 for all damages, instituted a
professionally administered patient compensation fund to decide all
losses above $100,000.482 Contrary to expectations, malpractice
awards in Indiana came to average one third higher than those of
its neighbors, Michigan and Ohio, which retained traditional
malpractice systems.483 Why? One possibility is that professional
476 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 15 (reporting data for the period 1979
through 1989). Clermont and Eisenberg found the following notable exceptions to
the trend: medical malpractice cases (wherejudges andjuries give nearly equivalent
awards) and product liability cases (where juries give larger awards). See id.
477 The inclusion of the verdict ratio adjusts the amounts awarded by judges and
juries for the probability of winning a case before one versus the other.478 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 15.
479 See id. The warning about confounding of case selection with decision-maker
type, mentioned in reference to the NCSC study, see supra note 474, applies with
equal force to these data.
480 See Neil Vidmar, Medical MalpracticeJuries, DuKE L. MAc., Summer 1991, at 8,
12.
481 See id. at 12.
482 See Eleanor D. Kinney & William P. Gronfein, Indiana's Malpractice System: No-
Fault by Accident?, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring 1991, at 169, 172-74.
For claims filed after January 1, 1990, the cap rises to $750,000. See id. at 172.
Malpractice insurance covers settlements or awards up to $100,000. Compensation
above that amount, up to the limit of the cap, is decided by and paid out of a
professionally administered patient compensation fund. See id. at 174.
483 See id. at 182 (mean awards were about $400,000 in Indiana compared to about
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administrators are better able than jurors to calculate damages, and
therefore come closer to the correct (and higher) amount.
Another benchmark is the comparison of jury awards to
negotiated settlements of cases from the same pool. One study had
two sets of cases, one composed of complex, higher stakes cases and
the other of simpler, lower stakes cases. The study found that
lawyers settled cases from the more complex set for a mean of
$15,800 and from the less complex set for a mean of $5800-a 3:1
ratio.48 4  The mean jury award for the first set of cases was
$24,300 and for the second set $8600-the same 3:1 ratio.48 5 This
suggests that lawyers and jurors respond similarly to given sets of
cases and reflects the expected (though not always found) discount
for settlements.
Yet another way to ask about the reasonableness of juror
decisions is to ask whether juries treat like cases alike. On the face
of it, for example, jurors appear to award a surcharge against
defendants who are "deep pockets," that is, wealthy defendants such
as those in product liability, medical malpractice, and worker injury
cases, as well as cases where the government is a defendant. The
first systematic empirical tests of this contention were conducted by
researchers at Rand.48 6 They found that "[a]wards in work injury
or product liability cases were 10 times larger than in automobile
accident cases, and were 25 times larger if the cases combined
product liability and work injury claims."
48 7
But these researchers recognized the possibility that the injuries
in cases filed against deep pocket defendants may be more serious
than those in other cases, and therefore would produce predictably
larger awards. As they suspected, injuries differed according to tort
$300,000 in Michigan and Ohio). Kinney and Gronfein suggest that the Indiana
system has inadvertently become a no-fault system, with insurers compensating many
claimants in amounts sufficient to make them eligible for the patient compensation
fund, and then the fund administrators follow their statutory mandate to assume
liability and consider only the value of the plaintiff's losses in paying damages. This
can explain why Indiana pays a higher frequency of large claims than its neighbors
and the nation generally, but it does not explain why the award amounts are higher
than comparison states with common law tort systems.
484 See INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., A COMPARISON OF SIX- AND TWELvE-
MEMBER CrVILJURIES IN NEW JERSEY SUPERIOR AND COUNTY COURTS 24 (1972).
485 See id.
486 See AUDREY CHIN & MARK A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO
WINS IN COOK COUNTYJURY TRIALS 41-45 (1985); COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES, Supra
note 346, at vii.
487 See COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES, supra note 346, at vii.
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type.48 8 Death or permanent disability were more likely in medi-
cal malpractice (55% of malpractice cases), product liability (48%),
or work injury (40%) cases.489 "Plaintiffs who based their claims
on malpractice, on injuries from defective products, or on work-
place accidents were more likely to have severe and disabling inju-
ries."490 All other categories of cases tended to involve substan-
tially less serious injuries. 491 Indeed, two thirds of the variation
in awards disappears when differences in plaintiffs' injuries are
taken into account.
Nevertheless, after controlling statistically for the severity of
plaintiffs' injuries in a set of California cases, some difference in the
size of awards remained. 492  After comparing approximately
similar injuries across different categories of cases, "[p]laintiffs in
malpractice, product liability, and work injury cases still received
two to four times the compensation that their counterparts received
in other cases." 493 Chin and Peterson concluded that while most
of the difference in awards between deep pocket and individual
defendants reflects objective differences in the injuries, after
controlling for those differences, larger awards still were assessed
against some kinds of defendants (professionals, corporations,
government) as opposed to others (individuals).494 We might take
from this study two lessons. One lesson is that a huge amount of
the apparent difference between awards against deep pocket
defendants and shallow pocket defendants is due to a large
difference in the severity of injuries suffered by the respective
plaintiffs. A second lesson is that some difference appears to
488 See id. at 32-37.
489 See id. at 33. Indeed, these more serious injuries resulted in higher awards.
See id. at 34-37. Furthermore, defendants named in these higher stakes cases tended
to be corporations rather than individuals. See id. at 37.
490 Id. at vii.
491 See id. at 33.
492 See id. at 35-37. The researchers adjusted the data to make sure that the
comparisons were between apples and apples (cases involving comparable injuries)
so that the effects of the defendant's wealth were not confounded with the
seriousness of the injuries.493 Id. at vii. Government defendants paid 15% more than corporations and 50%
more than individuals. See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 486, at vii. Juries were
approximately 30% "more generous to plaintiffs who sued corporations for injuries
that were not extraordinarily severe" than if they sued individuals for the same injury.
Id. With severe injuries, the "deep pocket" effect tended to be more pronounced:
corporations were required to pay 4.4 times what individuals were. See id.
494 See CHIN & PETERSON, supra note 486, at 58.
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remain even after cases are equated for injuries. In the end, deep
pockets are assessed more.
495
As Hans has pointed out, important questions remain.
496
Why assume that the lower awards assessed against individual
defendants are the correct ones and the larger ones include a
surcharge? Does the residual difference represent a surcharge
against deep pockets or a discount to shallow pockets? Hans
suggests that the difference between awards against corporate and
individual defendants in cases involving the same degree of injuries
may be the result not of surcharging corporate and professional
defendants, but of giving discounts to individual defendants.
497
Recall the findings of other research we have reviewed showing that
in general juries undercompensate for economic losses, even against
deep pocket defendants. 498  If the larger awards come closer to
the actual value of the plaintiff's losses, it makes more sense to
think of the lower awards against individual defendants as being still
deeper discounts.
49 9
Hans and Ermann have attempted to explain the observed
difference that remains even after controlling for objective differ-
ences in the injuries. 50 0 By conducting trial simulations using
cases identical but for whether the defendant was an individual or
a corporation, they found evidence of the following explanation.
The superior resources of deep pocket defendants implies a greater
capacity to foresee and control harmful consequences. This
perception leads jurors to assign greater intentionality or reckless-
ness when a professional or corporation injures someone than when
an ordinary individual does so. At the same time, the organizational
character of a defendant lowers the perceived responsibility of any
495 If injuries and injury costs were measured more precisely, or if additional
control variables were included, some additional portion of the apparent difference
would no doubt disappear. For example, lawyers in higher stakes cases may do a
better job of proving damages or hire an economist expert witness. See supra notes
458-62 and accompanying text. On the other hand, some of the difference would
remain.4 96 See Valerie P. Hans, The Juiy's Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 177, 202.
497 See id. at 195.
498 See supra notes 234-63 and accompanying text.
499 These discounts are inappropriate, it would seem, from the viewpoint of the
law of remedies. Plaintiffs should not be further disadvantaged merely because a
defendant is an individual with relatively limited resources.
5 00 See Valerie P. Hans & M. David Ermann, Responses to Corporate Versus Individual
Wrongdoing, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 151, 158-59 (1989).
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single individual within the organization. Hans's experimental
studies, in which the defendant was either "Mr. Jones" or the "Jones
Corp.," found thatjury verdicts were related to perceived intention-
ality or recklessness, but were not correlated with perceptions of
financial resources. 50 1  These results suggest that the "deep
pocket effect" might well be renamed the "perceived responsibility
effect."
Such differences in perceived knowledge and control may
reasonably affect liability verdicts, but ought not affect the size of
damages. Yet, they do affect awards. Greene has suggested that
jury awards reflect a fusion of liability and damages; how blamewor-
thy the defendant is seen to be affects the size of the award. °2
Hans and Ermann's findings can be interpreted by the fusion
phenomenon: Because corporations were perceived as more
blameworthy, they were assessed higher damages.
In the preceding section on liability verdicts, I noted that a large
body of research suggests that juries' decisions are rational at least
in the sense that they are responsive to the evidence and arguments
placed before them.503 One study makes this point clear with
respect to damages. Peterson conducted further analyses of Rand's
Cook County data, trying to make sense of variation in damage
awards.50 4 He found that "[]ury awards are closely related to the
amount of medical specials." 50 5 Medical expenses as predictors
of total jury awards produced a multiple correlation coefficient of
.51.506 When injury severity, lost income, and case type were
used to predict total awards, they did so across two decades with a
multiple correlation of .51.507
501 See id. at 159-61.
502 See Edith Greene, Onjuries and Damage Awards: The Process of Decision-making,
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 225, 227-46 (reviewing the small body of
literature on damage awards). For further evidence of fusion, see Dale W. Broeder,
The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744, 757-59 (1959) (citing jury
interviews in which jurors indicated that blameworthiness affected the amount of
compensatory damages awarded); Kalven, supra note 453, at 167 (noting that "jurors
... may simply fuse the liability and damage issues sufficiently to shade their estimate
of the damages").
503 The evidence in this section suggests that if we are to characterize jury
decisions as irrational, the ways in which that is most obviously true are that juries
undercompensate for losses (probably because of poor exponential adjustment and
by overlooking damage components) and fuse blameworthiness with compensation
amount.
5o4 See COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES, supra note 346, at iii-iv.
505 Id. at 23.
506 See id. at 90.
507 See id. at 91 (relating that for the 1960s this figure was .49k and for the 1970s
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What can we conclude from these findings? On the one hand,
these jury awards were, to a considerable extent, predictable by
knowing something about the evidence with which the juries were
confronted, namely, the severity of the injuries and losses. This is
far more sensible decision-making than many who comment on jury
awards would have us believe. 508 Simply looking at medical bills
and placing injuries into a few broad categories transformed Rand's
Cook County data from a picture that "fueled existing concerns
about 'runaway verdicts '"' 50 9 into findings showing that "[t]he size
of jury awards was strongly related to the amount of medical
specials, a relationship that was clearly shown."
510
On the other hand, if half of the variation in awards has been
accounted for, half has not. No doubt the predictability of awards
could be improved by identifying and including more predictor
variables. 511 But those holding juries to a standard approaching
perfection would soon find at least two grounds for renewing their
criticisms. First, some of the additional predictor variables would
turn out to be, if not irrational, at least disapproved of by the law
it was .52). These numbers will take on considerable meaning in subsequent
paragraphs. For the moment, their definition will have to suffice: These numbers
represent the proportion of variance in the dependent variable (in this instance, the
jury's total award) accounted for by the variables being used to try to predict it. They
may be thought of as percentages. In this first example, 51% of the variance in
awards was accounted for by knowing the victim's medical expenses.
508 See, e.g., Mosberg, supra note 53, at 873 ("[T]he amount of award should be
commensurate with the damages that have been sustained. Instead, based on
emotion rather than reason and unrestrained by judges who should know better,
juries grant outrageous awards bearing no relation to reality."); Zuckerman, supra
note 303, at 80 ("Personal injury awards, especiallyjury awards, are out of touch with
reality.").
509 COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES, supra note 346, at 1.
510 Id. at vi.
511 The predictive strength of the awards could be improved, partly by refining the
injury categories, partly by taking into account other distinguishing facts about the
cases, and partly by including other relevant information received by the judge or
jury. For example, the flagrancy of the culpability may affect the size of verdicts. At
a meeting of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, a director of
maternal/fetal medicine at a California hospital was reported as saying: "While many
physicians are sued unfairly, ... physicians also must recognize that 'the greatest
cause of malpractice is malpractice.... You must understand that some of the
malpractice out there is so grievous, offensive, and implausible as to beggar the
imagination.'" Carol Cancila, Clean Own House to Go After Liability Woes, MDs Told,
AM. MED. NEws, June 21, 1985, at 26, 26 (quoting statement of Barry S. Schifrin,
Director of Maternal/Fetal Medicine, Huntington Memorial Hospital, Pasadena, CA).
It is possible that "grievous, offensive, and implausible" torts are the cause of large
tort verdicts.
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(for example, attributing more responsibility to corporations and
professionals than to individuals). Second, we eventually would
reach a point of diminishing returns where additional predictors
would add too little predictive power to warrant including them.
Some unexplained and random variation in jury awards would
remain.
Instead of comparing jury decisions to a standard of perfection,
suppose we were to judge them against the standard of other human
institutions. Earlier I discussed the reliability of juries compared
with judges, doctors, and scientists and found that they more than
held their own.5 12 We can now add that the proportion of varia-
tion in awards that has already been explained is impressive.
Evidence of injury severity has a greater effect on juror decisions
than several of the most acclaimed modern medical treatments have
on their objects.51 If evidence presented to juries for their
decisions may be regarded as the legal system's "treatment" for
unresolved disputes among parties and rational, predictable
responsiveness to that information is the measure of effectiveness,
then the evidence-jury "treatment" has been phenomenally more
successful than important medical breakthroughs.
5 14
512 See supra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
51' Contemporary medical discoveries provide a basis for comparison. For
example, aspirin was regarded as so successful at preventing heart attacks that
research on it was discontinued and the treatment was made available to the general
public. The comparable r-squared relating aspirin-taking to heart attacks was .0011.
See Robert Rosenthal, How Are We Doing In Soft Psychology?, 45 AM. PSYCHOL. 775,
775-76 (1990) (calculating r-squared); see also Steering Committee of the Physicians'
Health Study Research Group, Preliminary Report: Findingsfrom the Aspirin Component
of the Ongoing Physicians' Health Study, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 262, 263 (1988)
(providing raw data for r-squared calculation). Similarly, on October 2, 1981, the
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute discontinued research on propranolol
because the drug had proved to be so successful; its r-squared was .0016. See
Rosenthal, supra (calculating r-squared); see also [-Blocker Heart Attack Trial
Research Group, A Randomized Trial of Propranolol in Patients with Acute Myocardial
Infarction, 247JAMA 1707,1712 (1982) (providing raw data for r-squared calculation).
A third example is cyclosporine, regarded as a major breakthrough in organ
transplantation, with an r-squared relating use of the drug to organ rejection of .036
and to patient survival of .022. See Rosenthal, supra (calculating r-squared); see also
Canadian Multicentre Transplant Study Group, A Randomized Clinical Trial of
Cyclosporine in CadavericRenal Transplantation, 309 NEW ENG.J. MED. 809,811 (1983)
(providing raw data for r-squared calculation).
514 The jury treatment ranges from being a dozen times more potent than
cyclosporine to hundreds of times more potent than propranolol to thousands of
times more potent than aspirin's effect in preventing heart attacks. See supra note
513.
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When the statistical mirages have been dispersed and replaced
with real data, and reasonable standards are adopted for evaluating
the performance of the institutions of the civil trial and the jury,
warts will still be evident. But we will know that what is needed is
a dermatologist, not a neurosurgeon.
H. Cost
More must be said about costs-to defendants, insurers, injury
victims, and society-as they relate to the behavior of the tort
litigation system. Costs include, but go far beyond, payments
resulting from settlements and trial awards.
1. Post-Verdict Adjustments
Settlements and trial awards are not the final stage of the
litigation process. Parties unhappy with awards can request the trial
judge to undertake additur and remittitur review.515  If the
additur or remittitur process leaves either party dissatisfied, they
can appeal the trial results. Appeal, or the threat of appeal, often
leads to further negotiations before an appellate court has a chance
to uphold or modify the trial award. The outcomes of many trials
are altered through agreements between the parties, usually
resulting in reduction of the trial awards. 516  One major study
found awards were reduced in 15% of cases and increased in 2-
3%.517 Defendants paid an average of 71% of what the juries
515 The prospect of additur does not exist in the federal courts. See Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474,487-88 (1935) (holding that the Seventh Amendment prohibits
federal courts from increasingjury awards (additur) but allows the courts to decrease
them (remittitur)). To give an extreme example of remittitur, ajury's award of $125
million in punitive damages in a famous Pinto fire case was reduced by the court to
$3.5 million. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 390-91 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1981).
The asymmetry of post-trial adjustment combined with the increased variance in
awards due to jury size reduction, see supra notes 463-67, produces an ironic conse-
quence: it exaggerates still further the disproportionate effect of remittiturs. (The
additional outlier awards at the high end are reduced, but more outliers at the low
end remain erroneously low.) Thus, insurers and defendants have a net gain. Yet the
impression of unpredictability created by that increased variation probably has
frightened insurers into raising their premiums in order to reserve more and brace
themselves for an "unpredictable" future.
5 16 
See MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, PosTrRIAL ADJUSTMENTS TO
JURY AWARDS at iii (1987).
517 See id. at 27.
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awarded.5 18  The larger the awards, the sharper the reduc-
tions.
5 19
The post-trial reduction data counsel against taking trial awards
for something they are not. Although it makes sense to interpret
trial verdicts as revealing what juries or judges think a particular
case or type of case is worth,5 20 they do not reveal what defen-
dants and insurers actually are paying in damages. To understand
the behavior of the system, one needs to know what the system is
doing. Shanley and Peterson conclude: "[T]he system appears to
work already in much the same way that the current proposals for
legal change are intended to work, namely by [reducing] 'excessive'
awards."
5 21
2. The Cost of Litigation
A major expense of the litigation system is its transaction costs.
Evaluating the system requires consideration not only of the
decisions made and the dollars shifted between parties, but the costs
of carrying out those decisions and how those costs compare to
alternatives to the system-in short, a cost-benefit analysis. Although
518 See id. Recall that punitive damage awards were reduced more sharply. See
supra notes 389-434 and accompanying text.
519 See SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 516, at viii. Shanley and Peterson found
the following data:
Trial Award Amount Paid Ratio of Amount
(in $000's) (in $000's) Paid to Award
1-99 23 .93
100-999 314 .82
1000-10,000 2673 .68
over 10,000 27,220 .57
See id.
Interesting differences emerge from disaggregating the cases in other ways.
Deep pockets pay .77 while individual defendants pay .58-despite the fact thatjury
awards were six times greater when deep pockets were defendants. See id. at x. This
suggests either thatjudges agreed thatjuries were headed in the correct direction in
light of the facts (by assessing larger damages against corporate defendants) but had
not gone far enough in distinguishing the cases, or that judges give individual
defendants even steeper discounts thanjuries do. Medical malpractice awards were
reduced more sharply (to .67) than other personal injuries (.78). See id. Ultimate
payouts for product liability, however, were .91, again suggesting greater agreement
by judges with the juries' awards. See id.
520 Although, as pointed out above, most studies have measured only the naked
award and very few have made any effort to measure the cases and changes in the case
mix over time, leaving us not even knowing this much. See supra notes 334-46 and
accompanying text.
521 SHANLEY & PETERSON, supra note 516, at xii.
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a formal analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, it is relevant to
note that one is required and that the transaction costs of the tort
litigation system are by no means trivial.
In the middle of the 1980s, the typical dollar expended in auto
tort litigation was distributed this way: $.52 in net compensation to
the plaintiff, $.24 to plaintiffs legal fees and expenses, $.13 to
defense fees and expenses, and $.13 to various other costs. 522 Put
differently, it cost society $1.92 to deliver $1 of compensation to a
victim of negligent injury. The non-auto tort litigation compensa-
tion dollar provided less to injury victims: $.43 in net compensa-
tion, $.20 to plaintiff's legal fees and expenses, $.18 to defendant's
fees and expenses, and $.20 to other costs.523 That is, delivering
$1 in compensation cost $2.33.
Perhaps the grimmest cost picture comes from asbestos
litigation. The average cost to a defendant to try an asbestos case
was $125,000 (which equalled 49% of the average compensation
paid).524 The defense cost of a settled or dismissed case was
$33,000 (60% of the average settlement paid).525 Where a defen-
dant paid nothing to a plaintiff, defense expenses were $59,000 per
tried case and $10,000 per settled case.526 For every $1 of com-
pensation received by a plaintiff, the litigation expense for defen-
dants was $0.95 and for plaintiffs $0.64. Delivering $1 of compensa-
tion cost $2.59.527
One survey of insurance companies in the early 1980s found
that legal expenses, though not necessarily amounts paid to
claimants, were soaring. 528 Based on both published and unpub-
lished insurance company data, Rand researchers estimated the total
cost of tort litigation in 1985 at somewhere between $29 and $36
billion.529 Of that total, $16-19 billion, slightly more than half,
was spent on transaction costs and $14-16 billion went to compensa-
522 See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 192, at 27. The various other costs include
value of defendant's time, plaintiff's time, claims processing, and court expenditures.
523 See id.
524 See JAMES S. KAXALUK ET AL., VARIATION IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSA-
TION AND EXPENSES 74 (1984).
525 See id.
526 See id. at 88.
527 See id. at 91.
528 See PETERSON, supra note 227, at 1-2 (noting that 11 of 24 insurance companies
surveyed reported more than a doubling of legal expenses in a five-year period
ending in 1982).52 9 SeeJAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID
IN TORT LITIGATION at vi (1986).
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tion of the victims of injury.530 The cost of insuring against these
losses adds an amount about equal to the costs themselves.
53 1
When insurance costs are added in, the total rises to $68 bil-
lion.53 2 In short, the principal beneficiaries of the tort system are
insurers, followed by lawyers. The injury victims themselves take a
more modest slice.
53 3
3. The Cost of Accidents
A recent Rand study calculated the direct and work-loss costs
resulting from non-fatal accidents in the United States to be $175.9
billion annually.53 4 Of this sum, $86.4 billion is paid for medical
care, and most of the rest reflects work loss in various forms.
53 5
About 38% of these direct costs are paid out of the pockets of the
injured and their families.5 3 About two-thirds of the cost of lost
earnings are borne by the accident victims or their families.
53 7
The study found that "[w]orkers' compensation pays the hospital bill
for about 50 percent of individuals injured during work time."
53 8
530 See id. at 67-68. Eight to ten billion dollars went to legal fees and other
defense expenses. This is an average of $5400-6600 per case. See id. at 67. To
plaintiffs' fees and expenses went six to eight billion dollars, an average of $7300-
8800 per case and approximately 30-31% of total compensation paid to plaintiffs. See
id. at 68. Court costs consumed one-half billion dollars. See id. Mean compensation
paid equalled $24,000-29,000 per case, including all tried, settled, and dismissed cases
and including those in which payment was zero. See id. at 69.
531 See id. at 75.
532 See id. (citing ROBERT W. STURGIS, THE COST OF THE U.S. TORT SYSTEM: AN
ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION (1985)).
533 Defendants also enjoy great advantages under the existingregime. The regime
allows them to internalize far less than the full cost of the losses they inflict. See supra
notes 102-32 & 224-63 and accompanying text (discussing low claiming and under-
compensation, respectively).
534 See COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURiES, supra note 110, at 52. These
dollars pay for "almost one-fourth of the nation's total spending for inpatient care
each lear" and "15 percent of the nation's ambulatory care bill each year." Id.
53 See id. at 53.
5'6 See id. at 53-54.
537 See id. The study reports: "The income loss borne by individuals and families
amounts to $51 billion annually." Id. at 85. Not surprisingly, given that better paying
jobs are more likely to include disability benefits, the less a person earned, the larger
a proportion of his or her earnings went unreimbursed. See id. at 84. Those earning
$50,000 or more per year had to absorb 37% of the cost of their lost earnings; those
earning $25-50,000 lost 65% of their earnings; and those earning under $25,000 had
80% of their losses go unreimbursed. See id.5 3 8 Id. at 79.
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Most other direct costs are paid by first party insurance or by
taxpayers through various forms of social insurance.
539
The tort system plays a surprisingly small part in all of this.
Liability payments paid the hospital costs of three percent of
hospitalized patients and five percent of those receiving outpatient
care.5 40 The tort liability system compensated only $7.7 billion of
the $175.9 billion of direct personal losses due to accidental
injuries.
54 1
Clearly, the tort system is not intended to compensate the costs
of all accidental injuries. Many, perhaps most, of these injuries may
not be the result of tortious conduct by potential defendants. But
the very gap between the losses suffered and the liability system's
contribution to paying these losses is contrary to much of what is
popularly believed about that system.542 These cost findings are
consistent with evidence reviewed earlier that the tort system is used
to resolve far fewer cases than it legitimately could.5 43
4. The Cost of Accident Avoidance
One of the greatest increases in costs associated with litigation
may grow not out of lawsuits themselves, but out of irrational fears
of lawsuits-irrational in that they respond not to the actual behavior
of the tort litigation system but to inaccurate beliefs about that
behavior. 544 The economics of tort law expects people to modify
their behavior in light of the actual risks of negligently injuring
someone and the costs associated with compensating for those
injuries. 545 The costs associated with irrational fears of lawsuits
5s9 See id. at 1.
540 See id. at 80.
54' See id. at 101. Total liability payments for all non-fatal accidents equal $15.7
billion, but after subtracting the amounts paid for property damage, legal fees, and
pain and suffering awards, what remains is $7.7 billion. See id. Furthermore, of the
1.4 million people who do receive compensation from a tort liability claim each year,
only 40% use lawyers to assist in obtaining those payments. See id. at 100.
542 One commentator expressed the view of many when he said: "The litigious
nature of the American public, as much as any other factor, has created the present
dilemma. A philosophy has permeated our society that no matter what happens,
someone is responsible and someone must be made to pay." Mosberg, supra note 53,
at 860.
-"-' See supra notes 102-32 and accompanying text (discussing claiming behavior).
544 Throughout this Article are examples of the gaps that exist between what
people think the litigation system has been doing versus what the evidence indicates
it actually is doing.
545 See CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 26; POSNER, supra note 3, at 122-23.
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include: excessive reserves by insurers, 546 defensive medi-
cine,547 and products not produced.548 Can massive miscalcula-
tion be efficient?
The Minnesota Commerce Department's study of medical
malpractice insurers found that 1982 was the high water mark for
losses; in subsequent years losses declined.549 In addition, mean
payments were decreasing. Nevertheless, insurers "consistently and
significantly over-reserved. Ending reserves have been three times
higher than actual loss payments over the last five years."
550
The American Medical Association estimated that $9 billion of
health care costs were spent on defensive medicine in 1984.551
That same year, the total cost of premiums for medical malpractice
insurance coverage was $1.775 billion.552  Doctors apparently
were going to extraordinary expense to avoid lawsuits.553  They
were, if the data are to be believed, quintupling the nation's medical
malpractice insurance costs. Moreover, those ordering unnecessary
tests risked harm to patients and more lawsuits in a desperate effort
to avoid lawsuits.
A full understanding of the behavior of the tort system requires
an understanding of the responses that the system, or its apparition,
546 Throughout this Article I have endeavored to find explanations for both real
and apparent problems with the tort litigation system that involve natural, normal,
understandable, and often desirable social and technological changes-rather than
mysterious or fantastic discontinuities in the behavior of people or their institutions.
I want to continue the same supposition now by assuming that insurance
company over-reserving in the face of stable or declining losses is the result of their
own real (even if mistaken) fears of potential lawsuits. I also urge the reader at least
to suspend any suspicion that these insurers were mendaciously raising their reserves
and their premiums in order to wrest excessive profits from customers whom they
knew would be all too willing to blame the legal system rather than their insurers.
547 See INSURANCE INFO. INST., supra note 361, at 59.
548 See, e.g., Mahoney & Littlejohn, supra note 337, at 1395 (claiming that the
"slowing of innovation is directly attributable to a dramatic increase in product
liability lawsuits").
549 See MINN. CLAIM STUDY, supra note 385, at 19.
550 Id.
551 See INSURANCE INFO. INST., supra note 361, at 59. A cautionary note is in order
here: These are among the softest data mentioned in this Article. The line between
good medical practice and defensive medicine is a fuzzy one. It is doubtful that
anyone believes that if physicians were insulated from all liability tomorrow, $20
billion would be subtracted from next year's national health care bill. See DANZON,
supra note 6, at 146-49.
552 See INSURANCE INFO. INST., supra note 361, at 34.
5,5 Of course, the expense is not that of the doctors, but the patients and their
health insurers. Indeed, quite apart from "defensive medicine," more tests ordered
mean more physician profits.
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engenders in people. Among the costs of the current tort system,
and the alternatives to it, that must be taken into account are the
costs, in dollars and behavior, associated with irrational or excessive
reactions to the risk of suits, if that is what these examples are.
5. Compensation
From a compensation viewpoint, the problem with the tort
system is not that it over-compensates or wildly compensates or
imposes undue costs on liable injurers. Its principal shortcoming
seems to be that it usually provides no compensation at all or, when
it does, it under-compensates. So little compensation is achieved
through the tort system that only as an act of hyperbole can it be
said to be part of an injury compensation system. As we saw above,
of the $176 billion annual direct costs for non-fatal accidental
injuries, the tort system provides compensation for less than $8
billion (at the expense of an additional $7 billion or so in transac-
tion costs).
554
6. Deterrence
On the other hand, the tort liability system may be doing a
better job as a deterrent than it usually receives credit for. Where
a deterrence system directly touches only a fraction of the cases it
is intended to have impact upon, it needs to find a way to make up
for the reduced probability that any potential injurer will feel its
effects. One obvious solution would be to multiply penalties so that
the cost of doing harm discounted by the probability of being held
to account for that harm still amounts to a deterrent-if you are not
going to hit often, hit hard.555 But the data strongly suggest that
our tort system hits infrequently and lightly. Yet, it has nevertheless
somehow succeeded in frightening a great many potential defen-
dants, who seem to go to considerable lengths to avoid becoming
actual defendants.556 Somehow people have come to overesti-
55 See supra notes 534-41 and accompanying text.
555 See POSNER, supra note 3, at 170 (making this point more eloquently in the
context of criminal law).
556 For example, physicians on average estimate that if they were to injure a
patient negligently, the probability that they would be sued is .60; the actual
probability is .02. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 85, at 9-23.
Their estimate is 30 times the actual risk. Moreover, even their inflated risk estimate
reflects a belief that the tort system holds physicians accountable for many fewer than
the full number of negligent injuries inflicted. Yet they still seem inordinately
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mate vastly the tort system's vigilance and the magnitude of its
sanctions. Perhaps the tort system achieves what deterrence it does
by the unpleasantness of its operation-at least as that is experienced
or imagined by defendants. 557 The tort system is a mouse with an
otherworldly roar.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented an empirically informed guided tour
of the tort litigation system. A comprehensive picture, based on the
best available evidence, suggests a system that behaves quite
differently from what is widely assumed.
A tiny fraction of accidental deaths and injuries become claims
for compensation; even known actionable injuries rarely become
lawsuits. 55 8 In both federal and state courts, torts has not been
the largest or the fastest growing area of civil litigation. The great
majority of all kinds of civil suits result in negotiated settlements.
On average, these settlements undercompensate the plaintiffs
losses. Modest losses are fully or overcompensated, but the larger
the loss suffered, the more pronounced the undercompensation.
The great majority of jury verdicts reach the same result that judges
would in the same cases. The degree ofjudge-jury agreement is all
the more striking when we recognize that the clearest cases are
removed from the system before trial. In the aggregate, jury awards
are remarkably predictable. Over half the variation can be account-
ed for merely by knowing the severity of the plaintiff's injuries.
Paralleling settlements, however, jury awards overcompensate small
losses, undercompensate larger losses, and on average undercomp-
ensate plaintiffs. Judicial review at and after trial tends to reduce
rather than increase awards, most dramatically for punitive
damages.
At nearly every stage, the tort litigation system operates to
diminish the likelihood that injurers will have to compensate their
victims. Only a small fraction of the costs created by actionable
injuries will ever be paid by the injurers. Although the tort system
plays only a tiny part in the compensation of victims of accidental
injury, and does so at relatively high transaction costs, it may be
concerned with taking steps to reduce the risk of a lawsuit.
557 The source of its effectiveness as a deterrent, if indeed it has any, may be
likened to the title of a book on the criminal justice system: MALCOLM FEELEY, THE
PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979).55 8 The major exception to this is auto accident injuries.
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more efficient and effective as a deterrent. At the same time that
it provides such infrequent and partial compensation, it succeeds in
generating huge overestimates of its potency in the minds of
potential defendants.
Although the preceding sketch is faithful to the available
empirical evidence, the available evidence provides a poor basis for
resting any conclusions about the behavior of the tort litigation
system. More than an inquiry into the findings of empirical
evidence about the litigation system, this Article has been a critical
evaluation of the evidence itself. Data about the civil justice system
have failed to include variables of central interest, or have been
unable to encompass a diverse geographic and jurisdictional range,
or have been unable to cover more than a brief time period. In
short, official statistics have failed to track much of the most basic
information about the performance of the system, and they
continue to be deficient in many respects. As a result, official
judicial system data play a surprisingly small part in much of the
research and policy debate about the behavior of the system. Even
if the basic descriptive data were reasonably complete, no research
has made much, if any, attempt to control for extraneous influences
that distort the data. As we can see from existing studies, the fewer
control variables employed, the more dramatic changes over time
appear to be. The more control variables, the more muted the
changes, to the point of disappearing.
559
We cannot draw rigorous or even reasonable conclusions about
changes in the behavior of the litigation system because the
overwhelming bulk of the research lacks any but the most primitive
controls, and much of it lacks even that. In short, our society has
been unable to produce research that is even minimally adequate to
answer our most basic questions about the behavior of the civil
justice system.
The absence of empirically validated models of the behavior of
the litigation system, incorporating data about both the system and
the environment which produces its cases, leads to a panoply of
problems. Reform efforts must guess at which problems are real
and which are mythical. Being the product of guesswork, some
559 Medical research provides a direct analogy. The more poorly designed a piece
of research is, the more dramatic the changes due to treatment appear to be. The
better designed the research, the more modest, or downright disappointing, the
findings are. SeeJohn P. Gilbert et al., Statistics and Ethics in Surgeiy and Anesthesia,
198 SCIENCE 684, 686-87 (1977).
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reforms will produce effects contrary to the intentions of their
makers; indeed, some already have. We will fail to anticipate future
changes in litigation activity caused by changes in the law or the
legal system or the social, economic, or technological environment
of the litigation system. Because they will arrive unexpectedly and
their causes will be poorly understood, the effects of those changes
will repeatedly arrive as new "crises."
Finally, the absence of a reliable model of the behavior of the
tort system leaves us in a poor position to evaluate radical recon-
siderations of our system of accident compensation and deterrence.
Even if we agreed on the values and goals of such a system, we have
no sound basis for concluding that those goals would be more likely
to be reached by abandoning the tort system in favor of a no-fault
system, by finding ways to make a tort system that is more active
and efficient, or by retaining the current system.
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APPENDIX A:56 ° ACCIDENTAL DEATH
Motor Vehicles Workplace
Number Rate Number
in 000's per 100,000 Pop in 000's
Perm Temp Penn Temp Perm Temp
Year Deaths Injury Injury Deaths Injury Injury Deaths Injury Injury
1955 38 110 1250 23 66 753 14 75 1800
1960 38 120 1280 21 66 708 14 85 1850
1965 49 150 1700 25 77 875 14 90 2000
1970 55 170 1850 27 83 902 14 90 2100
1975 46 150 1650 21 69 764 13 80 2100
1980 53 150 1850 23 66 812 13 80 2100
1981 51 150 1750 22 65 760 12 70 2000
1982 46 150 1550 20 65 667 11 70 1800
1983 45 150 1450 19 64 618 11 70 1800
1984 46 140 1600 19 59 675 12 70 1800
1985 46 140 1600 19 59 669 12 70 1900
1986 48 140 1700 20 58 704 11 60 1700
1987 49 150 1700 20 61 697 11 70 1700
1988 49 150 1700 20 61 691 11 60 1700
1989 47 140 1600 19 56 643 10 60 1600
560 The data for Appendix A are compiled from the National Safety Council's
annual publication ACCIDENT FACTS, supra note 77. Raw frequencies for the several
categories were combined with U.S. population data to arrive at the rates per 100,000.
See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 94, at 7 tbl. 2.
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AND INJURY IN THE U.S. SINCE 1955
Workplace Total
Rate Number Rate
per 100,000 Pop in 000's per 100,000 Pop
Perm Temp Perm Temp Perm Temp
Deaths Injury Injury Deaths Injury Injury Deaths Injury Injury Year
8 45 1085 93 340 9000 56 205 5424 1955
8 47 1024 93 360 9050 51 199 5009 1960
7 46 1029 107 400 10000 55 206 5147 1965
7 44 1024 114 400 10400 56 195 5072 1970
6 37 972 102 380 10300 47 176 4769 1975
6 35 922 105 360 9600 46 158 4215 1980
5 30 869 99 350 9000 43 152 3911 1981
5 30 774 93 350 8600 40 151 3699 1982
5 30 767 91 350 8400 39 149 3578 1983
5 30 759 92 330 8400 39 139 3544 1984
5 29 794 92 340 8700 38 142 3636 1985
5 25 704 94 330 8600 39 137 3559 1986
5 29 697 94 350 8400 39 143 3444 1987
4 24 691 96 340 8700 39 138 3535 1988
4 24 643 94 340 8600 38 137 3457 1989
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APPENDIX B
5 6 1
FEDERAL CIVL DATA, 1974 TO PRESENT
Over-
Filings Total payment
Year Total Torts Recovery
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
103530
117320
130597
130567
138770
154666
168789
180576
206193
241842
261485
273670
254828
239185
239634
233529
217879
24231
25691
25736
26029
26375
28901
32539
33767
34218
36484
37522
41593
42326
42977
44961
42090
43759
294
681
1087
865
1856
9254
15588
18161
30048
41213
46190
58160
40824
24233
18676
16467
10878
Total
Social Product
Security Liability
3585
5846
10355
10095
9950
9942
9043
9780
12812
20315
29985
19771
14407
13338
15152
10206
7439
1579
2886
3696
4077
4372
6132
7755
9071
8944
9221
10745
13554
13595
15143
17140
14348
19428
Total
Other Total
Contracts Nontort
10595
12391
12473
12628
13484
16468
20098
19535
21499
24439
24756
26849
28840
28273
27725
28415
20398
79299
91629
104861
104538
112395
125765
136250
146809
171975
205358
223963
232077
212502
196208
194673
191439
174120
561 The data in this table, except data for product liability, are based upon
information contained in Table C-2 (in later versions accompanied by Table C-2A) of
the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts. Product Liability data are compiled in a separate section of the Annual
Report. See 1990 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 84, 139-40; 1989
ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. Crs. ANN. REP. 116, 176-79; 1988 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF.
U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 180-83; 1987 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 114;
1986 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 175-77; 1985 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF.
U.S. Crs. ANN. REP. 154,280-81; 1984 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 148,
253-55; 1983 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 130, 245-47; 1982 ADMINIS-
TRATivE OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 106, 215-17; 1981 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS.
ANN. REP. 219, 366-68; 1980 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTs. ANN. REP. 236, 373-75;
1979 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 230, 361-63; 1977 ADMINISTRATIVE
OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 212,317-19; 1976 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP.
194-95, 293-95; 1975 ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 346-48; 1974
ADMINISTRATIVE OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. 389-90.
